21809

National Library of Canada | Bibliothèque nationale du Canada

CANADIAN THESES ON MICROFICHE | THÈSES CANADIENNES SUR MICROFICHE

NAME OF AUTHOR/*NOM DE L'AUTEUR* LYNDA ERICKSON

TITLE OF THESIS/*TITRE DE LA THÈSE* CITIZEN ORIENTATIONS OF ENGLISH ADOLESCENTS: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE

UNIVERSITY/*UNIVERSITÉ* UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED/ *GRADE POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE FUT PRÉSENTÉE* DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

YEAR THIS DEGREE CONFERRED/*ANNÉE D'OBTENTION DE CE DEGRÉ* 1974

NAME OF SUPERVISOR/*NOM DU DIRECTEUR DE THÈSE* R.R. GILSDORF

Permission is hereby granted to the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

L'autorisation est, par la présente, accordée à la BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE DU CANADA de microfilmer cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.

L'auteur se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans l'autorisation écrite de l'auteur.

DATED/*DATÉ* Sept. 25, 1974 SIGNED/*SIGNÉ* Lynda Erickson

PERMANENT ADDRESS/*RÉSIDENCE FIXE* 5445 TRAFALGAR STREET
VANCOUVER, B.C.

NL-91 (11-73)

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

CITIZEN ORIENTATIONS OF ENGLISH ADOLESCENTS: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE

by

LYNDA ERICKSON

A THESIS.

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, 1974

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled

Citizen Orientations of English Adolescents:

A Developmental Perspective

submitted by Lynda Erickson in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Robert J.C. Hobdell
Supervisor

J. Paul Johnston

Rodney A. Schmeck

C.J.K. Mann

External Examiner

Date AUGUST 12, 1974

ABSTRACT

Following the recent resurgence of interest in political participation at the individual level, this study explores adolescent participatory dispositions in a sample of over 500 14 and 15 year-olds from a culture with a comparatively long history of democratic government. Assuming adolescent orientations are to some extent the antecedents of adult orientations, the study examines some of the background characteristics and experiences which seem to encourage the development of participation and involvement in the political process as measures by a political involvement scale. Given the tendency to attribute deferential attitudes to the English, a subquestion relevant to political participation was concerned with the prevalence and sources of political deference among these English adolescents.

Insofar as the measure of political involvement was concerned, family variables such as the political interest and activity the adolescents attributed to their parents and degree of child participation in family decision-making were correlated with this variable. An effect from social class background was also evident even when class was considered independent of family and, later, school variables. Under the school variables, the level of classroom political discussion reported by the adolescent and the type of school attended were correlated with political involvement, but the correlation with type of school attended was difficult to interpret since the effect of such characteristics as IQ could not be determined. Finally, social participation in the form of club memberships was correlated with political involvement, but only

for the middle-class pupils.

On the deference question, the results did not support the notion that these adolescents were absorbing deferential attitudes to their political elites. While not indicating a high level of political involvement, still the adolescents were not particularly inclined to be deferential. Nor were any important social bases for political deference discovered.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to thank her advisor, Robert R. Gilsdorf, for his advice, encouragement and assistance at all stages of this project. He did all the things a good advisor should do. J. Paul Johnston also added some ideas and critical comments in the developing stages. In England, during the data collection stage I received assistance from Fred Greenstein and Diddy Seyd, both of whom helped in the task of contacting schools, and in the latter case, administering questionnaires. For financial assistance, both the Canada Council and the University of Alberta Dissertation Fellowship were invaluable. Finally, thanks to Gaalen for his help and enthusiasm.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter		Page
I	Introduction	1
II	Adolescence and Participation Orientations	12
	Political Socialization	16
	The Adolescent and the Development of Political Orientation	16
III	The English Political Culture	33
	The Political Environment	34
	England -- A Deferential Political Culture	42
	Youth and Politics in England	52
IV	The Sample	61
	Secondary Education in England	61
	Selecting the Sample	67
V	Creating the Measure: Political Involvement	82
VI	The Family	90
	Parental Political Role-Modelling	91
	Family Democracy	97
VII	Social Class	112
VIII	The School	127
	Selective Education	128
	Classroom Political Education	139
	School Authority Structure	149
XI	Social Factors	159
	Sex Role Differences	168

Chapter	Description	Page
X	Political Deference	180
	Constructing the Measure	180
	Prevalence of Deference	185
	Deference and Party Affiliation	189
	Sources of Political Deference	192
	The Family	192
	Social Class	196
	Schools	201
	Sex	205
	Political Deference and Political Involvement	206
XI	Summary and Conclusions	214
Bibliography		226
Appendix A		245
Appendix B		251
Appendix C		269

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Description	Page
2.1	Consistency of Vote Turnout: 1964, 1966, 1970	14
2.2	Consistency of Political Communication Channels: 1964, 1966, 1970	15
4.1	Comparison of Sample and Population Distribution of Pupils Among School Types in the State Sector	70
4.2	Comparison of the Proportion of Secondary Pupils Attending Independent Schools in the Sample and in the Secondary School Population	70
4.3	Social Class Composition of Different School Types in the Sample	74
5.1	Sample Distribution on Spectator Indices	87
6.1	Political Involvement by Parental Political Model	96
6.2	Political Involvement by Perceived Family Authority Structure	102
6.3	Perceived Family Authority Structure by Social Class	104
6.4	Political Involvement by Perceived Family Authority and Social Class	105
6.5	Political Involvement by Parental Political Model and Perceived Family Authority Structure	107
7.1	Political Involvement by Occupational Category	117
7.2	Political Involvement by Social Class and Parental Political Model	119
7.3	Political Involvement by Social Class and Perceived Family Authority Structure	120
8.1	Political Involvement by Type of School Attended	133
8.2	Political Involvement by Type of School Attended by Social Class	134

Table	Description	Page
8.3	Political Involvement by Type of School Attended by Parental Political Model	136
8.4	Weighted Distribution of Political Involvement Among Types of Schools: Selective-Non-Selective versus Comprehensive	138
8.5	Political Involvement by Classroom Political Discussion	143
8.6	Political Involvement by Classroom Political Discussion by Type of School Attended	144
8.7	Percentage of High Involvement Scores by Classroom Discussion by Type of School Attended	145
8.8	Political Involvement by Classroom Political Discussion by Parental Political Model	147
8.9	Political Involvement by Classroom Political Discussion by Social Class	148
8.10	Political Involvement by (Perceived) Authority Pattern	150
8.11	Political Involvement by (Perceived) Authority Patterns by Type of School Attended	152
9.1	Political Involvement by Club Memberships	161
9.2	Political Involvement by Club Memberships by Social Class	161
9.3	Political Involvement of Working Class Sample by Club Memberships by Sex	164
9.4	Political Involvement Among Working-Class Adolescents by Club Memberships by Type of School Attended	165
9.5	Political Involvement Among Middle-Class Adolescents by Club Memberships by Type of School Attended	166
9.6	Political Involvement by S x	171
9.7	Political Involvement by Sex by Type of School Attended	173
9.8	Political Involvement by Sex by Social Class	174

Page	Description	Page
10.1	Deference Questions	182
10.2	Individual Deference Item Responses	186
10.3	Deference Scores: English and American	188
10.4	Political Deference by Labour Party Affiliation	190
10.5	Political Deference by Party Affiliation	191
10.6	Political Deference by Parental Political Model by Labour Party Affiliation	194
10.7	Political Deference by (Perceived) Family Authority . . .	195
10.8	Political Deference by (Perceived) Family Authority by Labour Party Affiliation	197
10.9	Political Deference by Social Class	199
10.10	Political Deference by Social Class by Labour Party Affiliation	200
10.11	Political Deference by Type of School Attended	202
10.12	Political Deference by School by Labour Party Affiliation	203
10.13	Political Deference by Concern with Authority	206
10.14	Political Involvement by Political Deference	208

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Although a study of political participation seems an unremarkable undertaking in the context of Western political science, it should be mentioned that the concept of public participation in the political realm has a checkered history in Western political theory.[1] Moreover, popular notions to the contrary, the question of the appropriate role for the ordinary citizenry still arouses controversy among political scientists. Since this study is premised upon certain arguments which are part of the most recent controversy in this area, an introduction to this controversy will serve as an introduction to the study.[2]

In "traditional" democratic theory there is no quarrel with the general dictum prescribing the desirability of some form of popular participation.[3] However, the arguments for participation 'by the many' differed in a basic way. On one hand, one group of theorists argued for some form of participation on what are best described as "instrumental" grounds.[4] That is, on grounds of superior governmental performance or output. These theorists were generally concerned that popular interests would not be met except under a democratic form of government. They thought popular governments would be more likely to reflect the community interest as opposed to the narrow interests of a few; consequently, a popular form of government was deemed necessary to safeguard the interests of the majority from exclusion by those who hold power.[5]

But another group of theorists, while not denying the relevance

of instrumental arguments were also concerned with the developmental potential of democracy. This, the more "radical" tradition in democratic theory, justified citizen participation not only on the basis of policy outputs and other such performance criteria, but also because participation itself is viewed as a means to individual human development.[6] Thus, for example, John Stuart Mill, a representative of this tradition, has argued,

> it is not sufficiently considered how little there is in most men's ordinary life to give any largeness either to their conceptions or to their sentiments ....Giving [the individual] something to do for the public, supplies, in a measure, all these deficiencies. If circumstances allow the amount of public duty assigned him to be considerable, it makes him an educated man.[7]

And further,

> still more salutary is the moral part of the instruction afforded by the participation of the private citizen, if rarely, in public functions. He is called upon, while so engaged, to weigh interests not his own; to be guided, in case of conflicting claims, by another rule than his private partialities...he is made to feel himself one of the public, and whatever is for their benefit to be for his benefit.[8]

Consequently,

> it is evident that the only government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of the social state is one in which the whole people participate; that any participation, even in the smallest public function, is useful; that the participation should everywhere be as great as the general degree of improvement of the community will allow; and that nothing less can be ultimately desirable than the admission of all to a share in the sovereign power of the state.[9]

Claims to promote a "better and higher form of national character,"[10] as argued by these theorists, certainly enhance more narrow considerations based on self-protection motivations and do provide a compelling argument with which to counter attacks on democracy in the name of efficiency. By appealing to the intellectual, social and moral development which could accrue from meaningful participation in social decision-making, this kind of justification for democracy is still a morally persuasive argument for contemporary social theorists.[11]

However, starting in the early 1950s, this more radical tradition in democratic theory has received some severe buffeting within the discipline of political science as a result of empirical studies into popular political attitudes and behavior.[12] These studies indicated that the citizens of contemporary Western systems, even those which have had the longest histories of a democratic franchise, were far removed in their basic political orientations from those of an "ideal" democratic citizen. It seems that the general electorate lacked interest, motivation and knowledge. Apparently the average citizen was not very involved in political issues and controversies, but in fact was often apathetic, frequently uninterested, and quite ignorant of government and politics. Far from being a vigorous participant in public decision-making, he was more accurately described as a "passive inert follower."[13]

This led some investigators to speculate on what they considered to be a more "realistic" approach to the concept of a democratic political system, one which takes into account the fact that the mass electorates of even the most "advanced" democratic countries are not

participants in any but a narrow sense.[14] The subsequent revisions of democratic theory which emerged thus de-emphasized the importance of active, interested participation on the part of the general citizenry. Accordingly, democracy was defined in terms of "institutional arrangements" according to which the mass public, through means of periodic elections, provoke some degree of responsiveness to public demands on the part of the elite but otherwise provide little input.

Although not requiring a very participant public, these institutional arrangements may, in many ways, satisfy performance criteria as well as would a democracy with an informed, active citizenry.[15] In fact, some contemporary commentators have suggested that widespread public involvement may be undesirable.

For example, in their pioneering work on the American voting public, Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee found what they considered were low levels of political interest and involvement among the public.[16] Instead of lamenting the extent of public apathy in the political sphere, they pointed out how mere quasi-participation on the part of the electorate contributes to the stable functioning of the political system. They contended that:

> low affect toward the election -- not caring much -- underlies the resolution of many political problems; votes can be resolved into a two party split instead of fragmented into many parties....Low interest provides maneuvering room for political shifts necessary for a complex society in a period of rapid change. Compromise might be based upon sophisticated awareness of costs and return -- perhaps impossible to demand of a mass society -- but it is more often induced by indifference.[17]

Thus apathy and disinterest among the mass electorate were considered functional for the system because they contribute to political stability.

However, although such reassessments of democratic theory have been quite prevalent, they have not remained unchallenged, as evidenced by a recent flurry of critiques challenging the conservative direction of contemporary democratic inquiry.[18] These critiques have not been issued to refute the empirical data which have described a lack of participative orientations among democratic electorates. Rather, their objective has been to deplore the normative implications of contemporary "realistic" redefinitions which ignore the issue of individual social development. In discounting the failure of democracy in individual terms, often the result of being preoccupied with stability and efficiency, contemporary theory has, in the view of these critics, the very real and undesirable effect of refocusing values and expectations.[19] They suggest that we again direct our attention to the participative aspect of democracy before we lose sight of the ideal of widespread individual participation in the governmental process. Here the impetus for empirical political science is toward renewed inquiry into the nature, development and implications of participation and involvement at the mass level. As Lane Davis suggests, "empirical research...is necessary to provide more satisfactory explanations of the gaps which exist between political reality and the polity to which the classical democrats aspire."[20] This study of English adolescents was stimulated by this kind of concern for the citizen role at the individual level, by the renewed enthusiasm for the <u>ideal</u> of widespread, meaningful

political participation.

The object of the study is to add to explanations of how people come to be interested and involved in the political sphere by looking at factors which are related to political interest and involvement among adolescents. The study is based on the assumption that explorations into the antecedents of adult behavior may help us to understand some of the early personal experiential supports for political involvement. In other words, it may help us to trace the development of democratic predispositions.

Ideally, of course, tracing the development of such predispositions should be done by a longitudinal study. Such a study could explore the pre-adult orientations and experiences of individuals during their youth, and then in a subsequent survey of the adult dispositions of these same individuals later results could be cross-tabulated with earlier orientations and experiences. However, the cost, time and technical difficulties of longitudinal studies are enormous and force most people (including this author) to use alternative methods.

One alternative is to elicit recall data from adult respondents, asking them to describe some kinds of pre-adult experiences thought relevant for participative orientations and behaviors. Another alternative, used here, is to study young people directly; that is, to explore the degree to which they seem predisposed toward political involvement and then to relate variations in involvement to personal and experiential variables. While this alternative has its shortcomings in assuming continuity between pre-adult and adult dispositions, it

was chosen by this author for two reasons.[21] First of all, recall data from adults is subject to distortions of time and memory and therefore is not wholly reliable as a source of information about childhood experiences. Secondly, a number of adult studies of political participation which are available have raised some questions for exploration among pre-adults as to the developmental impact of early experience.[22]

In studying a pre-adult sample, the author has chosen to concentrate upon adolescents of ages 14 to 15. Since the relevance of adolescence for participation dispositions will be discussed in Chapter 2, suffice it to say here that individuals in that age group were chosen because they are thought to be at an important stage of development in their personalities and social attitudes. Further, since 15 was the legal school-leaving age in England at the time of the study, many of these adolescents would soon be entering the adult work world, and their pre-adult life would, in many respects, be over.[23]

At this point we should note other limitations of the study, in addition to the obvious shortcomings of a one-point-in-time exploration of attitude development. Micro-analysis, that is, use of data limited to individual characteristics, is never wholly adequate to explain political participation. Systemic characteristics such as historical development and the contemporary organizational and institutional arrangements available for political participation are also important explanatory variables for describing the development of participative orientations. However, since we are using survey research data on adolescent individuals <u>from one country</u>, we are not only

limiting our inquiry to one stage in the socialization process, we are also limited to looking at the effect of only individual level characteristics and experiences at that stage and in that society.[24]

The focus of this inquiry is on adolescent attitudes related to self-participation and involvement in the political process. As such it is not concerned with the direction of attitudes motivating political activity, as for example left-right, liberal-conservative dimensions, but is rather concerned with the prevalence of attitudes directed toward an active role of the self in the political sphere, and some of the correlates of these attitudes at this pre-adult stage in social development. Orientations descriptive of apolitical individuals, and passive or unquestioning followers of government and political leaders, are considered to be the converse of this participation dimension.

The data which have provided the basis for analysis consist of 547 questionnaires self-administered in fourth form classes in schools in London and the Southeast of England during the spring and early summer of 1969. This sample is described more fully in Chapter IV. In order to give some background to the study, Chapter II will consider the relevance of adolescence for the development of participation orientations and Chapter III will describe the cultural context of English politics. The remaining chapters will deal with the results of the survey.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Although the idea of widespread popular participation has been around from the time of the Greeks, among Western thinkers, "democracy used to be a bad word. Everybody who was anybody knew that democracy, in its original sense of rule by the people or government in accordance with the will of the bulk of the people, would be a bad thing -- fatal to individual freedom and to all the graces of civilized living. That was the position taken by pretty nearly all men of intelligence from the earliest historical times down to about a hundred years ago." C.B. MacPherson, The Real World of Democracy (Toronto: CBC Learning Systems, 1965), p. 1.

[2]For a good review ofthis controversy and the positions taken by the protagonists, see Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1970), Chapter I.

[3]I use the word "traditional" with reservation, as it may be interpreted to imply there is a single "school" of democratic theory. On the contrary, the word is used only to refer to the accumulated ideas, largely originating in the 18th and 19th Centuries, which have been passed down to contemporary students.

[4]Geraint Parry, "The Idea of Political Participation" in G. Parry (Ed.), Participation in Politics, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1972), pp. 18-31.

[5]Jeremy Bentham and James Mill were two 19th Century proponents of this position. However, although both these theorists considered popular participation the best way to protect the general interest of the citizenry (and thereby attain their larger utilitarian goals), they did consider this aim could be achieved only with a literate and educated population.

[6]Historically speaking, J.S. Mill and Rousseau are probably the most prominent theorists in this tradition. See Carole Pateman, op. cit., Chaps. 1 and 2 for a discussion of this tradition of "participatory theory."

[7]J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism; Liberty; Representative Government (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1910), p. 216. While Mill is important for his contribution to this tradition of democratic theory, his overall view of the "ideal" polity is less than compelling for contemporary "radical" democrats. An ideal polity is, according to Mill, based upon recognition, and in fact entrenchment, of an inequality of persons in politics. Thus, although he seems convinced of the educative values of participation for the average person, he still holds to the notion that, even with the educative effect of widespread discussion

and concern about politics, only the educated elite should have important political power. For a discussion of this see Pateman, op. cit., pp. 31-33. In this sense Rousseau is more the father of contemporary "radical" democrats.

[8]Ibid., p. 217.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid., p. 211.

[11]See, for example, Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967); Lane Davis, "The Cost of Realism: Contemporary Restatements of Democracy," Western Political Quarterly, VXII (March, 1964), pp. 37-44; Jack L. Walker, "A Critique on the Elitist Theory of Democracy," American Political Science Review, LX (June, 1966), pp. 285-296; and Carole Pateman, op. cit.

[12]While the empirical studies were accumulated to a great extent in the 1950s, Joseph Schumpeter began the conservative assault on democratic theory as early as 1943. See his Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1943).

[13]Jack L. Walker, op. cit., p. 256.

[14]See Ibid. for a discussion of these kinds of theories which he calls "elitist theories of democracy". As proponents of this approach, see Schumpeter, op. cit., Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld and William McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954). Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960); and Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956) for just a few. For a reply to Walker by Robert Dahl, see "Further Reflections on 'the Elitist Theory of Democracy'" American Political Science Review, LX (June, 1966) pp. 285-305.

[15]In fact, as Pateman argues, with reference to Bentham's and James Mill's concern to protect popular interests "there is nothing specifically democratic about this view of the function of participation." Op. cit., p. 20.

[16]Op. cit., Chap. 14.

[17]Ibid., p. 314.

[18]See the references in footnote 11. To these may be added: Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudo Politics," American Political Science Review, LIX (March, 1965) pp. 39-52; Lewis Lipsitz, "If As Verba Says, the State Functions as a Religion, What Are we To Do Then to Save Our Souls?"

American Political Science Review, LXII (June, 1968) pp. 527-535; and Dennis F. Thompson, The Democratic Citizen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

[19]See Walker, op. cit., pp. 288-289.

[20]Op. cit., p. 41.

[21]For a critique of this assumption concerning continuity, see David Marsh "Political Socialization, the Implicit Assumptions Questioned," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. I (Oct., 1971), pp. 456-460. Chapter 2 will consider some of the issues raised by Marsh and attempt to give reasons for considering continuity does exist in the orientations of concern in this study.

[22]For example, some claims have been made concerning the effects of school experiences on young people, or the role of family background (as opposed to adult social status).

[23]In January, 1969, only 56.2% of the adolescents aged 15 who were eligible to leave school were still in school, and in January 1970 only 35.5% of these were left. This indicates the extremely high attrition rate that occurs when pupils reach the legal school-leaving age and shortly thereafter. See Department of Education and Science, Statistics of Education, 1969: Schools Vol. I (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1971) p. 24.

[24]The effects of some systemic characteristics can be investigated through survey data on individuals, however it is of course necessary to have a cross-cultural study in order to do this. For a study of this sort, see Guiseppi DiPalma, Apathy and Participation (London: Collier Macmillan Ltd., 1970).

CHAPTER II

ADOLESCENCE AND PARTICIPATION ORIENTATIONS

In looking for antecedents of political involvement among adolescents, we are assuming that adult involvement is based upon relatively persistent dispositions. A developmental approach would hardly be appropriate if adults showed little continuity of interest in the world of politics "apart from the transient stimulation in the individual's environment."[1]

But it is one of the criticisms of studies on children's political views that they assume continuity in adult orientations without examining the question.[2] And indeed, research on public opinion suggests that at least some kinds of attitudes should not be treated this way. On the contrary, a large portion of people among the general electorate do not appear to have stable views on many political issues considered by politicians and public commentators to be of public importance.[3] Their opinions on specific issues frequently fluctuate, seemingly in a random manner, without relationship to other issues. That is, these fluctuations do not appear to be related to shifts in ideology on the part of individuals but are apparently due to the remoteness and lack of saliency of many prominent political issues.[4]

Casual observation, on the other hand, suggests that political participation is quite different from specific issue opinions and that we should expect more consistency on this variable. Lester Milbrath, in his analysis of political participation in America,[5] presents this position quite clearly. He describes what he sees as the basic types of active

versus passive political roles into which the American citizenry falls, and then notes, that "one of the striking things about these roles is their stability."[6] But, notwithstanding such observations, more systematic data on the stability of participative orientations (especially in England) are still desirable, if merely to provide *prima facie* evidence for the relevance of a developmental approach.

In this respect we find some evidence pertaining to political participation is available on the British electorate in the responses to a panel survey originally conducted for a study of political change in Britain.[7] This survey, with initial interviews in 1963 and re-interviews in 1964, 1966 and 1970, contained a number of items concerned with political activity and interest, including questions on voting, party and campaign activities, and media attention.

The general pattern in these data is one of consistency from interview to interview in the respondents' descriptions of their political activity. Thus, the respondents who voted in 1964 were much more likely to vote in the two subsequent elections (of 1966 and 1970) than were non-voters in the 1964 election. (See Table 2.1.) The number of communication channels used by an individual during an election campaign was generally consistent from election to election[8] (see Table 2.2), and even attendance at political meetings was reasonably consistent.[9] Further, an even greater degree of continuity is evident amongst the "gladiators" of the 1963 sample.[10] Seventy-two percent of the 1963 party campaigners worked in the 1964 campaign while only 2% of those who did not campaign in 1963 did so in 1964.[11]

TABLE 2.1

Consistency of Vote Turnout: 1964, 1966, 1970

(a) 1964 - 1966

Voted in 1966:	Voted in 1964: Yes	No
Yes	92%	43%
No	8%	57%
	100%	100%
	(859)	(76)

(b) 1964 - 1970

Voted in 1970:	Voted in 1964: Yes	No
Yes	88%	60%
No	12%	40%
	100%	100%
	(859)	(76)

(c) 1966 - 1970

Voted in 1970:	Voted in 1966: Yes	No
	90%	59%
	10%	41%
	100%	100%
	(817)	(112)

While this evidence is by no means conclusive, it does suggest an important element of continuity in levels of participation and involvement, particularly when one looks at the limited extent to which people seem to move from largely a spectator role to a gladiator role (i.e., engaging in party activity) and vice versa. Thus, somewhat satisfied that we are dealing with a relatively stable phenomenon when we are looking at the participative dimension, we can seek to account in part for regularity in adult responses by focusing on the learning and internalization of these particular orientations. This learning process is part of what we now call political socialization.

TABLE 2.2

Consistency in Use of Political Communication Channels: 1964, 1966, 1970

(a) 1964 - 1966

Number of Channels Used in 1966:	Number of Channels Used in 1964: None or One	Two	Three or Four
None or One	65%	29%	11%
Two	25%	38%	26%
Three or Four	10%	32%	63%
	100%	99%	100%
	(275)	(313)	(374)

(b) 1964 - 1970

Number of Channels Used in 1970:	Number of Channels Used in 1964: None or One	Two	Three or Four
None or One	53%	25%	11%
Two	25%	32%	27%
Three or Four	22%	43%	62%
	100%	100%	100%
	(203)	(313)	(410)

(c)1966 - 1970

Number of Channels Used in 1970:	Number of Channels Used in 1966: None or One	Two	Three or Four
None or One	51%	26%	9%
Two	24%	34%	26%
Three or Four	25%	40%	65%
	100%	100%	100%
	(240)	(287)	(399)

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

The concept of socialization, first extensively developed as a category of analysis by cultural anthropologists, has been adopted by sociology, social psychology and psychology to describe the process by which individuals acquire patterns of behavioral response, attitudes and values relevant to their social milieu. Following the lead of these other social sciences, political scientists concerned with the acquisition of politically relevant values, beliefs and feelings, have coined the term political socialization under which to subsume the processes of genesis and development of political orientations. Although there are numerous variations in the scope and meaning now accorded to the term, broadly conceived it encompasses "all political learning, formal and informal, deliberate and unplanned, at every stage of the life cycle, including not only explicitly political learning, but also nominally non-political learning that affects political behavior such as the learning of politically relevant personality characteristics."[12]

Yet,while the term may encompass learning "at every stage in the life cycle," the unique contribution of political socialization research has been to examine the pre-adult stages of political learning, sensitizing us to the possibility that the child is also the father of political man. However, for specific research concerns this is not enough. The question remains as to what period of the pre-adult experience we should concentrate our research.

THE ADOLESCENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS

Although the earliest research on political socialization emphasized

the changes in and development of individual political attitudes during the adolescent years, research soon began to suggest that, at least in Western societies, the genesis of many political attitudes and values begins well before adolescence.[13] In fact, according to one study of young American school children: "every piece of evidence indicates that the child's political world begins to take shape well before he even enters elementary school and it undergoes the most rapid changes during these years."[14] Consequently, emphasis in research soon shifted from adolescence to childhood (the pre-teen years) as the period for acquisition of many attitudes and attachments crucial to the nature of an individual's subsequent adult political personality.[15]

The importance of this early learning was thought to be twofold. Firstly, there are certain orientations which may well begin to form at an early age, then develop fairly rapidly in childhood, and reach relative stability by the onset of adolescence. For example, Greenstein, working in the United States, reports that by the fourth grade (approximately ages 9 to 10) more than 6 out of 10 of the children in his New Haven, Connecticut, sample expressed a preference for one of the two major American parties.[16] The proportion of "party identifiers" changed little from Grade Four to Grade Eight (from age 9 to ages 13 or 14), and as Greenstein remarks, this proportion is identical to the frequency with which 21 to 24 year-olds in the adult population have been found to exhibit such party preference.[17] Although a more recent research project conducted among elementary school children in America does not show this high a figure for early establishment of party identification, it does

indicate that, even in a larger and more diversified sample, almost half (49%) of the age group 9 to 10 clearly opts for one or the other major parties and that by the onset of adolescence (ages 12 to 13), 56% of the children are so inclined.[18]

In Great Britain, the importance of the early years for the formation of party attachment may be even greater than in the United States. One pilot study of a cross-national socialization project found that in a sample of English school children, ages 8 to 10, four-fifths of the children already considered themselves Liberals, Conservatives or Labourites.[19] While it is still necessary to provide evidence that there is some continuity between these early attitudes and later adult orientations, these studies do provide a prima facie case for supposing such childhood learning is of significance.

The second reason for supposing the relevance of pre-adolescent learning is that certain early ideas and emotions may influence the development of later attitudes and behaviors.[20] One set of early orientations which has been suggested as important in this way concerns children's attitudes toward political authority figures. In some political systems, young children attribute benevolent characteristics to the most prominent national political figures, such as a President or a Prime Minister.[21] Since the child's first images of government and political authority in complex nation states are very personalized and appear to be largely dominated by these prominent national figures, the favorable views they have of these figures seem to provide some basis for attachment to, and support of, the political system.[22] Although in later life many of these

children will probably develop more critical attitudes towards the government, political leaders and various other political objects, it has been suggested that positive personal attachment does leave a residual element of supportive sentiment for the political system and regime.[23]

In substantive terms, pre-adolescent political socialization seems to follow the general pattern of childhood learning described by Brim in his general theory of socialization.[24] As Brim suggests, childhood learning results primarily in the establishment of basic commitments, motivations and values. In politics, we find that attachments to the most prominent political objects such as the nation state,[25] the government,[26] and political parties or other vital political groupings[27] are evident early and seem largely to comprise the basic political loyalties of later adulthood.[28] In addition, motivation to obey the law and to adhere to elementary democratic canons stressing the importance of citizen interest and participation is instilled early during socialization in stable democracies.[29]

However, on the whole, the young child lacks any, except minimal, knowledge regarding political objects and roles in the world immediately about him, and, in some areas, very early socialization tends to be idealistic.[30] In other words, although primary commitments and attachments may have been initiated and the basic values (or perhaps, more accurately, clichés) of the political system imparted, it is later in the process of political maturation that the child acquires much political information and becomes aware of the informal and realistic conduct in the game of politics and governing.[31] Even by the age of 11 years, when the child

is rapidly gaining in political knowledge, his conceptions of the political world are, according to Adelson and O'Neill:

> erratic and incomplete -- a curious array of sentiments and dogmas, personalized ideas, randomly remembered names and party labels, half-understood platitudes.[32]

But between the ages of 11 and 13, two kinds of changes take place. Firstly, the child greatly increases his or her store of both discrete political information and political opinions. Secondly, the mode of conceptualizing the political world is changing. In these terms, "the most extensive increase in political learning and the ability to think and grasp abstractions takes place between the ages of 11 and 13."[33] Further changes to age 15 -- the modal age of my fourth formers -- are in the same direction, toward an increasing understanding and sophistication in political thinking.

These changes of adolescence reflect both the development of cognitive capacities and the expansion of the adolescent's conceptions of himself and his relevant world or life space. In his self-conception, the adolescent is no longer as tied to the home and the moral authority of his immediate significant adults as he was in childhood. In other words, a sense of independence is more available to him at the same time as he is becoming increasingly aware of the political world.[34]

But while this independence or growing autonomy does begin to distinguish the young personality as he or she emerges from the constricted world of childhood, some words of caution must be voiced about this image of adolescence and its relevance in shaping the individual's values and ideology. First of all, the degree of independence from

parental authority in the realm of values is a variable thing, influenced by cultural factors and by changes in life patterns within a society. At this point, it is not altogether clear just how much autonomy contemporary Anglo-American adolescents are able to attain, or for that matter how much they strive for it. Analyzing interviews from a survey of 3,000 American youngsters ranging in ages from 12 to 18, conducted in 1955 and 1956, Douvan and Adelson concluded that, on the whole, American adolescents neither really reach for, nor achieve much emotional and ideological freedom from their parents.[35] This they attribute to the long period of dependency forced upon the adolescent by the increasing number of years of educational training he must face. To what extent these conclusions may still hold for a new generation of teenagers -- one that has seen evidence of much independent activity and dissent by at least some adolescents -- is a moot point,[36] as is the issue of whether they ever were descriptive of British adolescents. The important point is that the individual going through adolescence is forging his values, attitudes and self-concept (in the terms of personality theory it is a time of "resynthesis of the ego")[37] with <u>some</u> degree of independence not evident in childhood and in a way that may be crucial for the pattern of later life and beliefs. For some (or maybe many) this resynthesis does occur at a time when the individual has achieved a great deal of psychological freedom and autonomy from the family. But if freedom and autonomy are not extended to, or achieved by, the young person, instead of having synthesized his (or her) own set of values and ideas, the emergent adult will remain, by and large, tied by the emotional and

ideological binds of his family -- albeit not in as narrow cognitive confines as in childhood where even knowledge about the outside world is so limited.[38]

In cognitive development, the young person has moved from the stage of concrete operations to that of formal operations in passing from childhood to adolescence.[39] Simply put, this change is such that the adolescent can reason about more complex problems and situations because he (or she) is able to perform mental operations of which the younger child is incapable. First of all, he can "take his own thought as an object and reason about it."[40] In other words, the adolescent is not as tied to personal experience, or concrete situations as is the young child and, consequently, can hypothesize about things and experiences without the aid of concrete props. In addition, he can now perform mental operations (reason about or otherwise mentally manipulate) when more than two variables are involved and can more freely use abstract and generalized notions.

This has many ramifications for political learning. For one thing, it means that the child can more effectively cope with the impersonal nature of institutions, political structures and roles without always retreating to explanation and discussion in terms of individual persons.[41] It also means that the adolescent has reached a level of intellectual maturation whereby he is capable of understanding political principles in a way heretofore not possible -- that is, in applying general or abstract concepts to specific political questions or situations. The young child may "know" about political principles such

as democracy or equality in a very simple way so that he can regurgitate their meanings, but by and large he is not able to use this knowledge by applying the principles to situations.

Finally, the adolescent can reason hypothetically about the political world and compare how political and social life is, with how it might or ought to be -- and find discrepancies. Coupled with a growing knowledge about political life, the capacity to compare "what is" with some of the basic democratic principles presented in school lessons and textbooks may contribute to cynicism or perhaps restatements of one's own motivations to participate in political life.

In general then,

> The eleven year old's political thought is constrained by personalized, concrete, present-oriented modes of approach. Once these limits are transcended, the adolescent is open to influence by knowledge, by the absorption of consensus, and by the principles he adopts from others or develops on his own.[42]

Thus it is not until adolescence that the individual reaches the level of political maturation that would seem to be necessary for the formation of well-developed and fairly stable participation orientations. Until this time, the chichés of democratic ideology which may have been ingested at an early age could not have had the underpinnings of political information or opinion that turn the notion of political participation into a realistic behavioral alternative. And with the achievement of abstract, future-oriented thinking, political beliefs can be guided by principles to give a certain rationale to political activity not available in the younger child's thinking.

But this difference between the child and the adolescent should not be so emphasized as to give a false impression of the consistency, clarity and sophistication of adolescent political thinking. It has been well illustrated that the conceptual organization of adults', let alone adolescents', political thought is far from sophisticated.[43] Thus, although the cognitive capacity for ideological thought -- in the sense that political beliefs are guided and restrained by general principles -- may be available to many at adolescence, this capacity is frequently not applied to political perception and beliefs.[44] In other words, it is not <u>just</u> general cognitive capacity which determines the development of political thought. It is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for intellectual sophistication in the realm of politics.[45] Therefore, on this issue of changes in political thinking from childhood to adolescence, it is enough to say that there is a qualitative change by which a 15-year old tends to be more consistent, has a better grasp of political concepts and more readily generalizes and justifies political decisions than does an 11-year old. It may be that the adolescent has not assembled information or opinions of a very extensive nature, or that his or her political beliefs are not very well developed in an ideological sense. However, this is the first period at which the birth of such political thought is generally possible and that the shift from the child's perspective is achieved.

In saying this we are not trying to negate the importance of childhood learning, for as noted above, the sentiments and norms of early learning may still play an important role in adolescent (and adult)

beliefs, even among ideologues. But there are, at the stage of adolescence, factors contributing to the alteration or further development of political orientations which may be particularly crucial for participation, where impinging realism or even cynicism (plus a growing sense of independence) may affect the idealistic motivations and/or normative conformity of early years. It is in recognition of this that this study of participation orientations in a stable democracy has focused upon the adolescent stage of development as one in which to probe the development of attitudes relevant to the citizen's role.

Having briefly discussed the kinds of developmental changes which seem to be important for adolescent political socialization, the next task is to consider some important characteristics of the political culture which surrounds the socialization process in England.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Herbert H. Hyman, Political Socialization (New York: Free Press, 1959), p. 25.

[2]See Marsh, op. cit., pp. 458-460.

[3]The initial statement of this phenomenon was made by Philip Converse in his excellent analysis of public opinion data collected in the United States, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David Apter (Ed.), Ideology and Discontent, (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 206-261. Converse found a high instability of opinion on "basic" policy issues and little evidence of any restraint imposed on specific issue opinions by general left-right or liberal-conservative structuring of opinions by the opinion holders themselves. Following this line, Butler and Stokes provide evidence of both the instability of opinions on important political issues in Great Britain in the early sixties and the inadequacy of a left-right ideological ruler for measuring British electoral trends. Even among the few electors who have well-formed, enduring opinions (at the most about 30% of the electorate by their calculations) the degree of ties between opinions is certainly weak. See David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain (London: Macmillan, 1969), ch.p 9.

[4]See also Philip E. Converse, "Attitudes and Non-Attitudes: Continuation of a Dialogue," in Edward R. Tufte (Ed.), The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems (Reading Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 168-189.

[5]Lester Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965).

[6]Ibid., p. 20. Milbrath calls his three kinds of citizen roles: "apathetics," "spectators," and "gladiators," using the analogy of the roles played at a Roman gladiatorial contest from which to draw his terms.

[7]See Butler and Stokes, op. cit., for a report on this study. For a description of the data available from this study, see InterUniversity Consortium for Political Research, Study of Political Change in Britain, 1963-1970, Vols. I and II (Ann Arbor, Michigan: ICPR, 1972). The following analyses of the Butler and Stokes data were done by the author.

[8]The following sources each counted as one "channel" of communication: morning paper; a second paper; evening paper; talking to other people; following politics "much" on TV; following politics "much" on radio.

[9]The degree of continuity is perhaps not quite so high here because one year (1964) was an election year while the other was not. Unfortunately there were no data on meetings attended in subsequent years.

[10]See Milbrath descriptions of "gladiators" op. cit., p. 18.

[11]Unfortunately the number of gladiators in the 1963 sample was very small and there are no data on party work for subsequent elections. These conclusions then with respect to the consistency of gladiatorial levels are very tentative.

[12]Fred I. Greenstein, "Political Socialization," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968, Vol. 14. Some political scientists place limitations on the term political socialization by using it to refer only to political learning congruent with, or acceptable to the existing political system under scrutiny. See for example, Roberta Sigel, "Assumptions About the Learning of Political Values," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 361 (1965), pp. 1-9. However this approach is, in the view of this author, too restrictive because it eliminates consideration of neutral and/or negative attitudes which are surely important considerations for both political behavior in general and for the conduct of the system.

[13]Herbert Hyman's book Political Socialization, op. cit., published in 1959, was the first attempt at systematizing the available findings in psychology and political science on political behavior as learned behavior. In it the majority of studies looked at were focused upon the development of political orientations during the adolescent years. Also working in the 1950s, H.H. Remmer and D.H. Radler, in their major project on teenagers, The American Teenager (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957) assumed that a crucial stage in the development of political attitudes and motivation occurs during adolescence.

[14]David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "The Child's Political World," Midwest Journal of Political Science, VI (August, 1962), pp. 237-238.

[15]A partial list of the studies that have focused on pre-adolescent years as the decisive period for important orientations includes: David Easton and Jack Dennis, Children in the Political System (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969); Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Young Children (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967); Fred I. Greenstein, Children and Politics (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965); works by Gustav Jahoda in the Journal of Social Psychology, Vols. 50 and 58, and the British Journal Educational Psychology, Vol. 33.

[16]Greenstein, op. cit., pp. 71-73.

[17]Ibid., p. 72. There was a drop in the percentage of 8th Grade, upper SES children who indicated party preference, but they were small in number in the total sample and less than one third of his total 8th Grade sample. Later work has since supported the notion that some drop in the proportion of party supporters occurs around this age. See

Hess and Torney, op. cit., p. 90. It is thought this is to be explained by acquisition of the norm of the "uncommitted" (i.e., unbiased) voter.

[18]Hess and Torney, op. cit., p. 90.

[19]Jack Dennis and Donald J. McCrone, "Pre-Adult Development of Political Party Identification in Western Democracies," Comparative Political Studies III (July, 1970), p. 251.

[20]See Orville G. Brim, "Socialization Through the Life Cycle," in Socialization After Childhood by Orville G. Brim and Stanton Wheeler, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 20-24.

[21]There are a number of studies which have found that the prevailing view of the President held by young elementary school children in the United States is one of a benign and idealized figure. See Fred Greenstein, op. cit., pp. 37-42; Robert D. Hess and David Easton, "The Child's Image of the President," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIV (1960), pp. 632-644; and Hess and Torney, op. cit., pp. 38-42. In more sketchy data collected in Australia, Chile and Japan, Hess found a similar pattern of idealized images of national authority figures. See Hess, "The Socialization of Attitudes Toward Political Authority: Some Cross-National Comparisons," International Social Science Journal, XV (1963), pp. 542-559.

[22]Hess and Torney, op. cit., pp. 33-37.

[23]Greenstein, op. cit., pp. 52-54.

[24]Brim, op. cit., pp. 24-39.

[25]Hess and Torney, op. cit., pp. 26-31.

[26]Ibid., pp. 32-50.

[27]See for example, Ibid., p. 90, Greenstein, op. cit., pp. 71-73, and Dennis and McCrone, op. cit.

[28]Unfortunately there have been no longitudinal studies to confirm the extent to which the basic political commitments of childhood remain largely intact until and throughout adult life. (See David Marsh, op. cit., for this kind of criticism of political socialization studies.) Consequently these kinds of statements must remain tentative until such data is available. Even so, it must be recognized that much of political socialization research has been based on assumptions about continuity of orientations -- of which some assumptions are more reasonable than others. With respect to the basic commitments described here, our assumptions that these commitments of childhood remain reasonably consistent are based on inferences from the observations and data on adults and

children. We observe that adults express commitments to the state, political parties and other political groupings which seem to show some stability over time. (See for example, Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems..." for evidence of the temporal stability of party identification in the U.S. Page 240.) We see that children also express such commitments and their commitments show similar characteristics as those of adults in such things as the relationship of party preference to social class. From the adult data we infer that some sort of learning process may account for the stable commitments and since we find similar commitments expressed by young children, we suggest that this may be the beginning point of adult commitments. Of course this hypothesis need not assume there is no change from childhood to adulthood, only that there tends to be a certain amount of continuity and that childhood learning predisposes one to commitments in a certain direction.

[29]See Hess and Torney, op. cit., regarding the young child's positive orientation to the law and beliefs in the inevitability of punishment for legal infractions, both of which motivate obedience to the law, (pp. 50-59). Also see pp. 74-79 for their discussion of participation orientations.

[30]The idealism of the young child's political beliefs is, it seems subject to variability in different cultural contexts. For examples of cultures which do not seem to encourage such idealism see Dean Jaros et al., "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-culture," American Political Science Review LXII (June, 1968) pp.564-575, and Laurence Wylie, Village in the Vaucluse (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957).

[31]That a more realistic view of politics and government does seem to develop with age is suggested by some of the data Hess and Torney present. Their sample showed decline with age on agreement with the statements, "what goes on in government is all for the best." But even by Grade 8 (ages 13 to 14) there was a high percentage of agreement on this question compared to the teachers responses to the same question -- which suggests a further change may still occur in subsequent adolescent years. See p. 63, op. cit. (My sample of adolescents indicated a greater degree of cynicism than did the American youth closest to them in age. 58% of the British sample disagreed with this statement, whereas 76% of the American 8th Graders -- only one and one-half years younger -- agreed with it.) Beliefs in the infallibility of institutions, political figures and laws also declined with age in the Hess and Torney study. See pp. 44-54.

[32]Joseph Adelson and R.P. O'Neill, "The Growth of Political Ideas in Adolescence," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, IV (1966) pp. 295-306.

[33]Dawson and Prewitt, op. cit., p. 42.

[34]See for example, the discussion on family in Joseph Adelson and Elizabeth Douvan, The Adolescent Experience (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 119-145.

[35]See the "Mystique of Adolescence," by Joseph Adelson in Dorothy Rogers (Ed.), Issues in Adolescent Psychology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969) pp. 45-50. This article summarizes the general conclusions Adelson and Douvan reached in their study of the 3000 youngsters. A full report of the survey and its findings is found in Elizabeth Douvan and Joseph Adelson, op. cit.

[36]In Chapter Three the phenomenon of youthful political activism in the 1960s will be discussed more fully. That this activism is not restricted to the realm of politics can be seen in the schoolboys movement in Britain which was concerned with issues such as pupil participation in school decision-making, and corporal punishment used in schools. See the New Statesman, March 1969.

[37]Adelson, op. cit., p. 49.

[38]This does not mean that the adolescent must reject his parents' values and morals in order to achieve a large degree of independence. He may go through a serious period of moral and emotional evaluation from a more or less autonomous position and still adopt his family's values and ideological position.

[39]This discussion of the changes in cognitive functioning is largely derived from the theories of cognitive development of Jean Piaget. For his work on the changes from childhood to adolescence, see Piaget and Barbel Inhelder, The Growth of Logical Thinking From Childhood to Adolescence, Translated by A. Parsons and S. Seagrin (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1958). For one of the best general treatments of Piaget's theoretical position, see John H. Flavell The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand Company Inc., 1963). For a brief description of Piaget's general theory as relevant to adolescents, with selected examples of experimental work which has been done under the aegis of the theory see David Elkind, "Cognitive Development in Adolescence," in James F. Adams (Ed.), Understanding Adolescence (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), pp. 128-159.

[40]Ibid., p. 142.

[41]The most relevant evidence of these claims concerning the level of cognitive functioning of adolescents vis-à-vis children in the area of political thinking is to be found in the work of Joseph Adelson and his colleagues. See Adelson and O'Neill, op. cit.; Adelson, Bernard Green and O'Neill, "Growth of the Idea of Law in Adolescence" Developmental Psychology, I (1969), pp. 327-332; and Judith Gallatin and Joseph

Adelson, "Individual Rights and the Public Good," Comparative Political Studies, 3 (1970), pp. 226-243.

[42]Adelson and O'Neill, op. cit., p. 305.

[43]Converse, op. cit., passim.

[44]This kind of phenomenon is not peculiar to politics. Research in Piagetian theory has shown that children frequently operate at different developmental levels with different subject matter. The interested reader should refer to the idea of horizontal décalage as outlined by Flavell, op. cit. With respect to political judgement, Merelman has suggested that another important explanation for the lack of ideological thinking may in fact be that many people do not have the complex moral and cognirive skills necessary for ideological thought. The moral and cognitive skills are, he suggests, multi-dimensional and not easily "mastered and integrated." And, he says, "the complexity of cognition and moral judgement raises the chances of cognitive and moral instability. The more capacities to be mastered, the less likely it is that there will be consistency along any single dimension.... Perhaps the explanation of Converse's findings inheres in the complexity and fluidity of those moral and cognitive skills which underlie political judgement. Converse's finding, in other words, becomes less perplexing when we recognize that, for many, political perceptions are underpinned by unstable moral and cognitive sense." Richard M. Merelman, "The Development of Political Ideology: A Framework for the Analysis of Political Socialization," American Political Science Review, LXIII (1969), p. 765.

Although I find Merelman's argument interesting, I do not dismiss another sociological argument about the remoteness of politics for mass publics quite so readily. In other words, I would suggest that the explanation for lack of ideology among mass publics may be both the problem of unstable moral and cognitive sense and the fact that the political world is often very remote for individuals. They do not focus very sharply on what is going on in the political ring, nor do they always (or even often) focus on the issues that are brought into that ring. Thus while individuals may have developed certain moral and/or cognitive skills which could be usefully applied to the world of politics, lack of familiarity and experience in this area could perhaps result in a sort of décalage with respect to political reasoning.

[45]Here I would agree with a more recent hypothesis put forward by Merelman concerning the development of intellectual sophistication in political thinking. Speculating from the findings of a study of adolescents he suggests that "most political thinking results from a combination of genetic-maturational and politically related environmental factors. Variation in these cases is the product of resonance between environmental stimuli and particular intellectual skills. I would hypothesize, speculatively, that politically related environmental

stimuli are probably most likely to impinge on those skills and modes of thought which are salient to the individual at the moment, those which are poorly integrated into the intellectual hierarchy, and those which are developing especially slowly, for these modes of thought are particularly open to the environment." Merelman, "The Development of Policy Thinking in Adolescence," American Political Science Review, LXV (1971), p. 1047.

CHAPTER III

THE ENGLISH POLITICAL CULTURE

When studying the development of political orientations amongst the young of a nation, we are in part looking at the process by which the nature of a society's political culture is transmitted, either in original or altered form. This political culture is the "pattern of individual attitudes and orientations towards politics among members of a political system,"[1] and is considered important for the overall operation of the political system. But in more specific terms, the effects on the political process of variations in political culture are as yet still largely a matter of conjecture. In general terms, we can only say that "the demands made upon the system, the responses to laws and to appeals for support, and the conduct of individuals in their political roles, will [probably somehow] be shaped and conditioned by the common orientation patterns."[2]

But more importantly for the context of this study, the adult culture has consequences for the younger generation, as the term transmission indicates. Even where new political values are being presented to the youth of a nation -- values which may mean a radical change in the political orientations of subsequent generations -- the prevailing adult culture will have some effect. This is so because there are few cultures in which the young can be totally isolated from the dominant values of adults. Even where conscious efforts are made to isolate the young and to manipulate socialization through agencies such as the

schools, a political party, or government propaganda agencies it seems such efforts are seldom wholly successful.[3] The dominant adult values are important because they are easily absorbed by young people both from their own families and from the social environment around them. In many cases the young may be merely conforming to or adopting those ways of viewing the political world which have surrounded them from early years, just as a person would adopt the living habits or forms of social intercourse around him.[4] Consequently, in describing and explaining the nature and development of citizen orientations of a new generation, it is important to describe the existing political culture of the society, both to be aware of what is "available" for the younger generation to pick up in terms of political ideas from the adult culture and to know the environment within which potential cultural changes must be made.

THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

As one of the most advanced democracies of the modern world, England is often singled out as a repository of democratic traditions. Yet even here the development of widespread popular participation is a relatively recent phenomenon.[5] Though the struggles between the Monarchy and Parliament were generally resolved in favor of Parliament as early as 1688, it was not until 1832 that the privileged ruling class, dominated as it was by landed gentry and the aristocracy, began to recognize the claims of other social groups for political status. In that year, the Reform Act (1832) granted the franchise to about half of the middle class on the basis of property qualifications. In

subsequent years the franchise was extended to some of the working class as household ratepayers (1867), then to a majority of the adult male population (again according to property qualifications) under the Reform Act of 1884 and to all adult (over 21) males and women over 30 in 1918. Universal suffrage was finally adopted in 1928.

This gradual expansion of the electorate that eventually legitimized public participation in politics by virtually all except the young was achieved quite peaceably and the new voters were soon incorporated into the political structure. In other words, they were not isolated and left to form alienated groups on the periphery of political life, nor did they self-consciously form radical alternatives to challenge the regime.[6] Rather, where they were active, it was mainly under aegis of existing parliamentary parties or groups.

To harness the new forces of voters which were entering the electorate under the Reform Acts, the two major parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals, evolved systems of local organizations which brought the parties down to the constituency level. These organizations were in effect designed to solidify mass support for the party elite in Parliament and to attract new voters to the party fold, but <u>not</u> to extend control of the party to the grass roots.[7] Popular control was staunchly and successfully resisted after some attempts were made by local grass roots organizations to control their parliamentary representatives.

But even under circumstances of elite control of the parties, by 1882 the new voters had been so well incorporated into the structure

of political life that W.S. Gilbert could write with not too great exaggeration:

> Every little boy and gal
> Who is born into this realm alive
> Is either a little Liber - al
> Or else a little Conserva - tive[8]

Nor did other changes in public life which accompanied democratization of the political system create lasting threats to the continued existence and general stability of the regime. The growing support for socialism and trade unionism among the workers and intellectuals in the late 19th Century represented an important impetus for change, but did not mean a turn toward revolutionary violence as was frequently the situation in such movements in many Continental European countries. Instead, the leaders of the socialist and working class movements chose to work within the system, which they saw as potentially responsive to their efforts.[9]

This, however, it not to say that Britain has experienced no periods of popular discontent and political unrest since the advent of popular government. To the contrary, the pre-war and postwar periods of the early 20th Century were times of grave social and political difficulties and some domestic violence.[10] Thus by 1914, the Liberal Government had faced crises over the issue of Irish Home Rule, inflation, and an escalating suffragette campaign. The Irish crisis had almost deteriorated into civil war in Ireland, inflation coupled with union militancy had sparked widespread disaffection among workers, and the suffragette campaign had led to demonstrations, hunger strikes and even

violence as Parliament continued to resist cries for the enfranchisement of women. However, with the advent of World War I, the threats from external aggression which were loudly proclaimed diverted attention from internal dissension and dislocation.

After the war, the country again faced unrest because of social and economic problems and the growing militancy of a new socialist party, the Labour Party. Yet the legitimacy of the regime held sway both for the leaders of the new party and presumably also the majority of their supporters. Even with the lower wages and increased unemployment which accompanied the postwar economic slump, a General Strike, begun on May 4, 1926, under the leadership of the General Council of the Trades Union Congress (TUC), was conducted peacefully, if in an atmosphere of resolute labor cohesion.

Thus, although its recent political history has seen some periods of unrest and dissension in addition to the introduction of a strong socialist movement, the system has remained essentially stable. Democratic innovations came gradually as the system adapted on a piecemeal basis to demands for participation by excluded groups, and new voters were absorbed by parties committed to the parliamentary system. Generally speaking, then, change was incorporated by processes within the existing structure, not imposed suddenly or violently from without, and opposition continued to be contained within the system.

It is not therefore surprising that stability continues to characterize the political system, and the persistence of the present form of parliamentary government seems likely. There exists no organized political group of any size which challenges the basic structure of

government,[12] and among the mass electorate it appears there is widespread support for general democratic principles and a democratic system of government.[13]

In the area of partisanship -- the struggle for political power between various political groups and their supporters -- conflict is open and moderate. There are few who engage in a political hostility so great as to participate in or advocate open violence -- or, for that matter, few who are unwilling to accept opposition. While over three-quarters of the electorate seems to be committed in a psychological sense to supporting one of the three major parties, in general the population is not intensely divided by these identifications.[14] Political antagonisms may at times be evident, particularly during election campaigns, but these antagonisms are not such that they seriously disrupt social life, nor do they restrict social relationships between members or supporters of different parties.[15]

It is true that social class differences are well recognized in Britain, and they certainly account for a greater polarization of parties along class lines than occurs in either the United States or Canada.[16] But even these differences are comparatively restrained and are apparently decreasing in intensity.[17] With respect to political issues, there are few controversies that represent a threat to this general tone of moderation in political conflict. There are, of course, differences of opinion on policy alternatives, but they do not polarize political life so as to create unbridgeable gulfs between large groups in the society.[18]

But while there is general political stability with open and

moderate political partisanship, it seems the English electorate is not uncritical of government or their political system. They are, for example, reserved in their judgements of the democratic nature of British government.[19] Thus a number of national surveys have reported their respondents do not feel the government is very responsive to public opinion. Butler and Stokes found 50% of their 1963 sample agreed that the government does not pay much "attention to what the people think when it decides what to do.[20] A 1968 national survey reported 77% of its respondents agreed that people like themselves have little or no influence over their country's future.[21]

These kinds of sentiments have been interpreted by one study as an indication of a general decline in support for the political system and a possible threat to its future stability.[22] This, however, is certainly open to question. In many cases the assessments of system functioning are quite realistic in the context of modern industrial society and they need not represent a potential basis for violent opposition, support for change imposed from outside the system, or even a desire for change in the basic structure (as opposed to functioning) of the system. Rather it may be an indication of desire for <u>reform within the system</u>. For general system stability, it has yet to be shown that uncritical popular support of government is a necessary ingredient of a stable polity.[23] On the other hand, from the standpoint of traditional democratic theory, a critical approach to government would seem to be morally healthy. This position was well stated by Ian Budge in his critique of the notion that unquestioning popular support of government is necessary for system stability.

> One of the reasons why, on the moral level, we approve of democracy is the freedom it provides for internal criticism and discussion. Why then on the empirical side should criticism be regarded as undermining a democratic regime? On the contrary its absence may be more dangerous.[24]

Yet while the English are apparently not uncritical of the functioning of their system, neither, on the other hand, are they particularly active in the political sphere. In fact, the great majority of citizens participate only on the periphery of politics.[25] While over three-quarters of the electorate do profess to be supporters of one of the political parties, only 2 to 3% are active in political parties.[26] There is, of course, much public participation on election day during a national election and fairly widespread concern about the outcome. Thus in the seven elections from 1945 to 1966 the average turnout was 78%, and in voter samples from the sixties, 65 to 71% of the respondents said they usually care which party wins a general election.[27]

However, elections do not seem to evoke the kind of enthusiasm conducive to sustained public involvement, and concern with politics does not usually extend beyond elections. According to a local study done by Richard Rose and Harve Mossawir in Spring, 1964, 54% of their sample said elections had no emotional effect on them and only 31% said they definitely enjoyed elections.[28] It is probably true, as Rose and Mossawir suggest, that "for most voters the gratification obtained from voting is the result of having done a necessary but not particularly pleasurable duty."[29] Exploring political interest between election periods, Butler and Stokes found only 11% of their national sample said that they generally follow politics very closely when there

isn't an election and 52% said they don't follow politics much at all.[30]

This then is the "participant culture" within which the British adolescent is being introduced to democracy![31] The duty to vote is obviously emphasized -- to the point of inducing ingrained responses to the call of the polling booth on election day. And no doubt the folklore of democracy presented in the schools and the media does include the notion that citizens should be active and interested in public affairs. Even so, extensive public involvement is not a characteristic of day-to-day life.

Of course this aspect of public involvement in politics is not limited to the United Kingdom. As noted earlier, widespread political activism is not prevalent in other "participant cultures" where the electorates also tend to participate only intermittently through elections. However, on another dimension of public participation -- the relationship between the mass electorate and its leadership -- it has been suggested that there is a difference between the British culture and the cultures of other Western democracies. This difference is in the prevalence of political deference which is said to be particularly characteristic of British society. Since attitudes indicative of political deference are relevant to the active-passive dimension of grass roots political participation, both in themselves and because they may affect other elements of political involvement, and since the extent of political deference is said to be a distinctive characteristic of the British political culture, some attention will be given to this phenomenon in our study of English adolescents.

ENGLAND -- A DEFERENTIAL POLITICAL CULTURE?

In order to discuss political deference as part of English society, it is important to give some idea of the nature of this phenomenon and its pertinence to the participation dimension in democratic theory. To do this we will examine the meaning of this concept as developed in the literature on English politics and thereby attempt to extract both its most salient elements and its participation dimensions. Following this, some analysis of the claims concerning the prevalence of political deference in England will be in order.

In attempting to elaborate upon the meaning of political deference, it is first necessary to make a distinction between political deference and other kinds of deference. To do this we will follow the kind of analysis proposed by R.D. Jessop in his examination of traditionalism in the English culture.[32] This leads us to posit four kinds of deference. These are: ascriptive social deference towards "the high born and wealthy;" ascriptive socio-political deference by which people prefer to accord high political office to a socially ascribed elite; socio-cultural deference which "involves affirmation of the legitimacy of traditional institutions and their values;" and political deference.[33] For our purposes it is most important to make clear the distinction between political deference and forms of social deference. Political deference is directed to persons in positions of political leadership, of whatever social background.[34] Social deference, on the other hand, is directed toward social elites, and while it may have political implications, it is best distinguished by its social context. Thus the

ascriptive socio-political deference which is often alluded to in explanations of Conservative support among the working class is primarily a form of social deference.[35] It describes a preference for socially ascribed elites in high political office, but the deference is directed toward the social status of the elites, which is thought to make them particularly qualified for positions of power and authority. Political deference may, of course, be related to social deference historically, or in contemporary social attitudes, but it is still primarily concerned with political relationships.

In commentaries which attribute political deference (as opposed to socio-political deference) to the English electorate, two related themes seem to emerge, each of which emphasizes an aspect of this kind of deference. One theme is concerned with the British conception of authority, the other is concerned with notions of the superiority of political elites. The first theme is most fully elaborated by Harry Eckstein and Eric Nordlinger.[36] They describe the British conception of authority as one which accords more independence to political leaders than is generally found in democratic societies. They contend that political leaders in England are expected to initiate action and make decisions with relatively little constraint from their followers or the general public. In Eckstein's terms, the English "expect their rulers to govern more than represent them."[37] This approach to leadership is not just observation of political reality; it is also normative. Not only are members of the electorate said to submit voluntarily to to strong independent leadership, they are also said to consider this

structure of political authority right and proper.[38] Thus, even though there may be general support for the popular mandate, the voter's role is seen to be essentially passive -- to express judgement on government performance only after the fact in elections, but not to legitimate "interference" by non-elites in political decision-making. The result of this has been, according to Nordlinger, "the non-elites' readiness to accept rather than to question or direct governmental authority."[39] As can be readily seen, this is most relevant to the participative dimension of democratic theory.

The second theme, alluded to in descriptions of public attitudes to political leaders, suggests that political office confers high status and public respect on incumbents who are then considered to be superior sorts of persons. Describing the stature of these men in England, Seymour Lipset writes: "persons in high positions are given generalized deference....The protection from populist criticism that an elitist system gives to all who possess the diffuse status of leaders extend... to the political and intellectual elites."[40] Eckstein, in echoing this theme, uses a 19th Century description penned by Walter Bagehot to characterize the 20th Century electorate. "English politicians are the men who fill the thoughts of the English public...and it is hard for the ordinary spectators not to believe that the admired actor is greater than themselves."[41] This is in contrast to more equalitarian societies in which politicians and public officials, as the people's representatives, are considered to be <u>of</u> the people -- "one of us" -- and not thought to be generally superior or deserving of special respect.[42]

Briefly then, political deference, as used in the literature on English politics, is characterized by submission to and respect for political leaders and political leadership. It is elitist because it stresses the status and superiority of political leaders. It is hierarchical because it stresses the independence of political leaders. And it is antithetical to democratic participation because it limits the active participation and intervention of the general public in political decision-making.

Studies which depict England as having a politically deferential culture attribute this deference to historical factors, principally the evolutionary nature of social and political change in Britain. The argument is that because the introduction of democratic (and social) reforms was achieved peaceably, there was not a period of intense public upheaval to challenge traditional notions and values. Consequently, pre-democratic attitudes to authority and the social order remained amidst growing support for democratic norms. Politically this meant that the government, which had traditionally assumed independence in this sphere of authority (particularly vis-à-vis the "common people"), continued to be accorded respect and legitimacy as an "independent body."[43] Socially, many of the common people still felt that those above them in status and station in life were generally superior and deserved respect and obedience as part of the correct ordering of society. This was said to have reinforced ideas concerning the superiority of government because its history as an aristocratic stronghold had suffused it with "an aura of aristocracy."[44]

However, the pervasiveness of pre-democratic values such as elitism, and more particularly, the extent to which they are reflected in contemporary views about political leaders and the relationship between the public and government, has not been clearly established. In other words, while it may be true that traditional notions about the social order and political authority died slowly in Britain, the prevalence of political deference in the contemporary political culture, especially in comparison to other Western democracies, is still an open question. This is because empirical evidence is ambiguous for claims that this kind of deference is still widely apparent throughout the culture. Clearly defined measures of political deference have not been set out and tested systematically. Rather, diverse and often questionable indicators of something described as deferential are used to substantiate claims concerning public attitudes to political leadership and political authority. For example, Eric Nordlinger makes reference to a survey question about the most important characteristics of a good party leader in order to substantiate his position concerning the "non-elites' readiness to accept rather than question or direct governmental authority." Fifty-nine percent of the Conservative respondents to a national survey and 53% of the Labour respondents chose the characteristic of a "strong leader" as the most desirable quality in a party leader.[45] The question still remains, though, to what extent this majority of respondents would have been willing to defer to strong leadership through restraining criticism or acknowledging the general superiority of these political leaders over the common people.[46]

Similarly, Almond and Verba, when describing England as having a "deferential political culture" do not refer directly to sample responses giving evidence of the public's unwillingness to criticize or "interfere" with decision-making by governmental leaders.[47] Rather, the evidence they use is concerned with the relationship between the public and the administrative levels of government, and not the relationship between the public and the political elite. Their argument is based on a characteristically high level of "subject competence" among British citizens which co-exists with a high level of citizen competence. Subject competence is, by their measures, the perception on the part of citizens that the administrative levels of government would be responsive to their appeals. To quote their interpretation of the measure:

> As competent subjects, they perceive themselves as able to appeal to a set of regular and orderly rules in their dealing with administrative officials. They will receive fair treatment from the administration, and their point of view will be considered, not because they attempt political influence, but because the administrative official is controlled by a set of rules that curbs his arbitrary power.[48]

Citizen competence, on the other hand, is perceiving oneself as "able to affect governmental decisions through political influence."[49] Because both a high level of citizen competence and a high level of subject competence were recorded in Britain, the claim was made that "the development of participant orientations in Britain did not challenge and replace the more deferential subject orientations as was the tendency in the United States," where there was recorded a lower level of subject competence.[50]

But are the British showing "strong deference to the independent authority of government"[51] because they felt it was likely their appeals to government officials and the police would be taken into account by such "administrators"? Feelings of subject competence may stem from feelings about the inherent equality of all, or from positive experiences with the government bureaucracy, and not from feelings of subordinate status, the superiority of officials, or other such elements of hierarchy and elitism.[52] If political deference is taken to be a phenomenon as has been described here and in the literature -- that is, related to notions of elitism, inequality and hierarchy -- then Almond and Verba's evidence for a claim that Britain has a deferential political culture must, in these terms, be considered inconclusive.

A final claim for the contemporary prevalence of political deference in Britain is made by Eckstein on the basis of an argument from history as outlined earlier.[53] In summary, he says that the political structure in England gradually adapted to the pressure of reformists and was not subject to sudden upheaval as was the United States, or France and Germany. Consequently, old ideas of political ordering and authority were neither symbolically defeated in a sudden and violent manner, nor did they fragment the society into antagonistic camps. Rather, they remained generally diffused throughout the culture and were available for transmission to subsequent generations.

There is, however, some question about this interpretation of traditional norms regarding political authority. For example, Dennis Kavanagh points to Walter Bagehot as one source who suggested that

Englishmen have traditionally lacked political deference. To quote Kavanagh, "[Bagehot] suggested that the natural impulse of the English people is to resist 'authority' and that state legislation was widely seen as 'alien action' and government as an 'extrinsic agency'."[54]

But even granting Eckstein's interpretation of traditional values, to what extent could political leaders retain such superior status and remain "protected from populist criticism" in the context of contemporary British political life? There are a number of factors which would not be supportive of such traditional orientations and would seem to be corrosive of political deference. Some of these factors are as follows:

(1) The electorate, which is highly literate and relatively informed politically, is frequently witness to hot debates between rival political parties over policies and election campaigns that challenge reverence for rival party leaders.

(2) One of the two major parties, the Labour party, has as an official doctrine an ideology of egalitarianism. Moreover, with a strong trade union movement which has close political and ideological ties to the party, there is an important agency available to transmit egalitarian notions to the working class.

(3) For six out of ten years in the decade of the 1960s the Government, under the leadership of Harold Wilson and the Labour Party, did little to perpetuate an "aura of aristocracy" around political authority. The image of the public school politician with an aristocratic accent and an illustrious (upper class) family background just did not describe this Government. Furthermore, Government politicians

were not even accorded unchallenged respect on their own home ground. Government policies were frequently attacked not only by the opposition Conservatives and Liberals, but also by the left wing of the Labour Party itself.[55]

(4) Modern mass media have contributed a nation-wide forum for popular political debate and criticism of government policies, and the media show no reluctance in criticizing political leaders. This is particularly true of the broadcasting media which so often assume a critical posture in public affairs programming. In other words, the media's approach to political authority often seems to suggest a lack of deference which may well be communicated to their audiences.

In fact there are some recent data which suggest that popular orientations to political leaders are not particularly deferential. A number of questions about British politicians were put to a national sample of adults in 1968, and the replies to these questions do not give evidence of widespread respect for persons in public life.[56] A majority of the sample agreed that "most politicians will promise anything to get votes," that "politicians are all talk and no action," that "most politicians are in it for what they can get out of it" and that "there are no great men in any of the parties."

While it could be argued that politicians in general have a different status and less stature than their leaders, from this survey it does not appear likely that political leaders are accorded unusual respect in the larger society or considered to be above public criticism. Nor does it seem likely that the norms of submission to political leader-

ship which are also part of political deference would continue to be prevalent in the face of this kind of cynicism toward politicians. It would therefore seem necessary to reconsider notions concerning the prevalence of political deference in public values. Moreover, contemporary political and social experiences make future prospects of a deferential political culture even more debatable. It was in this context then that questions designed to measure elements of political deference were put to the adolescents of this study. It was felt that if cues from the surrounding environment and past experiences have reinforced deferential values among adolescents, as one would expect in a deferential culture, then respect for political authority would not be greatly diminished. On the other hand, with impinging realism and greater knowledge of the informal political world that seems to accompany the passage from childhood to adolescence, if deference is not reinforced, a more critical approach to political authority would be expected in the contemporary democratic context. In Chapter 10 the results of the deference questions -- which raise some doubts about the prevalence of political deference, at least among young people -- will be discussed and analyzed. This will be done first to assess whether political deference is a prevalent feature in the process of cultural transmission, secondly to look at possible sources of deference in that culture, and finally to consider briefly the relationship of deference to other dimensions of political involvement.

YOUTH AND POLITICS IN ENGLAND

One final characteristic to consider in this discussion of culture is the political nature of the youth culture in England at the time of this survey. While this is more appropriately considered an issue of sub-cultural characteristics, it is an important part of the political environment within which these adolescents were acquiring their political dispositions.

The adolescents of the late Sixties were maturing at a time when both political activism and particularly youthful activism apparently increased and attracted wide coverage in the media. In fact, these adolescents were about to enter young adulthood at a time when young adults developed a reputation as the activist generation.

Starting with the strike on the Berkeley campus of the University of California in the United States in 1964, student activism and press coverage of it was evident in diverse areas of the world.[57] Thus 1965 saw student strikes for free speech at the Free University of Berlin and student demonstrations in Spain. In 1966 there were more demonstrations in Berlin over free speech and Vietnam while students in Rome, Spain and Warsaw engaged in activities in demand for university reform or in support of political objectives. In 1967, student unrest and activity in support of demands on diverse political and educational issues erupted in South Korea, Venezuela, Japan, France and Iran, to name a few. But for European students, 1968 was the most remarkable year of all in a decade that was fast being identified with student activism and revolt. In Germany, widespread student demonstrations during Easter weekend

ended in battles between police and students; in France a countrywide strike of workers in May found its beginnings in the occupation of the universities by students in Nanterre and Paris; and in Czechoslovakia student and youth groups gave support to the liberal Dubcek regime and provided an important core of resistance to the Russian occupation of August which ousted Dubcek and his supporters.

Spring and summer of 1968 marked a high point in student activity in England also. In the spring, a dispute at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) between the University administration and student groups over the directorship appointment by the school of Dr. Adams, considered by the students to be a supporter of Rhodesian racial policies, had come to a head with the occupation of the school by students. The Government's decision to raise the fees of overseas students provoked reaction at many other universities, as this was claimed to be a racist policy by its student opponents, since a large number of overseas students in England are from non-white Commonwealth or ex-Commonwealth nations. The volatile issue of Vietnam also added motivation for action by a number of student groups. These groups violently opposed American activities there and any evidence they perceived of British support for the American position. In 1967 a new national students' organization, the Radical Students' Alliance, had been formed as a forum for more militant students and by 1968 was attracting increasing support. In March, 1968, a large student-filled anti-Vietnam rally in London culminated in instances of violence between students and police and against the United States Embassy.

That summer, student activity and dissent seemed evident in every area of higher education. Issues of student power, an anti-Monarchy demonstration during a Royal visit to East Anglia University, and the closing down of Essex University by the students made headlines. Thus the reputation of student activism, dissent and rebellion was typing a generation of young adults in Britain as elsewhere.[58]

Although it is frequently noted by academic commentators and casual observers that activists of all persuasions, left and right, are in a minority amongst both young adults and students, it is still apparent that the general activity level of this generation has changed quantitatively as well as qualitatively from the two previous decades. That is, there appear to be more activists and/or dissenters in this generation and their forcefulness (tactical and otherwise) plus the adamant nature of their demands regarding educational institutions and political issues, consistently received wide attention in the media. It is, then, by nature of these characteristics of their generation that the youth of the 1960s gained a reputation as an activist generation.

This was an element in the context of political life which may have been important for many adolescents maturing at this time. First of all, the "activist generation" was available as a reference group to the young teenager of this decade where it was not so obviously available a decade previously. There were activists in the 1950s of course, but they were considered "kooks", somehow strange, and certainly not part of the youth culture. In the 1960s, activists became more a part of the popular youth culture -- and although not always joined by their

peers, they were considered in vogue, and often romanticized. Secondly, young teenagers may be more drawn to political news when it does involve youth movements or activities. Thus they may become more politically aware or involved than would be the case in time of quiet stability and low key or negligible activity by youth. This is not to say that many adolescents were likely to become highly politicized by this example from the activist students, only that it may result in a somewhat higher degree of political consciousness for adolescents in general.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Gabriel A. Almond, and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966) p. 50.

[2]Ibid., pp. 50-51. The inset is my definition of the existing state of knowledge and is not necessarily that of Almond and Powell.

[3]Dawson and Prewitt point for example to the tragic effects of linguistic and tribal conflicts in some countries which attempt to create a "national identity" out of what is little more than a geographical entity. Op. cit., pp. 34-36

[4]The process of "absorption" which is being described here is not, of course, as simple as that. There are a number of variables which influence what a child picks out of his environment. For example, attitudinal dispositions already held by the young child are, as Lewis Froman has pointed out, important variables to be taken into consideration when more fully describing the socialization process. See Lewis Froman, Jr., "Personality and Political Socialization," Journal of Politics XXIII (1961) pp. 341-352.

[5]For a brief history of electoral reform in Britain see D.E. Butler, The Electoral System in Britain Since 1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963) pp. 4-13.

[6]For the development of political organization to represent working class interests see Henry Pelling, The Origins of the Labour Party: 1880-1900 (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1954).

[7]Robert McKenzie, British Political Parties (London: Mercury Books, 1963) pp. 8-9.

[8]W.S. Gilbert in Poland written in 1882, cited by John A. Hawgood, "Evolution of Parties and the Party System, the Nineteenth Century," Sydney D. Bailey (Ed.), The British Party System (London: The Hansard Society, 1952) pp. 30-31. As Hawgood describes, conditions were not always this stable in terms of the dominant parliamentary groups and the party system itself did fluctuate during the nineteenth century. But generally speaking, the new voters did not seek radical alternatives outside the parliamentary structure.

[9]For the early history of debate within Socialist organizations about revolutionary activity see Pelling, op. cit., ch. 3.

[10]For a brief survey of this period see C.B. Cox and A.E. Dyson (Eds.), The Twentieth Century Mind, Vols. I and II (London: Oxford University Press, 1972) esp. articles by Donald Read and T.C. Barker in Vol. I, and C.L. Mowatt and John Lovell in Vol. II.

[12]Richard Rose, Politics in England (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964) p. 27. One obvious exception could, of course, be claimed and that is the Irish Republican Army. However this group is concerned at this point only to effect changes in Northern Ireland, and is not strictly relevant to English political culture, except to the extent that the Irish issue has potential to become England's Vietnam.

[13]Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), pp. 70-72.

[14]Butler and Stokes found in three different interview waves, roughly 90% of their sample indicated a general partisan inclination, but a slightly smaller proportion seemed to be fairly stable in this partisan identification. Somewhere in the range of 83% of their sample indicated stable partisan self-images over three interviews in 1963, 1964 and 1966. Op. cit., p. 38.

[15]Almond and Verba, op. cit., pp. 85-104.

[16]See for example, Robert R. Alford's study comparing Britain, Canada, the U.S. and Australia in Party and Society (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963).

[17]Butler and Stokes, op. cit., pp. 115-122.

[18]See Ibid., chapter 8 and 9 for a discussion of issues and their salience in British politics.

[19]See for example, Jack Dennis et al., "Support for Nation and Government Among English Children," British Journal of Political Science, I (1971), pp. 25-48.

[20]Butler and Stokes, op. cit., p. 477.

[21]Reported in Dennis et al., op. cit., p.45. In addition, a number of polls have indicated the electorate favored changes in some of the structures and procedures of government, including the appointment of an ombudsman for national and local government and nationalized industries, the appointment of industrialists and others outside parliament to ministerial and other jobs. Ibid., pp. 45-46.

[22]Ibid., p. 43.

[23]See a similar criticism by Ian Budge, "Support for Nation and Government Among English Children: A Comment," British Journal of Political Science, I, (1971) pp. 389-392.

[24]Ibid., p. 390.

[25]Perhaps given their perceptions of government and its apparent unresponsiveness, it is not surprising that most citizens remain on

the periphery of politics. It may well be they consider active participation on their part would be quite futile and unproductive.

[26]See estimates in Rose, op. cit., p. 89. In their 1963 survey Butler and Stokes found 2% of their sample claimed to take an active part in party work. Butler and Stokes, p. 474. After the 1964 General Election, 3% of their second sample said they did some party work during the election campaign.

[27]Voting turnout statistics were computed from various election studies from 1945 to 1964. Figures on the voter sample are from Butler and Stokes, op. cit., pp. 474-488. The progressive increase from 65 to 71% may reflect sample loss from the panel.

Compared to voting turnout in Canada and the United States, Britain seems to come out ahead. In Canada in the same period, there were nine federal elections and the average turnout was 75%. Canada, Electoral Officer Report, Vols. 20-27 (Ottawa: the Queen's Printer), Part I. In the United States, the problem of comparing turnout statistics is difficult because voter registration is voluntary and consequently the voting register has a smaller record of voters than would be the case if all eligible voters were registered through a system of general enumeration (as is usually the situation in Canada and Britain). Using census data estimates and adjusting them to account for those ineligible to vote because of legal requirements, Land and Land estimate non-voting to be around 26% in the United States. See Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang, Voting and Nonvoting (Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 69-73.

[28]Richard Rose and Harve Mossawir, "Ordinary Individuals in Electoral Situations," in Richard Rose (Ed.), Policy-Making in Britain (New York: Free Press, 1969) pp. 71-80.

[29]Ibid., p. 78.

[30]Butler and Stokes, op. cit., p. 474.

[31]Since it is beyond the scope of this study to look into the effects of the institutional structures on political participation, no consideration will be made of these. However it is important to recognize at this time the very real effect these structures may have in promoting or discouraging participation by ordinary citizens.

[32]R.D.Jessop, "Civility and Traditionalism in English Political Culture," British Journal of Political Science, I (1971), pp. 1-24.

[33]Ibid., pp. 1-2.

[34]The definition of political deference being used here differs somewhat from that of Jessop as he restricts political deference to deference directed toward the government. The definition used in this

paper (and derived from the literature on political deference referred to above) includes deference directed to political leadership in general, and not just that of government. In other words, it includes deference to the leadership of non-government as well as government parties.

[35]See R.T. McKenzie and S. Silver, Angels in Marble (London: Heinemann, 1968); and Eric Nordingler, The Working Class Tories (London: MacGibbon and Kee, Ltd., 1967) pp. 34-43 for elaborations on this kind of deference in English politics.

[36]Harry H. Eckstein, "The British Political System," in Patterns of Government, Samuel H. Beer and Adam B. Ulam, (Eds.) (New York: Random House Inc., 1958) pp. 57-73; Nordlinger, op. cit., pp. 13-45.

[37]Eckstein, op. cit., p. 61. His emphasis.

[38]It is the normative element involved in the submission which distinguishes political deference from apathy.

[39]Nordlinger, op. cit., p.16.

[40]Seymour M. Lipset, "Value Patterns of Democracy: A Case Study in Comparative Analysis," American Sociological Review, 28 (1963), pp. 517-519.

[41]Eckstein, op. cit., p. 67.

[42]It should be noted here that the kind of "respect" for political leaders which is being described may theoretically occur without submission to the initiatives of this leadership. However, it is the conjunction of submission and respect which is described or at least implied in the political deference literature.

[43]From L.S. Amery, Thoughts on the Constitution, 1947, quoted in Nordlinger, op. cit., p. 15.

[44]Edward A. Shils, The Torment of Secrecy (London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1956).

[45]Nordlinger, op. cit., p. 17.

[46]Dennis Kavanagh in his provocative article, "The Deferential English" A Comparative Critique," Government and Opposition (1971) pp. 333-360, suggests desire for strong leadership may be based on instrumental, not deferential, values. See p. 338.

[47]Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, op. cit., pp. 177-180.

[48]Ibid., p. 171.

[49]Ibid., p. 171.

[50]Ibid., p. 315.

[51]Ibid., p. 315.

[52]It may be that with a history of an independent civil service compared to the American civil service which has such a large element of patronage in it, the public in Britain may have had more positive experiences with the impartiality of the administrative sector. In other words, expecting good treatment may now be a pragmatic assessment and not a reflection of submission because of notions about superiority which seems to be the connotation involved in a "deferential" explanation.

[53]Eckstein, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

[54]Kavanagh, op. cit., p. 335.

[55]The period 1964 to 1970 saw many instances of parliamentary revolt by groups of Labour M.P.'s. In 1969 alone, the government withdrew the controversial labour legislation on unofficial strikes and a bill on reforming the House of Lords at least partly because of the strong opposition within the parliamentary party. The extra-parliamentary opposition from the left wing of the party is illustrated by a party critique published in 1968, by Turell Burgess et al, Matters of Principle: Labour's Last Chance, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968).

[56]Polls, vol. III (1968) p. 39.

[57]The chronology of student activity and demonstrations which follows owes much to chronology presented in Julian Nagel (Ed.) Student Power (London: Merline Press, 1969) pp. 225-235.

[58]I do not wish to overemphasize the international aspect of student activity as if to suggest there is some overarching global cause of this phenomenon. I only wish to make the point that youthful dissent was attracting widespread attention and receiving much more exposure in the media than would a purely national phenomenon. Also, to some extent the international aspect of youthful activism reinforces whatever impetus the national situation may have. For an analysis of student activity and unrest in England see Trevor Fisk, "The Nature and Causes of Student Unrest," Political Quarterly 40 (1969) pp. 419-425.

CHAPTER IV

THE SAMPLE

SECONDARY EDUCATION IN ENGLAND

As mentioned earlier, the data for this study of English adolescents come from a sample of fourth formers who answered paper and pencil questionnaires for the author during school time in the spring and early summer of 1969. Since the structure of the education system at the time of the survey played an important role in determining the selection of appropriate schools for data collection, it is necessary to give some explanation of the system and its organization in order to describe how the participating schools were selected.

From the time of the Education Act of 1944 (which instituted free public education at the secondary level for all up to the age of 15) until just recently, secondary education in England has been mainly structured on the basis of the segregation of pupils according to ability levels. Thus, at about the age of eleven years, most children in the state school system were subjected to some form of selection process, frequently by sitting for standardized tests known as the eleven-plus.[1] On the basis of selection results, the children were directed into one of three types of schools: a grammar school, a secondary modern school, or a technical school.

The most preferred schools, the grammar schools, were designed to cater to the top ability group. These schools were (and still are) academically-oriented institutions whose places were limited to about

one in five primary school children and from whose ranks came most of the state-educated university candidates. Competition for grammar school places has always been severe as many parents see a grammar school education as a necessary stepping stone not only to higher education but also to more desirable kinds of jobs.[2] Technical schools, the second element in the tripartite system, were originally envisioned as an alternative to grammar schools for bright but technically-oriented pupils and were to specialize in technical training and education. However, this alternate form of selective schooling was not very widely developed. In 1952 there were only 291 secondary technical schools compared to 1189 grammar schools, and by 1968 only 2.1% of all maintained (i.e., state supported) secondary school pupils in England and Wales attended secondary technical schools.[3] Secondary modern schools, which were designed to give a more general and practical education, were provided for the formal education of the remainder of the secondary school population, with the exception of those few pupils who, because of various kinds of handicaps, require special schools.

But while secondary modern and grammer schools do still flourish in England, and in January 1968 were still educating the large majority of state-educated secondary pupils, there has been a growing movement in English education away from such bi-partite selection. This has come about through expansion of comprehensive schools. Instead of segregating pupils into different schools on the basis of some kind of "ability" measurement, comprehensive schools are supposed to serve pupils of virtually all ability ranges and provide for them, under one

roof, the choice of academic or vocational programs.

Although there had been some development in the direction of such multilateral schools under a few local education authorities prior to 1964 (particularly in areas whose councils were controlled by Labour Party members), the trend was accelerated with the election of a Labour government to Whitehall in that year. Committed to the task of "[eliminating] separatism in secondary education,"[4] the Labour Government, in 1967, requested local education authorities to "prepare and submit to [the Secretary of State] plans for the reorganization of secondary education in their areas along comprehensive lines." Schools then were to be designed "to cater for all the secondary education of all the children in a given area without an organization in three sides," i.e., technical, grammar and modern.[5]

With this pressure from the central government to reorganize their systems, many areas began to make changes. Thus, by 1968, the year before this survey was conducted, 21% of all children in the state secondary education system were attending comprehensive schools. This is compared to only 7% in 1964.[6]

However, it should be noted that even though the Central Government was committed to changing education to the comprehensive pattern, progress in this direction has been hindered by many obstacles. First of all, the problems and cost involved in restructuring the whole secondary schools system of a locality slowed up reorganization, even in those areas most committed to comprehensive education. Because of the economic situation in the country, extra funds were not available

for education, and consequently the construction of buildings more adequately designed for comprehensive schools was limited. Moreover, many local authorities, in whose hands lie the administration of local schools, resisted making changes which would mean the abolition of their grammar schools, which to them symbolized the best in the English tradition of education. Local Conservative Party organizations themselves often spearheaded the defence of grammar schools and resisted reorganization, even though their national party was committed to the concept (as opposed to enforcement) of comprehensive education.[7]

In 1970, when the Labour Government lost power, and three years after the circular requesting local reorganization plans, only 33% of state-educated secondary pupils were attending comprehensive schools, and some local education authorities still did not have approved proposals for change in their locality.[8] The new Conservative Government withdrew the circular pressuring local authorities to submit reorganization plans along comprehensive lines. The official Government policy was that each local authority should decide for itself on this issue. This in effect strengthened the position of local areas which wanted to keep grammar schools in their local school system and had not yet embarked on a program of comprehensive reorganization. Changes continue in the direction of breaking down selective education, but on a slower pace under a Conservative Government in Whitehall.[9]

Another aspect of the structure of English education which distinguishes it from that found in Canada is the prevalence of single-sex schools at the secondary level. Although coeducational schools are

now the norm in England, 39% of the secondary school pupils were still attending single-sex schools in 1968.[10] Consequently, in any effort to sample pupils from a cross-section of English schools, it is necessary to gain entry to coeducational and non-coeducational institutions.

Finally a word must be said about the nature and role of independent and direct grant schools in the overall school system.[11] This sector of education is both larger and of greater influence in England than are private schools in Canada. This is so largely because of the historical role of the so-called British "public schools." Accordingly, to begin a description of the private sector, one must give some explanation of "public schools" and their position in English secondary education.

Although there is often much confusion as to the specific definition of a public school in Britain (not to be confused with the term as it is used in Canada, for the public schools in Britain would be called private schools in Canada), it is usually associated initially with the more famous of British boys' schools, the 9 Clarendon schools, and then extended to other independent (i.e., non-state) schools according to their prestige.[12] A more arbitrary and probably less contentious meaning of the term can be found if one merely restricts its usage to those independent schools, both male and female, which belong to either of the three public school associations.[13] But whatever definition is used to identify the public schools, they still have a stature and position in British education which is unique.

To begin with, in the 19th Century, the public schools were

virtually the only schools in existence in England for those fortunate enough to educate their children at the secondary school level. This is because the country at that time relied on private enterprise to provide this service to the public, and of course, the fees required by the private institutions prohibited most except the wealthy from sending their children to them to be educated. Even now, except for the free places provided in direct grant schools, the fees of the independent schools have continued to keep them largely a preserve of the well-to-do.[14]

Because of its select clientele the public school sector has a disproportionate role in educating those in the decision-making centers of British society. In particular, the political elite, especially those in the Conservative Party, has close ties to the public school tradition.[15] But the claim to status by the public schools is not just that their pupils are restricted to the offspring of the socially elite (which, for some parents is incentive enough for them to pay the high fees required by these schools). It is also based upon a mystique which surrounds the quality of education they are thought to dispense. Traditionally they have claimed to foster what they call "the public school spirit," an ethic of leadership, duty and resourcefulness which was considered to be the desirable end of a good education. Because they were said to promote this character training, they developed a special mystique as educational institutions.[16] Today the public schools still claim to be especially capable of educating for character development and the virtues of leadership, and because of

their special mystique (largely inherited from the past) these claims are often accepted as valid.

It is, then, both because of this mystique, and the obvious social advantages to be gained through contacts with the offspring of the wealthy and prestigious, that public schools appeal to many parents in Britain. The appeal of the public schools in turn has an effect on other independent (i.e., private) schools. The prestige of the public school is often extended to these other independent schools and accounts to some extent for the popularity of non-state schools in general among upper- and middle-class parents, even among those for whom the high fees may impose some hardship. Further, the negative image of secondary modern schools (and for some parents comprehensive schools also) will motivate many parents to send their children to independent schools when they are not awarded grammar school places. Thus we find in 1967, 10% of the secondary school population attending schools outside the state system.[17]

SELECTING THE SAMPLE

Since the school experience of young people may have implications for political orientations, and since the social and academic characteristics of children are not equally distributed between types of schools in England, it was important when collecting the sample to recognize the structural features of the school system. However, it should also be recognized that while it was possible to include a wide range of adolescents in the study, it was not possible to sample from either the universe of fourth formers, or from the universe of English

secondary schools. Moreover, because of limited finances, it was necessary to restrict data collection to London and Southeast England.[18] These limitations must be kept in mind when interpreting the applicability of these results to the larger population of English adolescents.

The sample itself was obtained from a two-step selection procedure as follows. First of all, a number of schools were approached by the author in an effort to obtain cooperation in the distribution and completion of the questionnaires during school time. Upon approval from the appropriate school authorities, some proportion of the fourth form pupils in the school then filled in the questionnaire in their classrooms under the supervision of the author or a colleague.[19] Since the study was done in conjunction with another survey in order to facilitate access to schools, arrangements were made for half of each school sample to complete the questionnaire for this study and for the remaining half to fill in the questionnaire from the other study. Since the number of fourth form classes available in each school was determined by the individual school administration and was not uniform, the proportion of the fourth form to complete this questionnaire varied from 20% to 50%.

The sample frame for selecting schools was initially set up by classifying schools in the relevant geographical area according to structural type. Schools from each category were then approached (non-randomly) in an attempt to approximate the distribution among school types of the larger adolescent population. Sixteen schools (10 different institutional types) were subsequently sampled and 547 usable questionnaires completed. Included in the schools were: three

grammar schools, four comprehensive schools, eight secondary modern schools and one independent (direct grant) school. Nine of these schools were mixed (coeducational) schools, four of them were girls' schools and three of them were boys' schools.[20]

As is evident from Table 4.1 a reasonable approximation of the state system of pupil distribution among schools types was obtained. Further, respondents from the independent sector were also included. The school visited was a direct grant boys school which has had a long history as a distinguished private establishment.[21] However, as Table 4.2 shows, independent school pupils have been proportionately under-represented.[22] Because of the small numbers involved, this creates some problems for analysis regarding the differences between state schools and their more prestigious counterparts in the private sector. However, this was not considered serious for two reasons. First of all, a number of studies have been and are being conducted into the differential education of independent versus state schools.[23] Consequently, at the time of my survey, it was felt the need for more of these studies in the area of participatory orientations was not of high priority. Moreover, McQuail et al. have already suggested that the search for experiences which contribute to the politicization of adolescents may be unfruitful if merely focused on the public vs. state school dimension. As they stated:

>]Our results] tend to contradict the existing belief that in some mystical manner a public school education trains political leaders and that the experience of super-elite boarding school education instills different values from the state system.[24]

TABLE 4.1

Comparison of Sample and Population Distribution of Pupils Among School Types in the State Sector

Type of School	State Secondary Schools*	Sample
Grammar Schools	17%	26%
Comprehensive Schools	26%	27%
Secondary Modern Schools	49%	48%
Other Secondary Schools	9%	-
	101%	101%

*This is the proportion of pupils aged 14 among maintained schools as of January, 1969.

Source: Statistics in Education: Schools, 1969, v. 1, pp. 12 and 13.

TABLE 4.2

Comparison of the Proportion of Secondary Pupils Attending Independent Schools in the Sample and in the Secondary School Population

	All Secondary School Pupils*	Sample
Maintained	93%	98%
Direct Grant and Independent Schools	8%	2%

*This is the proportion of pupils aged 14 among maintained schools as of January 1, 1969.

Source: Statistics in Education: Schools, 1969, v. 1.

Secondly, it is mainly in the area of mass orientations that we are interested, and both the elite nature of these schools and the small proportion of the total society that they educate made a greater

emphasis on their role unnecessary. In other words, we were more interested in looking at the sample as a microcosm of the larger adolescent population than in examining the apparent future decision-making sector of the society.

Although type of school was a primary condition for sample selection, the choice of schools within these categories was not random. First of all, it was important to include some representation of diverse socio-economic characteristics among the individual respondents. Consequently, a number of the schools were selected because of the presumed social class composition of their student body, or their geographical location as rural or urban. Also, access to schools was problematic and restricted sampling even further.[25]

Since we required at least one period of school time in which to conduct our research, it was understandable that some schools were reluctant to participate simply because of the time required. In addition, the restructuring of the secondary school system created a special problem. One by-product of the changeover to comprehensive schooling has been that many administrators are bombarded by requests to conduct educational research in their schools. Of necessity they have had to limit access to their pupils, even though they were otherwise receptive to research projects in their schools. Also, there were some kinds of personal reservations which school teachers and administrators seemed to have concerning the conduct of research in their schools. For example, one imagines that more traditional headmasters and headmistresses were less willing to participate in this sort of project,

particularly since we included in our interview schedules questions concerning the pupils' perceptions of the decision-making processes in their schools. For these and other reasons, we received some refusals from school administrators and were forced to find a number of replacement schools.[26]

The result of all of this was a distribution of schools with a varied cross-section of characteristics in terms of their social and physical environments. They generally tended to be older schools, as are a majority of schools in England, but there was one brand-new comprehensive school in the group and a few others had relatively new structures or additions. Two of the schools had very recently undergone reorganization in the changeover to comprehensive: one of them had been a grammar school and the other had been a secondary modern school.

Three of the schools were situated in highly urbanized, hard-core working-class locations. (Two of these were in areas dominated by one firm and are best described as neighborhoods of the affluent working class. The third was in the inner London area with a relatively high non-white immigrant population.) Five of the schools were situated in middle-class or upper middle-class suburban areas (three of them bordering on the London conurbation), and two more schools were situated in relatively affluent towns of less than 25,000, and apparently drew from a middle-class element.

The remaining six schools were in neighborhoods of mixed social class composition which, judging from the occupations of the fathers

of the fourth formers interviewed, appeared to be mainly composed of the families of skilled manual workers and middle-class non-professionals.[27] Four of them were in urban localities of the London area; one of them was in a semi-urban setting and drew both from the large seaside resort town in which it was situated and the surrounding local area; and one was in a village just outside a city of 50,000.[28]

Generally speaking, this distribution of schools, and consequently of respondents, was limited in its social class representation. Using pupil reports of their fathers' occupation as criteria for establishing manual or non-manual status, we find that only 36% of the pupils would be counted as coming from working-class homes (i.e., homes in which the male head of the household was manually employed) and 53% were from middle-class homes.[29] By contrast, the 1961 census distribution of the employed male population in England and Wales showed about 65% manually employed.[30]

However, the social class distribution among schools did reflect two other features of the class structure of English secondary schools: 1) the relationship between social class and educational selection,[31] and 2) the middle ground that comprehensive schools seem to hold between secondary modern schools and grammar schools in terms of social class composition.[32] Thus we found that our grammar schools were more likely to be middle-class institutions than their secondary modern counterparts, and they educated a disproportionate number of the middle-class children. (See Table 4.3.) On the other hand, children of working-class origins were most heavily represented in secondary modern and

comprehensive schools, although somewhat less so in comprehensive schools.

Finally, a word must be said about the selective nature of the schools which willingly cooperate in a research program such as this. As implied earlier, it is likely that schools with very traditional heads are not represented in this sample. However, we were impressed with the diversity of attitudes toward discipline and toward methods of education and organization among the schools we visited. Certainly, authority and discipline appeared more formal and possibly rigid in intent (if not always in effect) than that which the author has encountered in Canadian schools. One of the most obvious manifestations of this was the greater insistence upon demonstrations of respect for the teachers, such as the practice of having pupils remain standing while the teacher walks into the room. But in general, there was still a wide range of experience in this area both between and within the participating schools.

TABLE 4.3

Social Class Composition of Different School Types in the Sample

Father's Occupation*	Type of School Attended: Grammar	Comprehensive	Secondary Modern
Non-manual	89%	55%	42%
Manual	11%	45%	58%
	100%	100%	100%
	(140)	(149)	(195)

*Where father was not living at home, or the child had no male guardian, the mother's occupation was used as the indicator of social class background here.

In terms of ability groupings of the pupils, the schools and classrooms we sampled included virtually all ability levels, both because we visited schools from the two tiers of the selective system in addition to the more heterogeneous comprehensive schools, and because we were neither restricted to interviewing the "best" classes in the schools as showpieces, nor were we relegated to disturbing only the less motivated or lower-achievement classes. A number of the schools made special efforts to provide us with a cross-section of the fourth form, while in six of the schools the entire fourth form was included in one of the two studies being conducted. In the remaining schools the selection of fourth-form classes to which we had access resulted, in the end, in a balance of the kinds of classes we had interviewed.

FOOTNOTES

[1]The notion that the selection processes which have been and are being used to classify children into these two levels are based on measures of ability has, more recently, come under fire by many psychologists and educators in England. If they measure anything at all clearly, it is probally more accurately called achievement levels.

[2]It is theoretically possible for secondary modern pupils to get the same academic certificates as grammar school pupils by taking the same standardized state examinations. But most secondary modern pupils settle for the more watered down tests now available for less academic pupils.

[3]Technical schools have not generally appealed to pupils of high ability; and in any case, the schools merely seem to educate similarly to the grammar or secondary modern schools, depending on the general ability level of their pupils, rather than providing distinctive form of education. See Olive Banks, Parity and Prestige in English Secondary Education (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955), pp. 151-167. The 1968 statistics above and all those statistics on the 1968 secondary school population used hereafter were, unless otherwise indicated, made available to me by Mr. D. Pickford from the Department of Education and Science. They have subsequently been published in Statistics of Education 1968: Schools Vol. I (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1969). These statistics all refer to the secondary school population of England and Wales. (Scotland is not included in school population statics because it has its own system of education.)

[4]Quoted in T.G. Monks, Comprehensive Education in England and Wales (National Foundation for Educational Research in England and Wales, 1968) p. 2.

[5]Quoted from the circular in Ibid., p. 2.

[6]See Department of Education and Science yearly publications, Statistics of Education (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office)

[7]The Times Educational Supplement, Oct. 11, 1968 "Grammar Schools Defended" p. 756. See also "No Compulsion Say Tories, Cuts Condemned" by Anna Sproule, p. 756, Ibid. for the debate on policy within the Tory Party.

[8]Statistics of Education:1970:Schools, Vol. I (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1971), p. 2. The central Government reviewed all reorganization proposals to see if they conformed with the principles of multilateral education as interpreted by the Government. The plans were then either accepted or rejected. If they were rejected, the local

educational authority was required to submit new plans more in accord with the policies of the central authorities.

[9]For a recent history of this change to comprehensive schooling, and a description of present-day comprehensive schools in Britain, see Caroline Benn and Brian Simon, Half Way There (Harmonds-Worth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1972).

[10]In total, the distribution of my sample, in representing both single-sex and coeducational schools, somewhat over-represented the single-sex schools but was able to obtain an equal balance of male/female respondents. Forty-eight percept of the respondents were male and 52% of the respondents were female. The table below shows the distribution of single-sex and coeducational schools both in my sample and the larger school population.

Distribution of Pupils in Single-Sex and Coeducational Institutions

Type of School	Sample	1968 School Population*
Single-Sex	50%	38%
Coeducational	50%	62%
	100%	100%

*These figures are based upon state-supported secondary schools only and do not include the independent sector.

[11]I have included direct grant schools in this discussion of the independent sector because most of these schools were originally fully independent, and because they share many of the characteristics of the fully independent schools, both in their histories and the clientele they presently serve.

[12]The Clarendon schools include: Charterhouse, Eton, Harrow, Merchant Taylors, Rugby, St. Paul's, Shrewbury, Westminster and Winchester.

[13]The Public School Associations are: the Headmaster's Conference, the Association of the Governing Bodies of Public Schools and the Association of Governing Bodies of Girls' Public Schools. This definition of public schools is in fact the one used by the 1967 Government inquiry into the Public Schools, The Report of the Public Schools Commission (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1968), Vols. I and II. My discussion on the public schools draws a great deal from this excellent study of the independent sector in English education. The specific frame of reference of this inquiry was to

"advise on the best way of integrating the public schools with the state system of education." Their report sets out a brief outline of the nature of the independent sector in education which is informative for those not acquainted with the British school system, (see pp. 17-21, Vol. I). In addition, they give an excellent detailed account of the nature of the public schools, their clientele and the kind of education they provide.

[14]See Ibid., p. 28.

[15]W.E. Guttsman, The British Political Elite (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1965).

[16]Report of the Public Schools Commission, Vol. I, pp. 17-18.

[17]Ibid., p.34. This includes direct grant schools and fully independent schools. 3.2 percent of this 10% were in direct grant schools and 6.4% were in independent schools.

[18]This geographical restriction has meant that areas of England often characterized as more traditional have not been included in the study.

[19]Supervision was sometimes assisted by classroom teachers, particularly when a number of classes were completing the questionnaire at one time.

[20]There is at least one girls' school, one boys' school and one mixed school from each type of state school except the comprehensive schools. Here we were not able to obtain access to a boys' comprehensive. However, as comprehensive schools are generally newer organizations, they tend to be co-educational, and lack of a single-sex school in this category is not serious. (Of all the state secondary pupils attending comprehensive schools in 1968, 78% were at co-educational institutions. Statistics of Education: 1968.)

[21]This particular school found it necessary to change over to direct grant status for financial reasons. Direct grant schools in England receive government grants for operating costs in return for admitting at least 1/4 non-fee paying pupils from the local school district.

[22]Although 10% of all secondary school pupils in England and Wales attended private schools in 1967, only 8% of all pupils aged 14 were attending such schools. The proportion of an age group attending private schools increases with age beyond 14 as private school pupils tend to remain in school longer than do pupils in the state system.

[23]My colleague in the questionnaire distribution, Miss Seyd was studying aspects of public school education in her study of the political socialization of British secondary school pupils. Paul Abramson compared samples from boys' grammar schools, secondary modern schools and a public school in his doctoral dissertation, Education and Political Socialization: A Study of English Secondary Education (University of California, Berkeley, 1967) and in "The Differential Political Socialization of English Secondary School Students," Sociology of Education 40 (1967), pp. 246-269. Also, McQuail et al., "Elite Education and Political Values," Political Studies XVI (1968) pp. 257-266 have looked at the influence of public school education on participation and other political values.

[24]McQuail et al., p. 266.

[25]Since there is a large degree of independence granted to secondary schools in England, it was decided the best approach to the problem of finding schools in which to conduct our research was to contact the heads of secondary schools individually rather than working through local education authorities. This was done, by and large, through contacting the heads by mail and following this up with a personal telephone call.

[26]A small number of schools required permission from their advisory boards or from the local education authority before they would permit us access to their pupils.

[27]Parental occupational descriptions were provided by the fourth formers themselves and not the parents nor the schools. This may have introduced some element of error into the classification of the pupils according to social class characteristics.

[28]One of the London area schools, like the inner city school, serviced a substantial immigrant population.

[29]Data on this variable was missing for 10% of the sample. Recalculated using only non-missing responses the proportion of working class pupils increases to 40% while the middle class composition is 59%.

[30]See the 1961 statistics given in R. Knight "Changes in Occupational Structure of the Working Population," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Part 3 (1967), pp. 408-422.

[31]The relationship between type of school and the social class origins of its student body has been a subject of extensive comment in the literature on the English bi-partite system but it has been less of an object for statistical analysis. However, two sources of national data are available on the class composition of the secondary schools. The first source, a National Service Survey, done for the Central

Advisory Council on Education in the 1950s, indicated the following breakdown of their sample according to social class background and type of school attended:

	Type of School Attended:*	
Parental Occupation:	Grammar	Modern
Professional & Managerial	26%	3%
Clerical and other Non-manual	18%	9%
Skilled Manual	44%	49%
Semi-skilled and Unskilled	12%	39%
	100%	100%
	(n=1,425)	(n=3,354)

*From a random sample of young men who began National Service between 1956 and 1958.

Source: Central Advisory Council on Education, 15 to 18, Vol. II, pp. 125-128.

Although the above information comes from, and therefore is limited to, young men undergoing their compulsory national service between 1956 and 1958, it is still thought to be indicative of the general pattern of education at that time. Furthermore, the second survey, a Gallup Youth Survey of boys and girls ages 16, 17 and 18 (collected in 1960) substantiated the earlier evidence with the following figures:

	Social Class:	
Type of School Attended:	Manual	Non-manual
Secondary Modern	74%	41%
Grammar	19%	50%
Other*	7%	9%
	100%	100%

*This remaining percentage was not broken down further.

Source: Abramson, Education and Political Socialization.

[32]Statistics on the social class composition of comprehensive schools are even more scarce than those of secondary modern and grammar schools. Part of this is, of course, because many comprehensive schools have just been established recently. However, one study of 331 comprehensive schools done in 1967 estimated the social class composition of these schools as follows:

Professional	9%
Clerical	12%
Skilled	37%
Semi-skilled and unskilled	46%
	104%*

*The total is over 100% because the figures were estimates given in large class intervals for each school.

Source: Monks, op. cit., p. 92.

These figures suggest a greater proportion of middle-class pupils in comprehensive schools compared to secondary modern schools and a somewhat smaller proportion than in grammar schools.

CHAPTER V

CREATING THE MEASURE: POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

In the literature on political participation, there is considerable variation in what is included within the scope of the term political participation, and what are considered valid measures for it. On the one hand are a number of observers who, in studying political participation, find its primary significance in the larger political effects it may have. They tend to limit their definitions of participation to those kinds of political behaviour which are directed towards influencing what happens in government.[1] On the other hand, there are those who, apparently more interested in individual participation per se, are less narrow in their definitions of the activities and, in some cases, the psychological orientations they consider to be elements of political participation. Thus, for example, both McClosky and Milbraith include seeking political information and discussing politics with friends as participation of a sort,[2] while Verba, Nie and Kim explicitly exclude it as not being aimed at influencing "the selection of governmental personnel and/or decisions they make."[3] On the psychological dimension, Alford and Scoble, concerned with the realities of what they call "actual" political involvement (compared to the "legitimacy of participation by all strata of society" which is the legal norm), include an index of political interest as one indicator for their conception of local political participation.[4]

It seems appropriate that studies which are concerned with the effects of participation on system output, or the extent to which participation in the (political) decision-making process of a society is

shared, should limit their definitions of participation to activities which are directed to influencing government. Indeed, in defining characteristics of a "participant" democracy, more stringent definitions for what is considered actual participation in decision-making are in order.[5] However, in this study the focus is not on the nature of the political system, whether participation in decision-making is widely shared. Nor is it on the political effects of participation. As indicated in Chapter I, the study is motivated by concern for the individual as participant in the political process because of the possible implications for individual development. In this respect, the model here is the "ideal" citizen of (unrevised) democratic theory.[6]

As emphasized in the introductory chapter, this ideal citizen is more than a merely perfunctory participant who votes in every election yet remains essentially apolitical between trips to the ballot box. The ideal citizen also exhibits an interest in politics, has an informed concern about public issues, pays attention to the coverage of political affairs presented through the media or other communication sources -- and, at some time or other, engages in political activity beyond the simple act of casting a vote in public elections. To use the terminology of Alford and Scoble, this person would be politically involved. With this as our model, the exploration of adolescents' political orientations -- more specifically, the nature of their anticipatory citizenship -- should also be concerned with the extent of the young person's total political involvement, both psychological and behavioural.

But in choosing the measures to use as indicators of political involvement for adolescents, it must also be recognized that the opportunities for involvement available to them are restricted. They are

limited in the kinds of overt activity which they may undertake simply because of age requirements placed on such things as voting or running for political office. While it may be argued that because of this it is unlikely that politics is at all relevant for adolescents, there is still some range of political behaviours available to them, including, for example, media usage and participation in other forms of political communication. And it is probably such elementary "participation" which leads to the development of more active participation as adults.[7] Also, there are some kinds of public activity such as participation in political demonstrations or limited forms of political campaigning which are not age-restricted.[8] Moreover, the psychological component of political involvement, in terms of interest and concern about public issues is quite meaningfully applicable to them. But generally speaking, it is the spectator aspects of political involvement which are most accessible to adolescents. Participation in the form of overt political activities of a more formal kind is less frequent. This being the case, it makes sense to give greater attention to types of behaviour of the former kind. Thus, in setting out questionnaire, items covering a range of indicators of political involvement were included, but a greater proportion of these items were related to spectator forms of involvement than to more overt (behaviour-act) forms of involvement. Responses to the items were then analyzed in the attempt to set out a scale measuring political involvement.

The spectator items covered three different classes of involvement. These could be described roughly as: 1) political communication

(discussing politics with others); 2) attentiveness to political affairs (including media habits); 3) importance of the political world to the respondent.[9] The items used to measure more overt political activity were concerned with membership in political clubs, political campaign activity and participation in a political demonstration.[10] The items were coded according to criteria suggested by classical democratic theory such that responses coded as high seemed to indicate sustained political interest and consistent involvement, especially at the spectator level. For example, to score high on media items the respondent had to indicate he or she used the media almost every day. Or to score high on political discussion respondents had to indicate that they frequently discussed current political issues, and that they "took sides" on at least three out of four current issues.[11]

A cross-correlation of all the spectator items indicated fairly high correlations both within and between the three classes of involvement, suggesting that an additive scaling technique was appropriate for these three kinds of items.[12] However, this kind of pattern was not evident in the items on more active participation. First of all, it appeared that participation in a political demonstration -- at least for adolescents -- reflects a quite different kind of behaviour than does membership in a political club or participation in a political campaign. The relationship of this variable to the other items, of both active and spectator variety, was generally either negative or statistically and substantively insignificant. With the other two items there was some correlation between activity and spectator involvement,

but this kind of participation was still very limited. Only 6.5% of the adolescents indicated either participation in a political campaign or membership in a political club. Since this represented only a small number of respondents, it was thought that further exploration on the basis of these indicators would not be very fruitful. Thus the spectator items alone were used to develop the involvement scale.

In order that all three classes of spectator involvement could contribute equally to the final political involvement scale, three standardized, composite indices were created to score the three kinds of spectator involvement. The distribution of sample scores on these three indices, essentially averages of the component items which had been standardized according to criteria outlined above, is shown in Table 5.1. The respondents' scores on these three indices were then averaged to create the final measure of political involvement. The resulting distribution of the sample according to this measure is as follows:

Low	32%
Moderate:	48%
High:	20%

It is this distribution which will now be used to examine the background and experiences which are correlated with adolescent spectator involvement.[13]

The independent variables which have been selected for analysis were derived both from the literature on political socialization and from studies on adult participation. But the analysis has been arranged in accord with a socialization model so that we will look first at

variables from the most proximate milieu of the child and work out to the less immediate features of his/her environment. Thus we will look at variables descriptive of the family unit first, then we will consider the child's social class background as the predominant feature of the environment within which the family unit is situated. With some perspective on the influence of these factors, we will consider a number of other intermediate factors, including the school, group memberships and social role expectations which might differentiate on the basis of sex.[14] Following this sequence of analyses, we will look at the question of political deference as a second element in the participatory dimension, a matter which requires special attention in the English context, considering the rather common tendency to characterize English political culture as "deferential."

TABLE 5.1

Sample Distribution on Spectator Indices

	Low	Moderate	High
Political Communication	44%	38%	17%
Attention to Politics	50%	31%	19%
Importance of Politics	19%	57%	23%

FOOTNOTES

[1]See for example, Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie and Jae-on Kim, Modes of Democratic Participation: A Cross-National Comparison Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971), pp. 9-11, and Geraint Parry, op. cit., pp. 3-5.

[2]H. McClosky, "Political Participation," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968, Vol. 12, pp. 252-56.

[3]Op. cit., p. 9.

[4]Robert R. Alford and Harry M.Scoble, "Sources of Local Political Involvement," American Political Science Review, LXII (December, 1968), pp. 1192-93.

[5]Parry makes this point in op. cit., p. 4.

[6]That is, the variation of democratic political theory which is concerned with the developmental potential of participation.

[7]Adolescents who do "participate" in this way will probably be more sensitive to political cues (from the environment) which stimulate active involvement among adults.

[8]Although active participation in a political campaign is rare for adolescents, wearing a party symbol and distributing party literature is done more frequently.

[9]See Appendix A for the wording of questionnaire items involved.

[10]The questions were as follows:

1. "Do you belong to any political clubs or associations? If so could you name them for us?"
2. "Some people your age take part in election campaigns by wearing party rosettes, distributing leaflets or doing something like that for a candidate or their favorite party. Have you even taken party in a political campaign? Yes/No".
3. "Have you ever taken part in a march or demonstration? Yes/No. If YES, what was it about?" (Only pupils who took part in demonstrations which could be considered as being concerned with political issues were coded as participants.)

[11]See Appendix A.

[12]A further check on the unidimensionality of the items through factor analysis validated the adoption of a single additive scale.

[13]Although an attempt was made to code the items in a manner consistent with the canons of democratic theory as described as important

earlier, no claim is made that the categories of low, medium, and high have intrinsic meaning in themselves. They are to a large extent arbitrary cutting points, to be used here only in a comparative perspective, comparing groups as to their disproportionate loadings in any of the categories.

[14]Sex differences can be viewed from a number of perspectives, including ones that view sex-role training as a function performed largely by the family. Since the analysis in this study presumes that sex-role expectations relevant to political behaviour are also transmitted by agencies outside the family (such as the school and the mass media), this variable has been included with variables of the "intermediate" environment. It should be noted that this variable has ambivalent status and that the family may have, however, an important role in establishing sex difference, if indeed there are any in this area.

CHAPTER VI

THE FAMILY

Since the family is the most immediate socializing agency children experience in their early lives, it is not surprising that political scientists have looked here for the source of many of the political dispositions adults display. Both the frequency of contact and the apparent resources the parents in particular command with respect to their offspring are strong evidence for a _prima facie_ case that the family wields important influence in the development of the personality and political outlook manifested by adults.

> Whether the child is conscious or unaware of the impact, whether the process is role-modelling or overt transmission, whether the values are political and directly usable or "non-political" but transferable, and whether what is passed on lies in the cognitive or affective realm, it has been argued that the family is of paramount importance.[1]

And generally speaking, this perspective seemed at one time to be confirmed by adult voting studies from a number of countries.[2] These studies reported that there was significant parent-child correspondence on party affiliation when adults were asked to recall their parents' party affiliation.[3]

But more recently assumptions about the pre-eminent position of the family in the (political) socialization process have been questioned by the results of some research.[4] It seems that since the saliency of the political world is not very high for most families and there are a number of other possible socialization agencies, especially in the context of an industrialized, urbanized society, the role of the family can

no longer be considered a foregone conclusion.[5] Factors ranging from formal schooling to the ever present electronic media can now intervene in the socialization process. It is therefore necessary to conduct careful and systematic investigation into both the role and nature of family influence in all domains of the political personality.

For the purposes of exploring the family as a politicizing vehicle, the literature suggests two relevant themes. The first, a question of direct socialization is concerned with the theme of role-modelling. To what extent does the child become interested and concerned about the political world as a result of the example his or her parents set? The second theme, an issue of indirect socialization, does, roughly speaking, consider the family as a "practise unit" for the political world. It suggests that practise as a participant in the family decision-making unit may sensitize the child to participation in general, and thus may encourage involvement in the political world. These two themes will provide the basis upon which we will explore the role of the family in the development of political involvement among adolescents.

PARENTAL POLITICAL ROLE-MODELLING

The question of the direct transference of political orientations (either consciously or unconsciously) from parent to child has probably been the dominant focus of research into the family as an agent of political socialization. And in one area in particular, the transmission of partisan attachments, some influence of the family still seems to be evident. Following up the adult studies which used recall data to

determine child-parent correspondence, Jennings and Niemi conducted a nation-wide study of American teenagers and their parents to substantiate intergenerational correlation, the recall data being suspect because of problems of memory and perceptual distortion.[6] The teenagers and their parents were classified according to their political party preferences; i.e., they were Democratic, Republican or "independent." Fifty-nine percent of the teenagers fell into the same category as did their parents, and only 7% fell into conflicting party categories (in which the teenager supported one party when the parent supported the other party).[7] Similarly, in Britain a much smaller non-random survey of 144 child-parent pairs indicated a .45 correlation in parent-child identification.[8] While this particular agreement was only modest, it does suggest that the political (partisan) effect of the family is not neutral.

But in other areas of investigation, even this kind of correspondence between parent and child has not been prevalent. In fact, apart from party identification and common cultural values such as commitment to the political system, Jennings and Niemi report (from their American national sample) that "parental values are an extremely variable and often feeble guide as to what the pre-adult's values will be."[9] Having looked for student-parent agreement in a wide area of political values and viewpoints, they found that where there was any correspondence at all in their data, it was greatest on issues of a more specific, concrete nature.[10]

In looking at research specifically concerned with the transfer of political interest and involvement we find mixed conclusions. In

studying a sample of American college students and their parents in the 1950s, Uyeki and Dodge found a significant positive relationship between the parents and their offspring on an index of political involvement.[11] Similarly, in reporting on the British electorate, Butler and Stokes noted that where their respondents recalled neither parent to be interested in politics, nearly 60% were themselves not very interested in politics. Only one-third of the respondents who recalled that both parents were interested in politics showed "not much" interest in the public realm.[12] On the other hand, using an English sample of child-parent pairs, Dowse and Hughes found only a low association between parents' and children's stated political interest (gamma = .20).[13]

It may of course be argued that insofar as the evidence relates significant parent-child transmission, it is not very convincing. For the Uyeki and Dodge study, the sample, being college students, was too selective and could have differed from the general population in terms of child-parent relationships. And, although the Butler and Stokes study sampled a cross-section of the general adult electorate, these data are subject to errors of recall. Middle-aged respondents may be hard-pressed to remember with any accuracy the political environment of their homes when they were youngsters.

Yet, notwithstanding the relatively low correlation reported by Dowse and Hughes, it would still seem that the general hypothesis on the importance of role-modelling is a good one. That is, the interest a child's parents show in the political realm would seem to be an

important influence on the development of political involvement of their offspring. Moreover, aside from the exemplary effect of parental behavior, one expects that both political conversations and political stimuli from the media are greater in a home where parents are politically interested and involved, and more exposure means more opportunity for interest to develop among the offspring. Furthermore, as an exemplary characteristic, political involvement seems to be a relatively stable orientation among adults and is probably less subject to change than are many other political dispositions. It is where political orientations are likely to fluctuate that transmission to the child is more difficult. In fact behavioral (and motivational) elements, of which nature is our political involvement variable, would seem to be different in general from "substantial" political orientations (i.e., issue opinions and attitudinal positions). The behavioral elements certainly, and probably the motivational features, are more concrete, visible and stable than are (many) political values. And abstractness and low visibility as well as instability seem responsible for the negligible transference of many political values from parent to child.[14]

Although the Dowse and Hughes study does call into question this position on the transmission of interest from parent to child -- because it was able to examine responses from a sample of child-parent pairs -- it has itself a serious drawback. The study uses a single-item indicator for the child's political interest (namely, 'How interested would you say that you are in politics?'[15]),

where the use of only one item is a questionable technique for measurement. The single-item indicator poses a problem in index reliability because of error due to such factors as the wording of the question, the method of questionnaire administration, or the differential meaning of specific responses to individual respondents, and this would seem to be particularly relevant for studies involving younger persons.[16] Generally speaking, then it has not been established whether political involvement, like party identification, is amenable to parent-child transfer.

In order to test this hypothesis, a simple index called "parental political model" was devised from questions put to the young people concerning their parents' interest and activity in politics. If parents were said to take part in political activity besides voting and were described as being quite or very interested in politics and public affairs, they were scored highest on the political model index. Parents described as very interested in politics but not active beyond voting in elections were given the second highest scores. Moderate scores as political models were given for parents described as quite interested in politics but not politically active. Finally, parents described as not very or not at all interested in politics were scored lowest (as politically apathetic).[17] While correlations of this index with that of the personal political involvement scores of the pupils are still subject to methodological criticism, in that the adolescents could have misperceived their parents' interest in politics (though they are not as likely to be inacurrate about actual parental political behaviors such as political campaigning

and so on), it is more sound than using adult recall because it does not suffer the further problem of possible memory lapses and interpretations influenced by experiences in later adult life. Secondly, in using a more sophisticated measure of the young person's political involvement, we are in that sense performing some check on the Dowse and Hughes conclusions.

In looking at the child-parent comparison we find quite a significant correlation between the parent-child scores. Of those pupils whose parents scored highest on the political model index, only 5% scored low on political involvement. Further, only 18% of the pupils whose parents were scored as very interested but not politically active, showed low personal involvement scores. On the other hand, 56% of the pupils whose parents were scored as politically apathetic also themselves scored low on political involvement. (See Table 6.1) These figures suggest it is indeed more difficult for young persons to develop keen motivations towards politics when the home environment provides little support or reinforcement for their interest.

TABLE 6.1

Parental Political Model:

Political Involvement:	Apathetic	Moderate	High Interest	Mobilized
Low	56%	30%	18%	5%
Moderate	37%	51%	48%	62%
High	7%	19%	35%	33%
	100% (n=125)	100% (n=285)	101% (n=63)	99% (n=99)

Gamma = .48
χ^2 $p < .001$

The apparent difference between these data and the Dowse and Hughes findings points up the need for studies of parent-child correspondence using less subjective measures of parent involvement. For example, it would be of advantage to use measures of media usage and political communication practises as well as measures of more overt political activity such as campaigning and other electoral and party activities. In this way, validity problems due to differences in young people's interpretations of subjective measures could perhaps be avoided. In the meantime, in virtually all of the available data it seems apparent there is some tendency for parental involvement to affect youngsters. The question now is, where does this kind of family influence fit in with other socializing agencies and influences? In this respect, concern for the development of participation orientations among future generations leads us to ask under what conditions will parental apathy be least likely to prejudice the adolescent's emerging attitudes and motivation regarding participation. We will return to this question in a number of contexts throughout the study in our efforts to look into the socialization factors which contribute to political involvement versus apathy and disinterest.

FAMILY DEMOCRACY

Persons concerned with the development of social and political orientations have long been attracted to the notion that childhood experiences in the family authority system have implications for adult predispositions. This was (and is) largely due to the influence of Freudian psychology on the psychological models being applied to explain

social and political attitudes and behavior. These models thus tend to emphasize the projection of the early family experiences to the larger political world. Accordingly, in seeking the roots of totalitarianism prior to and during World War II, explanations for the popularity of Naziism in Germany were often given in terms of the authoritarian character of the pre-war German family.[18] Then the classic study of authoritarian predispositions that was carried out in the United States during and after the war by Adorno et al. suggested that authoritarian political orientations were ultimately traceable to a person's early authority relations with his or her parents.[19]

However, in the ensuing debate in political science concerning the role of early non-political family experiences in the development of adult responses to the political realm, it became clear that at least the more simplistic models which conceive of the political system as the family writ large are not fully adequate. This was emphasized by Easton and Hess, who noted that, in data from the United States, comparisons between children's views of their father and the President began to diverge as they acquired increasing information about the presidency as a political role. Consequently, in the responses of older children, assessments of the President were less and less like assessments the children made of their fathers.[20] Similarly, among adults, the relationship to political predispositions of non-political attitudes toward authority is not always one of generalization from the non-political to the political realm.[21] Other factors such as class or cultural norms and beliefs, which are guides to "appropriate ideologies," may inhibit the

the projection of non-political attitudes to politics.[22] There is, it seems, an important element of specifically political learning which accounts for many political attitudes. In the area of participation we have already seen that the direct transmission of political orientations within the family has some importance for political involvement.

Further, to concentrate on the family as the authority system which conditions one's responses to the political realm is to ignore other authority systems in society with which one may interact and which may also contribute to the development of expectations and predispositions to political authority. That is, individuals may generalize from experiences with authority systems or organizations other than the family. Of particular relevance here would be adult experiences in the work place.[23] Thus the model of early and indirect socialization of political orientations, where the emphasis is on non-political aspects of family experience, is too narrow if it excludes other relevant socialization experiences, or even if it assumes (without further investigation) the over-riding importance of the family authority structure.

This is not to say that this family variable should be discarded, only that it should be included as one of the possible explanations to explore. In other words, there is still credibility in the notion that family authority relations of childhood and adolescence may have some implication for political orientations, especially where other experiences more relevant for conscious political learning are infrequent or absent. Almond and Verba, for example, found that among respondents with no secondary education, those who remembered having had some role in

family decisions in their childhood tended to score higher on subjective (political) competence than those who remembered only non-participatory experience from their childhood.[24]

Yet, although these data are suggestive of the direction and implication non-political experiences in the family may have for participation, they do not specifically attack this question. And there has been no further work to relate such experiences to political participation and involvement. This is so in spite of the fact that a logical extension of notions concerning the generalization from family roles to political roles would be that persons who had participated in family decisions in their youth would be predisposed towards a participatory role as a citizen.

Using adolescent data to begin exploration into this relationship between family authority systems and citizen participation is particularly appropriate. First of all, if the variable of family experience does have an impact, then the relationship should be strongest during adolescence, before other adult experiences and learning have a resocializing (or deflecting) effect. If there is no relationship between these variables during adolescence, it would seem unlikely that an effect would surface in later life. The second reason that adolescent data are desirable at this stage is the methodological one and concerns the using of adult recall material as a valid indicator of pre-adult experience. As noted above (in reference to recall data of parental political interest and preferences), there are problems of memory distortion which call into question the degree of reliability we may attach to adult responses. This is not to say that adult perceptions of childhood experiences are

invalid, only that they are not as reliable as data collected during youth.

Yet, even in looking at the family structure effect when it should be strongest, it should be recognized that determining the nature of family authority relations is neither straightforward nor simple. Even a thorough investigation of these authority relations from the child's point of view would be a complicated procedure. Thus in testing family relations as just one variable of many to explore, and without the benefit of parent interviews, it was not possible to cover all the issues involved in assessing the family authority structure. Consequently, in this study a single aspect of family relations was tested using a three-item scale. This scale, measuring the extent to which the pupils perceived themselves as participating in family decisions, was used as an admittedly crude indicator of family democracy.[25]

In general, the pupils reported they did play a role in family decisions. When asked how much influence they felt they had in family decisions that affected them, 65% said they had "quite a bit" or a "great deal" of influence and only 4% said they had little or no influence. In comparing these figures with the number of adults in the Almond and Verba sample who remembered having had some influence in similar family decisions, it appears that there has been an increased democratization of family life in Britain. Twenty-six percent of their adult respondents reported they had no influence compared to the 4% of this sample.[26]

Looking at the relevance of family experience for the political

culture, it seems that this democratization may have implications. Insofar as we are concerned with preparing the adolescents for the role of citizen, there appears to be some basis for the belief that participation in the family is a contributing factor for some adolescents. There is a positive relationship between perceived family "democracy" and political involvement (gamma = .40),and the number of political apathetics decreases from 51% among those pupils reporting low family participation to 29% among those pupils reporting high participation. (See Table 6.2)

TABLE 6.2

Political Involvement by Perceived Family Authority Structure

Political Involvement:	Perceived Family Structure: Non-democratic	Moderately Democratic	Democratic
Low	51%	37%	21%
Moderate	39%	52%	49%
High	11%	11%	29%
	101% (n=83)	100% (n=186)	99% (n=248)

Gamma = .40
χ^2 < .001

To anticipate the discussion in the next chapter, it is important here to consider the role class plays in the relationship just recorded. It is thought that social class background may have implications for involvement independent of the characteristics of the family unit under

discussion in this Chapter. In other words, the class environment may have a direct effect on political involvement. But the literature on social class childrearing practises also suggests that there may be class related differences in the way offspring in a family are treated. Thus some question arises as to whether what we have observed is really the effect of family or merely a spurious correlation, the result of the class factor.[27]

While it would be misleading to typify classes in terms of a predominant mode of childrearing,[28] the scattered data available on this subject do lead one to suspect working class children may experience (and therefore report) a less participatory role in family decision-making than do middle class children. For example, cross-cultural data (from the U.S. and Italy) which suggests a general relationship between parental values and social stratification (irrespective of culture), found middle class parents showed greater preference for self-direction on the part of their children than did working class parents. Working class parents on the other hand, appeared to place greater emphasis on obedience.[29] It could well be expected that working class parents, who place a higher value on obedience would be less disposed to allowing their children much participation in the decision-making of the family, especially when it comes to arguments between the parent and child.[30] Indeed, when we look at the sample breakdown according to social class (see Table 6.3), we find that children from middle class homes do report slightly higher levels of participation in family decision-making than do children from working class families (albeit the differences are not great). And, although the apparent effect of family structure is somewhat different within

social classes, the original relationship between family structure and involvement is not wiped out.

TABLE 6.3

Perceived Family Authority Structure by Social Class

Perceived Family Authority Structure:	Social Class: Working Class	Middle Class
Non-democratic	18%	12%
Moderately Democratic	40%	33%
Democratic	42%	55%
	100% (n=230)	100% (n=229)

Gamma = .21

As indicated in Table 6.4, the correlation between students' perceptions of their family authority system and their political involvement scores falls from .38 among middle class pupils to .28 among working class pupils. In addition, among working class adolescents, the greatest change in involvement scores occurs not between those pupils reporting virtually no participation in family decisions and those who report participation of a modest degree, but between those reporting moderate participation and those reporting high participation in their family role. Thus while high levels of participation in family decision-making seem to have some potential for fostering political involvement among young people, it appears to be both more prevalent and more effective among middle class families.

TABLE 6.4

Political Involvement by Perceived Family Authority and Social Class

	Social Class:					
	Working Class			Middle Class		
Political Involvement:	Non-Democratic	Moderately Democratic	Democratic	Non-Democratic	Moderately Democratic	Democratic
Low	52%	50%	33%	39%	22%	14%
Moderate	36%	44%	46%	46%	64%	52%
High	12%	6%	21%	14%	15%	34%
	100% (n=42)	100% (n=92)	100% (n=96)	99% (n=28)	101% (n=74)	100% (n=127)
	Gamma = .28 χ^2 $p < .05$			Gamma = .38 χ^2 $p < .01$		

The effect of family structure (or more accurately, lack of effect) on the relationship between the parental model variable and political involvement is also interesting. While high parental involvement is reflected most strongly amongst children who report the greatest role in family decisions, having a role in family decisions does not increase the transfer of "apathy"; rather among those with politically apathetic parents, participation in family decisions increases participation scores, not apathy scores. In fact, the size of the original relationship between parental model and political involvement is not affected by the family structure variable (gamma varies between .46 and .50). We have, in other words, an additive effect from combining these two variables. (See Table 6.5.)

Having found some evidence (albeit with reservations) to reinstate the family as an influence on political man in this limited sense, it will be important to fit <u>both</u> these family variables into perspective as we examine the other factors which have been selected for analysis. The first of these other factors to be explored is the class variable. In a sense class can be looked at as a part of the family background since it is to some extent a measure of family lifestyle. However, it can also be viewed as a rough measure of the social environment within which the family is situated -- probably the next most immediate environment the child encounters outside the family and one from which he or she may appropriate a political interest. At this point, then, let us turn to an exploration of the relevance of social class.

TABLE 6.5

Political Involvement by Parental Political Model and Perceived Family Authority Structure

	Family Authority Structure:								
	Non-Democratic Family			Moderately Democratic Family			Democratic Family		
	Parental Political Model:								
Political Involvement:	Apathetic	Moderate	Potential & Mobilized*	Apathetic	Moderate	Potential & Mobilized	Apathetic	Moderate	Potential & Mobilized
Low	77%	48%	29%	58%	30%	17%	45%	22%	6%
Moderate	23%	38%	64%	36%	61%	62%	45%	51%	48%
High	0%	14%	7%	7%	9%	21%	11%	28%	45%
	100% (n=22)	100% (n=42)	100% (n=14)	101% (n=59)	100% (n=89)	100% (n=29)	101% (n=38)	101% (n=138)	99% (n=64)
	Gamma = .48			Gamma = .46			Gamma = .50		

*Categories of "mobilized" and "High Interest" have been combined to increase the numbers available for analysis.

FOOTNOTES

[1]M. Kent Jennings and R.H. Neimi, "The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child," The American Political Science Review, LXII, (1968), p. 169.

[2]For American data see Angus Campbell et al., The Voter Decides (Evanston, Ill.: Row Peterson, 1954), pp. 97-107; Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960) p.86 and Herbert McCloskey and Harold Dahlgren, "Primary Group Influence on Party Loyalty," American Political Science Review, LIII (1959), p. 762. For British data see Butler and Stokes, op. cit., pp. 47-48. A celebrated exception to this phenomenon is found in France where many French parents apparently do not convey to their children their political proclivities, either because they fail to develop a long-standing sense of party attachment or because they feel that politics, like sex, is a subject taboo for children. Converse and Dupeux have linked this failure to pass on party preference with the rapid rise (and fall) of party movements. Flash parties can develop, they say, because there are so many voters who, having not "inherited" party identification from their parents, lack stable attachment to any particular party. See Phillip Converse and Georges Dupeux, "Politicization in France and the United States," Public Opinion Quarterly 26 (1962) pp. 1-23. David R. Cameron and Laura Summers have recently challenged this emphasis given to the process of parental transmission in the explanation of partisan fluidity in France. They suggest other important socialization forces must also be considered. However, the basic phenomenon, lack of parent-child transmission of partisan attachment, is not generally challenged, nor is its role as part of the explanation for politicization. See Cameron and Summers, "Non-Family Agents of Political Socialization: A Reassessment of Converse and Dupeux," Canadian Journal of Political Science, V (September, 1972), pp. 418-432.

[3]For a discussion of the problem of misperception and recall of parental partisan preference among young people see R.H. Niemi A Methodological Study of Political Socialization in the Family (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1967)

[4]See Jennings and Niemi, op. cit., pp. 169-184.

[5]We would expect more duplication of parental political characteristics in a more simple society, especially one that has undergone little social change.

[6]Op. cit.

[7]The correspondence between parents and offspring was made on the basis of correspondence between teenager and one parent. See Ibid., pp. 170-171 for the sample description and the matching technique used.

Obviously a serious problem for parental transmission exists when parental party preferences are not in agreement. See McCloskey and Dahlgren, op. cit., for reference to this problem, p. 761. See also

Kenneth P. Langton, Political Socialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) pp. 61-66.

[8]Elia A. Zurick, "Party Images and Partisanship Among Young Englishmen," British Journal of Sociology, forthcoming. In another study of parent-child transmission in England, Dowse and Hughes reported only 2% of their sample of school children ages 11 to 17 showed a party preference similar to the party they indicated their parents voted for in the last election. However, only 6% reported a party preference different from the party for which they felt their parents voted. The rest of the sample did not show a preference (22%), or did not indicate a parental preference (7), or did not indicate either a self or parental preference (30%). Unfortunately, the child-parent correspondence was not checked by asking either the parent sample in the study to indicate their party identification, or the children to report party identification instead of vote. (The parents were only asked their party vote in the most recent election.) See Robert Dowse and John Hughes, "The Family, the School and the Political Socialization Process," Sociology Vol. 5 (1971), pp. 25-27.

[9]Op. cit., p. 179.

[10]Ibid., p. 183.

[11]Eugene S. Uyeki and Richard W. Dodge, "Generational Relations in Political Attitudes and Involvement," Sociology and Social Research Vol. 48 (1964) pp. 155-165.

[12]Op. cit., pp. 46-47.

[13]Op. cit., p. 31.

[14]Ibid., p. 31.

[15]Jennings and Niemi, op. cit., passim.

[16]Norman H. Nie, G. Bingham Powell and Kenneth Prewitt, "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, I," American Political Science Review, LXIII (1969), p. 375.

[17]Only three parents were described as being "not very" or "not at all" interested in politics and still said to take part in political activity beyond voting. Because of their description on the basis of interest in politics suggested political apathy, they were included in the bottom groups in spite of their activity. This reflects our concern with total political involvement as a motivator and not just perfunctory behavior on the part of parents.

[18]Eric Fromm and Wilhelm Reich pioneered this kind of explanation by hypothesizing a personality syndrome which was particularly receptive to authoritarian relationships both socially and politically. See Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism (New York: Orgone Institute Press, 1946) and Fromm's theoretical paper on authority and the family in Max Horkheimer (Ed.), Studien über Autortät und Familie,(Frankfurt am Main: Institute für Sozialforschung, 1936).

[19]T.W. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper, 1950).

[20]Robert D. Hess and David Easton, "The Child's Changing Image of the President," Public Opinion Quarterly, 24 (1960), pp. 632-644.

[21]For a discussion of this issue see Robert LeVine, "The Role of the Family in Authority Systems" A Cross-Cultural Application of Stimulus Generalization Theory," Behavioral Science 5 (1960) pp. 291-296.

[22]This has been a central issue in the debate on the authoritarian personality in politics. An authoritarian personality is thought to be characterized by certain attitudes to authority relations. But it has been pointed out these general attitudes to authority are not necessarily reflected in a person's political beliefs. See Fred I. Greenstein, "Personality and Political Socialization; Theories of the Authoritarian and Democratic character," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 361 (1965), pp. 81-95.

[23]Almond and Verba, op. cit., pp. 294-297.

[24]Ibid., p. 289.

[25]See Appendix A for the construction of this scale.

[26]Ibid., p. 275.

[27]See Josephine Klein, Samples from English Culture II (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965) for descriptions of child rearing differences observed (or recounted in an impressionistic way) between status groups in England.

[28]Klein's comments in her introduction to Volume I of the above work are à propos in this respect. As she notes, the sub-cultures in English society probably share too many cultural traits to be typified as showing different "patterns," p. ix.

[29]Leonard I. Pearlin and Melvin L. Kohn, "Social Class, Occupation and Parental Values: A Cross-National Study," American Sociological Review, Vol. 31 (1966), pp. 466-479. As to the cross-cultural

application, they comment on the relevance of their data as follows: "In both Italy and the United States, middle-class parents put greater emphasis on the child's self-direction and working-class parents on the child's conformity to external proscription. There is something intrinsic to social stratification that yields strikingly similar results in the two countries."

[30]The scale on perceptions of the family authority structure includes a question on the extent to which the respondents' family "listens to your side of the argument."

[31]Because of the small numbers involved in some of these categories (particularly in the "non-democratic" families) these findings are very tenuous and should be so regarded.

CHAPTER VII

SOCIAL CLASS

One of the truisms in the literature on political participation is that there is a consistent relationship between participation and social class or status. Thus we find that in almost all areas, political interest and participation levels rise as we move from lower to upper socio-economic groups.[1] The only exceptions to this have been located in regions of high working-class concentration where a strong sense of class identification is prevalent and a status-polarized party system provides a class-party alternative.[2]

A number of reasons have been put forward to account for the relationship between social class or status and political participation, including the propositions that persons of higher socio-economic status are generally more educated, and as a result of more education, are more interested, knowledgeable and self-confident about politics;[3] that they probably consider politics to be more relevant to their lives;[4] that they have greater leisure time and economic resources with which to follow politics,[5] and that they tend to have more social contacts through organizational involvement, which is itself an important variable for political involvement.[6] Conversely, working-class individuals do not generally possess the educational or economic resources to apply to the world of politics, either as actors or spectators, and they are probably less likely to consider that politics is highly relevant to their day-to-day lives, or at least that it benefits them much.[7]

Parenthetically, it should be mentioned that for our concerns, it

is no explanation of political involvement -- for adolescents or adults -- to say that higher SES groups tend to consider politics is relevant to their lives. That, in fact, is one of our criteria for political involvement itself. In other words, it is considered a characteristic of involvement that one acknowledges the political sphere is relevant and important for oneself. Moreover, to use the sense of relevance as an "explanation" even for participation understood in a less comprehensive sense, is not very helpful simply because it is not obvious on the face of it that the stakes are objectively greater for those in the higher SES group. As DiPalma has commented in his context, "it is undeniable that political decisions are important for all groups in society. Decisions, or the absence of decisions and action, are just as important for the poor and needy as they are for the wealthy and influential. Yet, there are many instances when a stake in decisions does not lead to participation; it is the most deprived sectors of society that are often the least likely to participate despite their obvious political stakes."[8] Thus some explanation is needed as to why politics is not perceived as relevant -- if that is to be an explanation of lower class non-participation.

Of course, in this context we expect that the socialization process is a factor to consider. Indeed, in the previous chapter we have already seen evidence to suggest that different levels of political involvement among parents have implications for their offspring. And since all the evidence suggests that working-class parents will be less politically involved than middle class parents, we would expect their

offspring to be less politicized. Assuming restricted social mobility and the relevance of pre-adult socialization, then to some extent differential politicization would be "inherited" or learned even prior to the adult experiences and conditions which are said to restrain or limit working-class political involvement. But we will return to this issue later.

In the meantime, what we are most concerned with here is not just that political roles are inherited because of the parents' influence, which we have already examined, but whether or not different social class backgrounds, irrespective of parents politicization, have some effect on adolescents', and the subsequent adults', development of political interest. Since we expect the class culture outside the home is, in the working-class, less suffused with "civic duty" norms, and perhaps more cynical about the effectiveness of political involvement on their part, we can reasonably expect its effect to be negative for political interest. We would expect the converse in the middle-class culture.

Of course individuals of the same class designation will be differentially immersed in the culture of their class because of factors such as neighborhood homogeneity, inter- and intra-class contacts and so on, and eventually some assessments must be made of the effects of class culture taking into account this fact. Yet as a <u>preliminary</u> investigation into the socialization effects of the class environment where no data are available on "immersion" variables, we must proceed by attempting to establish the existence of any differences between

adolescents grouped only according to categoric class membership.

In order to look for these differences, it is necessary to decide upon the criteria for assigning the pupils into class categories. Since the concern is primarily to examine the relationship between some kind of life station and status as opposed to a personal sense of class identity, "objective" criteria for assigning class status are sufficient.[9] Accordingly, occupation has been selected as the best single indicator. That occupation is the major determinant of the class status system in England is illustrated by data from the Butler and Stokes study.[10] When respondents in their national survey were asked to describe the kind of people who are in the middle and working classes, occupational references far outnumbered any other attribute mentioned. Sixty-one percent of the respondents described middle class people in terms of their occupation and 71% described working class people in such terms. The second kind of description used, income and level of living standard, was referred to by 21% to characterize middle class people and by 10% to characterize working class people.[11] Furthermore, when placing themselves in the middle or working class, these adult respondents showed a "close alignment of occupational level and class self-image."[11] Thus although factors such as life style may be relevant aspects of the status system in England, it is clear that occupation is the main basis by which people characterize social classes. In terms of economic advantage, it is also evident that the basis of this hierarchy is largely the occupational structure, and class designation according to this criteria parallels that of the class status system.[13]

In using occupation as the criterion for class assignment, the occupation of the father, the traditional family wage earner, was chosen as the basic feature for characterization. Accordingly, the pupils were asked to name and describe their father's occupation or their mother's occupation where there was not a male guardian in the family. These descriptions were then coded into six major categories to be collapsed later into a simple middle-working class dichotomy.[14] The six categories were: (1) higher managerial or professional; (2) lower managerial; (3) supervisory non-manual; (4) lower non-manual; (5) skilled manual; (6) unskilled manual.[15]

But before collapsing the categories, a preliminary investigation of the data was conducted both to examine the general distribution of scores by occupational categories and to explore the validity of the class dichotomy for our analysis. These data are presented in Table 7.1. Two things are immediately obvious in this table. The first thing is, of course, that there is a tendency for political involvement scores to decrease as one looks down the occupational scale. (Gamma = -.34) The second thing is that there is a marked similarity between the score distributions in categories 4, 5 and 6. The usual analytic distinction between the middle and working class is, in the academic literature, made on the basis of manual-non-manual occupational distinctions, and accordingly we would expect the similarity between categories 5 and 6 (the two manual categories). However, we would also expect the respondents in category 4 (the lower non-manual category) to be more like those in category 3 (the closest non-manual category) rather than like

those in categories 5 and 6, if our assumptions about the utility of a strict manual-non-manual dichotomy are valid. In this respect, our data are similar to class data from the Butler and Stokes study. Kahan, Butler and Stokes found that lower non-manual respondents tended to identify themselves as working class and in so doing resembled skilled manual respondents more than they did their closest occupational group in the non-manual side of the scale.[16] Moreover, patterns of political behavior and attitudes tended to reflect this class identification such that the lowest non-manual group again resembled the working class respondents more than they did the middle class respondents.[17] It seems then that there is good reason in both our data and other data, for including the lower non-manual respondents in the working-class group. Further, the similarity of the working-class groups compared to the rest of the sample speaks for the utility of a class analysis (albeit a revised class).

TABLE 7.1

Political Involvement by Occupational Category

Political Involvement:	Occupational Category: One	Two	Three	Four	Five	Six
Low	12%	13%	27%	40%	45%	42%
Moderate	57%	53%	55%	46%	42%	39%
High	31%	33%	18%	14%	12%	18%
	100% (n=49)	99% (n=75)	100% (n=115)	100% (n=43)	99% (n=161)	99% (n=35)

Gamma = -.34
χ^2 $p < .001$

Examining this distribution of class scores on political involvement more closely, we find relationship between class and involvement is not fully explained by class differences in parental political interest. Class differences remain even within groups which scored the same on the parental model variables. But what also seems to be evident is an interaction effect between the class and family variables. Social class background appears most highly correlated with political involvement where parental role models are least encouraging in regard to involvement (i.e., among the pupils with politically "apathetic" parents), and shows the lowest correlation where parents are most political. (See Table 7.2.) It seems then that factors with distinguish the social class environments and experiences of the adolescents do have some effect independent of parental political role models (note that some correlation is evident in all three groups), but the degree of effect is conditioned by the amount of family input in politicizing the adolescent.[18]

As noted earlier, middle class children seem to experience more "democratic" family relationships, a fact which also has some implications for political involvement and differential socialization. However, we again find that the difference in scores on the family variable is not a sufficient explanation for the social class differences in these data, for class differences are still evident in the three different family structure categories. (See Table 7.3.) But again we see an apparent interaction effect. It seems the impact of social class is greatest among pupils from moderately "democratic" homes (gamma = .48), is lower but still of significance among pupils from

TABLE 7.2

Political Involvement by Social Class and Parental Political Model

	Parental Political Model:					
	Apathetic		Moderate		Potential and Mobilized*	
	Social Class:					
Political Involvement:	Working Class	Middle Class	Working Class	Middle Class	Working Class	Middle Class
Low	69%	38%	39%	20%	21%	7%
Moderate	28%	50%	48%	55%	54%	55%
High	3%	13%	14%	25%	25%	37%
	100% (n=58)	101% (n=47)	101% (n=139)	100% (n=118)	100% (n=28)	99% (n=65)
	Gamma = .54		Gamma = .38		Gamma = .33	

*Categories of "highly Interested" and "Mobilized" have been collapsed to provide a larger sample in this group.

TABLE 7.3

Political Involvement by Social Class and Perceived Family Authority Structure

	Perceived Family Authority Structure:					
	"Non-Democratic" Family		Moderately "Democratic" Family		"Democratic" Family	
	Social Class:					
Political Involvement:	Working Class	Middle Class	Working Class	Middle Class	Working Class	Middle Class
Low	52%	39%	50%	22%	33%	14%
Moderate	36%	46%	44%	64%	46%	52%
High	12%	14%	6%	15%	21%	34%
	100% (n=42)	99% (n=28)	100% (n=92)	101% (n=74)	100% (n=96)	100% (n=127)
	Gamma = .21		Gamma = .48		Gamma = .35	

the most "democratic" families (gamma = .35), but is quite reduced among pupils from "non-democratic" families (gamma = .21).[19] The kind of family relationships in which the young person sees his or her role as non-participative especially inhibits the development of political involvement among the middle-class children, who otherwise experience a background which is more supportive of political interest and involvement.[20]

To return briefly to our question concerning adult class differences in political involvement, it appears a number of factors, including parental political interest, family authority patterns, and the class culture initially dispose the working class adolescent to be less politically involved. Such evidence seems on the face of it to speak strongly for the notion that there are important pre-adult roots to the social class differences we find among adults. But while the evidence is suggestive, before we can conclude that this is indeed the case, we must establish that the social class membership of adolescents in England does not <u>generally</u> alter from childhood to adulthood. If England has high social mobility, the differential learning of political roles which is evident between adolescents of different classes will <u>in itself</u> provide little explanation for adult class differences because the class background among members of both classes would be heterogeneous.[21] In this respect, although the evidence is not unequivocal, the pattern and rate of social mobility of past generations does suggest the relevance of differential early learning.

First of all, in all of the data examined by this author, it was

apparent that adult members of the working class are quite consistently from a working class background. Using data from a 1951 national survey on social mobility, Fox and Miller found that 75% of the working-class respondents had working-class family backgrounds.[22] Similarly, Butler and Stokes, using their 1963 sample, show that 86% of their adult working-class respondents had a working-class background.[23] Finally, Noble found that 83% of working-class respondents from a 1967 sample collected for a study of social mobility were from working-class backgrounds.[24] We see then that the pattern of social change in Britain does not include a great turnover in the membership of the working class.

On the other hand, this does not appear to be true of the middle class. The three studies cited above show their middle-class respondents to be 58%, 50% and 54%, respectively, from middle-class family backgrounds. However, although the adult middle class does receive a good proportion of its population from working-class homes, this proportion is certainly not as large as the proportion received by the adult working class. It is, therefore, still plausible to suppose that differential socialization of working-class and middle-class adolescents does go some way in explaining social class differences among adults simply because of the disproportionate share of working-class adolescents (i.e., those who tend to be more apolitical) who remain in the working class. And if this sample can be considered representative of other generations which now compose the adult electorate (and there is no reason to suppose this social class difference in the adolescent subculture is peculiar to this generation) we can, I think, reasonably

argue that not only are there a number of features of the adult middle-class situation and experience which contribute to the greater politicization of the middle class, but that the middle class will also be more receptive to them because of the differential socialization in their childhood and adolescence.

FOOTNOTES

[1]See Milbrath, op. cit., pp. 114-128 for a review of the studies on this phenomenon.

[2]To quote from Milbrath, "Political participation, especially voting turnout, is higher in communes which are homogeneous in politics, socio-economic status, and economic activity." Ibid., p. 119.

[3]See Ibid., pp. 122-123 for the relationship between education and political participation.

[4]Robert Lane, Political Life (Free Press: New York, 1959) pp. 225-226, expands on this theme to give a more plausible explanation than the usual, and simplistic, "relevance" theme.

[5]Norman H. Nie, G. Bringham Powell, Jr., and Kenneth Prewitt, op. cit.

[6]Nie et al. found a correlation of .303 between social status and organizational involvement in the United Kingdom, and a correlation of .480 between organizational involvement and political participation. Computing path coefficients they found that 30% of the correlation between social status and political participation is "explained" by organizational involvement. See "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, II," American Political Science Review, LXII (1969), p. 812.

[7]For the argument that poor people in the United States see political participation (voting) as futile because they believe that the rich control the political system, see William H. Form and Joan Huber, "Income, Race and the Ideology of Political Efficacy," Journal of Politics, Vol. 33 (1971), pp. 659-688.

[8]DiPalma, op. cit., p. 85. The argument that politics is perceived by lower status groups as not benefitting them is different (and has more "explanatory" powers) than does a simple "relevance" argument.

[9]It is recognized that social class or status as determined by occupational criteria may still be somewhat subjective in the sense that the status of an occupation is determined by cultural norms and values -- that is, by the national pattern of subjective orientations. But when using cultural standards to classify individuals we are still being more "objective" than we would be by using the individual's self-assignment.

[10]Butler and Stokes, op. cit., p. 68.

[11]Ibid., p. 68.

[12]Ibid., p. 71.

[13]Frank Parkin, Social Class Inequality and Political Power (St. Albans, Herts.: Granada Publishing Limited, 1972), pp. 18-28.

[14]This method of assignment to social gradients was taken from M.J. Kahan et al., "On the Analytic Division of Social Class," Journal of Sociology, 17 (1966), pp. 122-132.

[15]A seventh category was included for "other" answers such as "retired" or "student".

[16]Ibid., p. 128.

[17]For example, choice of newspapers and party preferences follow this pattern. Ibid., pp. 128-129.

[18]Because of the small number respondents in the "Potential and Mobilized" category, these findings are quite tenuous. But the hypothesis is essentially reasonable -- inviting further inquiry.

[19]Again the small numbers involved make the findings tenuous in this category.

[20]Caution must be urged however when interpreting these results. It may be that social class interpretations of family relationships may differ under essentially the same conditions. The social class effect on interpretations may be a semantic one (differing uses of language) or a comparative one, i.e., that pupils respond to evaluations of "often", "sometimes , "seldom", and "never", by comparing their experiences with those of their friends and contacts who may be largely in the same social class. The comparative frames would then be within class and not over class. Either effect, semantic or comparative, could mean "often" is "objectively" less in one social class than another.

[21]Extensive mobility would depress middle class political involvement and increase working class involvement (if levels of political involvement were retained from adolescence) and differences between the classes would be eradicated. If differences remained in spite of high mobility then explanations would need to be restricted to descriptions of the adult situation and not differential role learning beginning in younger years. The only way to retain a socialization explanation with high mobility would be to turn to an explanation of "selective" mobility. While this probably has some validity in limited numbers, it becomes a weaker argument where mobility is very high.

[22]This is reported in Trevor Noble, "Social Mobility and Class Relations in Britain," British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 23 (1972) pp. 422-436.

[23]Butler and Stokes, pp. 96-97.

[24]Noble, op. cit., p. 429.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SCHOOL

In forming their conclusions on the effect of the school in the political learning process, Hess and Torney have contended that "the public school is the most important and effective instrument of political socialization in the United States."[1] Although this immodest proposition is open to question on a number of grounds,[2] it does illustrate the importance of viewing this social institution as a prospective agent of politicization in the adolescent's life.

But notwithstanding Hess and Torney, a closer examination of the research on the development of political orientations indicates that neither the nature nor the extent of the impact of the school is very clear.[3] Part of the problem is of course that there are a large number of variables which make for the composite school experience of each individual, and attempting to isolate and standardize any one element is often difficult. Perhaps a research strategy such as Niemi proposes,[4] one which focuses on the individual pupil and the factors which have affected him or her most, will prove to be more fruitful. However, for the concerns of this study, there are as yet a number of sufficiently important, but not fully explored questions concerning the aggregate effects of particular components of the school and the school system. Because of the English context, probably the most obvious of these is concerned with the overall organization of education.

SELECTIVE EDUCATION

Although comprehensive education is expanding in England, and apparently holds the support of an overwhelming majority of the population,[5] as the figures in Chapter V illustrate, selective education has by no means been eclipsed. This is in spite of public criticisms, and concern for the educational and social implications of such a stratified system.[6] In this section we will explore the possible effects of this stratification for political socialization and look for indications that selective education influences the development of participatory orientations toward the political realm.

When children at 11 are directed into different types of schools in the selective system, the implications of such direction are both socially and educationally significant for the individual. In terms of education, the pupil attending a grammar school can expect an academic syllabus and classroom instruction which is preparatory for General Certification of Education examinations -- so important, indeed in some cases necessary, for employment and/or further education.[7] The secondary modern pupil on the other hand has significantly less opportunity and encouragement in terms of school program, facilities, staffing and scholastic climate to attempt such an academic course of study.[8] The pupils are usually given a vocationally-oriented program or a "general education" which rarely leads to sufficient certification to allow them to compete on equal terms with the selective school products.[9] Moreover, some evidence is available which suggests that the secondary modern school not only is less academic in its curriculum,

but that it may depress the general performance levels of its pupils,[10] notwithstanding the claim which is sometimes made in defense of selection, namely, that it allows secondary modern schools to specifically cater to their clientele and thereby best develop their pupils' potential.[11]

In terms of social effects, the most obvious ramification of selection or non-selection is directly related to the certification system. Since occupational opportunities are apparently tied to GCE certification, and secondary modern schools are not designed to educate for these exams, secondary modern school-leavers find their occupational opportunities largely restricted to manual or lower non-manual occupations. Not surprisingly, grammar school products, along with independent school graduates, dominate professional and other upper non-manual occupations. According to one study, "type of school attended [even] appears to have greater effect on occupational status than the father's occupation," remembering of course the high coincidence of type of school attended and social class family background.[12] Social mobility then is restricted by type of school attended.

Ralph Turner has characterized this system as one approaching a "sponsorship" model of social mobility.[13] Under a sponsorship system, persons are recruited for elite status according to some criterion and then specially groomed for their future position. In contrast to a "contest" mode of mobility, under a sponsorship system elite status is given (i.e., one is "sponsored"), and cannot be taken by personal effort.

Also, those not chosen under a sponsorship system are "trained" for non-elite status. The English educational system approaches the sponsorship model in the sense that it sorts out the most promising children, "sponsors" them in grammar school, and gives them an education which allows them to enter a university or obtain higher status jobs.[14]

But the social implications of selection or non-selection may not be limited to occupational prospects. The suggestion has been raised that the two kinds of schools also reflect different social orientations in the adult culture. Marsden and Jackson for example, in chronicling the experience of a sample of 88 working-class children who attended grammar schools, emphasized the problem of discontinuity between the values and orientations of the schools these children attended and those of their working-class families and neighborhoods.[15] Ronald King, in characterizing the grammar school environment, explains this as follows: "the culture transmitted through the grammar schools is mainly derived from the systems with which it interacts," and the principal systems with which a school interacts are the families of the pupils and the occupational and educational systems its leavers enter.[16] Since grammar school leavers tend to enter mainly middle-class occupations, and the families of grammar school pupils tend to be disproportionately middle class when compared to the families of secondary modern or even comprehensive school pupils, the culture of the grammar school tends to be a middle-class culture.[17] In contrast to grammar schools, secondary modern schools interact largely with the

working class. As reported above, secondary modern leavers enter mainly manual occupations or take vocational training for manual occupations. Moreover, the social class background of secondary modern school pupils is overwhelmingly working-class. On this point the Crowther Report on secondary education was so impressed it was prompted to comment, "the modern schools as a whole are the most homogeneous element among English schools."[18] One would expect then on the basis of the King model that the secondary modern school culture is a working-class culture.[19]

Given these apparent characteristics of the grammar and secondary modern schools, we would expect to find some amount of differential political socialization between the two tiers of the selective system. First of all, the more academic programme of the grammar school may well promote a greater awareness of the political world. As Dowse and Hughes observe, "simply, grammar school children are more likely to know more (irrespective of the level of their parents' education) than are secondary modern school children, and among the more they know is social and political information."[20] To some extent this will be a result of the more scholastic programme offered by the grammar school to its clientele.[21]

If the King model is applicable, we would also expect the political orientations of grammar school pupils to reflect other characteristic features of the middle-class political culture, including higher levels of political efficacy, political interest and involvement. Conversely, we would expect the secondary modern pupils to reflect the

working-class political culture in these respects and to show lower levels of political efficacy and political involvement.[22]

The Turner thesis that the English selective system approaches a sponsorship model points in the same direction as does that of cultural transmission. According to Turner, under a sponsorship system of mobility, those "trained" for non-elite status are taught "to regard themselves as relatively incompetent to manage society, by restricting access to the skills and manners of the elites, and by cultivating belief in the superior competence of the elite."[23] To the extent that the system accords with the sponsorship model in inculcating values, we should expect differences in both political efficacy and political involvement, with grammar school pupils more efficacious and more involved, as it would presumably be their role as elites either to govern or at least to oversee government as involved citizens.

In all of these models, we would expect the comprehensive schools to be in a position midway between the secondary modern and grammar schools. In terms of class composition they are less overwhelmingly working-class than secondary modern schools, their scholastic program is more academic, and they accord to neither extreme in the Turner model. They are not a "training ground" for an elite, but neither can most of their pupils be considered "incompetent to manage society" -- even under elitist conceptions. (There is, in other words, an important component of grammar school type children in their midst.) We would then expect comprehensive school pupils as a whole to be more involved politically than secondary modern, but not as politicized as grammar school pupils.

In looking at Table 8.1, we can see our hypothesis on the relationship between selection and political involvement appears to be borne out. As we move from secondary modern to comprehensive to grammar school, we can see that levels of political involvement increase.

TABLE 8.1

Political Involvement by Type of School Attented

Political Involvement:	Type of School Attended: Secondary Modern	Comprehensive	Grammar
Low	43%	34%	13%
Moderate	43%	47%	56%
High	14%	19%	31%
	100% (n=223)	100% (n=166)	100% (n=149)

The difference between the secondary modern and grammar school pupils is particularly striking. To lend further credence to the hypothesis that selection has implications for political involvement, we find the relationship between involvement and type of school attended remains even when social class is controlled (although the small number of working class children in the grammar school contingent makes that distribution less reliable). (See Table 8.2) Thus while the overall social class composition of secondary modern and grammar schools may help create the conditions for differential socialization, the effect on individuals seems apparent regardless of individual social class membership. What we do in fact find is that within secondary modern and grammar school subsamples,

TABLE 8.2

Political Involvement by Type of School Attended by Social Class

	Social Class:					
	Working Class			Middle Class		
	Type of School Attended:					
Political Involvement:	Secondary Modern	Comprehensive	Grammar School	Secondary Modern	Comprehensive	Grammar
Low	50%	40%	21%	30%	25%	12%
Moderate	37%	48%	53%	56%	48%	58%
High	13%	11%	26%	14%	27%	31%
	100% (n=129)	99% (n=89)	100% (n=19)	100% (n=63)	100% (n=56)	101% (n=112)
	χ^2 $p < .10$			χ^2 $p < .01$		

the class differences are not very pronounced. The gamma scores equal .28 and .18 respectively. (Comprehensive schools are more distinctive in this regard, showing a gamma correlation between class and involvement of .36.) It seems then that insofar as school selection affects political involvement (and this must still remain in the realm of hypothesis, as will be elaborated below), selection contributes to class differences because of the disproportionate allotment of grammar school places to middle class children.

In looking at selection in the context of the family political environment, the data -- although not highly reliable because of the small numbers involved in some of the cells -- suggest a curvilinear relationship. The school contribution seems heightened where the child may be keyed to political cues by his or her family's interest in politics, or where the school provides input in a political vacuum, i.e., where the family is comparatively apolitical. However, even where the family is moderately interested in politics we find a significant relationship between involvement and selection versus non-selection. (See Table 8.3)

However, in spite of this evidence suggesting a relationship between school type and political involvement, there are still difficulties in coming to any conclusion on the influence of selective schooling. It may be that children who enter grammar school would be more politically aware almost regardless of the school they attended, for the same kinds of reasons that they have "succeeded" educationally in comparison to their secondary modern counterparts: that is, they are

TABLE 8.3

Political Involvement by Type of School Attended by Parental Political Model

	Parental Political Model:								
	Apathetic			Moderate			Potential and Mobilized		
	Type of School Attended:								
Political Involvement:	Secondary Modern	Comprehensive	Grammar School	Secondary Modern	Comprehensive	Grammar School	Secondary Modern	Comprehensive	Grammar School
Low	71%	49%	29%	36%	36%	12%	21%	12%	4%
Moderate	25%	44%	54%	45%	50%	62%	66%	46%	48%
High	3%	8%	17%	19%	15%	26%	13%	42%	48%
	99% (n=59)	101% (n=39)	100% (n=24)	100% (n=113)	101% (n=93)	100% (n=76)	100% (n=38)	100% (n=26)	100% (n=44)
	χ^2 $p < .01$			χ^2 $p < .005$			χ^2 $p < .01$		

curious, more aware of the world beyond their own personal experience and more able to "understand" many different kinds of phenomena.[25]

One way to further explore the question of whether the grammar school or secondary modern school atmospheres influence the development of participatory orientations would be to examine groups of children who are similar on the kinds of characteristics which lead to educational success but who have been directed to difference sectors in the selective system. I.Q. would probably be a good summary indicator for such a study. But since the range of I.Q groups which overlap between secondary modern and grammar schools is not very large, even this procedure is limited as inferences would have to be made on the basis of a select population.[26] Unfortunately, even this limited alternative is not available to us, given that I.Q. records of the sample could not be obtained, and our conclusion must remain in limbo. Thus while we find some significant differences between groups of secondary modern and grammar school pupils, and while we may suspect some reinforcing effect of the school environment, this is yet to be established with any confidence.

But what we can suggest from these data is that a change to comprehensive schooling seems unlikely, under present conditions, to mean changes in the overall level of political involvement. After weighting the sample in order to approximate the comparative distribution of secondary modern and grammar school pupils in the state-maintained schools, we find little difference in the distribution of the political involvement scores among those pupils in the selective system and those attending comprehensive schools.[27] (See Table 8.4) Thus even if selective

education were almost totally phased out, this alone apparently would not raise the level of citizen orientations in the subsequent electorate.[28] This may be symptomatic of the fact that comprehensive schooling as yet does not exclude the development of "class" schools -- that is, schools which are comparatively homogeneous in the class structure.[29] Although the sample does not include a large enough number of comprehensive schools to allow any assessment of the effect of class homogeneity, the distribution of political involvement scores among the comprehensive schools did suggest at least some negative effect of working class homogeneity (although here again the effect of the I.Q. variable is indeterminate).[30]

TABLE 8.4

Weighted Distribution of Political Involvement Among Types of Schools: Selective-Non-Selective versus Comprehensive

Political Involvement:	Selective System (Grammar and Secondary Modern)	Comprehensive Schools
Low	38%	34%
Moderate	45%	47%
High	17%	19%
	100%	100%

But while the overall organization of education, has, for the present, limited potential to promote increased involvement, there are two other salient features of the school whose possible impact calls for examination. These are: (1) the classroom as a forum for direct learning, i.e., the role of "political education"; and (2) the school as an

important authority system with which the children must interact. Let us look first at the effects of classroom political content.

CLASSROOM POLITICAL EDUCATION

Traditionally political education in schools has been considered an important vehicle for transmitting democratic norms and values. But more recently the impact of political teaching in schools has come into question. While Almond and Verba reported an association between political efficacy and recollections of exposure to political content in school by their adult respondents in Britain and the United States, some other American studies have found little change in "citizenship" attitudes of various kinds when they have assessed the impact of social studies courses among groups of students.[31] Faced with conflicting evidence on this issue, Langton and Jennings undertook to analyze data from a national probability sample of American high school seniors in order to determine the effects of high school civics courses on pupils' political orientations.[32] They were not at all impressed with the overall impact these courses appeared to have. They concluded: "our findings certainly do not support the thinking of those who look to the civics curriculum in American high schools as even a minor source of political socialization."[33]

One suggestion they have put forward to explain this lack of impact is that civics courses may, for the most part, simply be providing redundant information. In other words, the students may be receiving similar information or cues from other sources at the same time as they are taking formal instruction in these topic areas.[34] Alternatively,

it may be that students have already been subjected to political content in school during earlier grades and by high school are either bored by the kinds of material they are faced with, or are already resistant to such socialization experience. In other words, there is reason to consider the effect of political content in the school environment in a younger age group than the 17 to 18-year olds of the Langton and Jennings' study. It was with this in mind that items were devised to assess the impact of political content in schools on the younger English pupils in this study.

Unfortunately exposure to political content in English schools is more difficult to determine. Generally speaking, English education has tended to concentrate its focus on traditional academic subjects such as geography and history and has, until more recently, largely ignored other areas of the social sciences, including political science. Lately there has been some introduction of a wider range of subjects relevant to social studies, particularly in secondary modern schools and non-academic streams of comprehensive schools; but even yet there are few courses offered in British schools which specifically deal with politics, law and government. But political issues are frequently relevant in programs such as liberal studies and general studies; moreover, political discussion may often occur in other more traditional subject areas such as history, geography and English. While such discussion may be incidental to the particular programs in which they occur, they are situations in which manifest teaching of political information and democratic norms can proceed. The exchanges of political views which occur

in classroom discussion may also stimulate interest and motivation and lead to increased political involvement. Consequently, to assess the effect of political content in a school system which offers few courses on government and politics, it was decided to measure the degree of political discussion to which the pupils have been exposed in the classrooms, regardless of the subject area in which the discussion occurred. To this end, the pupils were asked how often they had discussion or debates on politics, government or public issues in class, both in the 4th form and in previous forms.[36]

A problem does arise in using a technique such as this to assess the political content of classroom experiences. When pupils are asked to indicate the amount of political discussion that has occurred in their classes, their assessments may be influenced by their general interest in political issues. A pupil may remember political discussion because he or she found them interesting, whereas other pupils who are not interested in political topics may forget such discussions. A more objective measure of political content, such as a measurement of the number of formal courses a student has taken, is not so prone to this measurement error (although it misses the possible impact of less structured classroom discussion on politics).

It should also be emphasized here that while there is opportunity in classroom political discussions to encourage or emphasize participation norms, and interest and involvement in politics, the kind of cues contributed by the teachers may tend to emphasize subject norms and obedience to political authority rather than participation norms.[37]

Thus, while the opportunity may be available for stimulating political involvement and interest during school discussions, the kind of information and cues which emanate from the teachers may not be encouraging in this respect. Unfortunately, without doing extended classroom observations, it is not possible to assess the kind of cues contributed by teachers in a particular classroom, nor the relative contribution of the teachers compared to the pupils in the context of the discussions. Consequently it was necessary to limit inquiry into the effect of different amounts of exposure to political content, but not the nature of the exposure.

Using such a measure of political discussion as an index of the direct political input of the school, the pupils' political involvement scores were correlated with the scores on school input. The results support the Almond and Verba finding. The data show a significant relationship between the amount of political communication experienced in classrooms and the level of personal political involvement (gamma = .40). In this correlation, 34% of the pupils who indicated having had a high degree of political discussion showed a high level of political involvement and only 11% showed a low score. On the other hand, 12% of those who said they had little or no political discussion in their classes were high on the involvement scale and only 47% were low. (See Table 8.5.)

Of course, it is possible that this correlation between political involvement and classroom political education is not entirely or even largely a measure of the impact of political discussion, but is due to a correlation between the quantity of classroom political discussion

pupils report and the kind of school they attend. It may be that the academically-oriented grammar schools are more likely to see political discussion occur in their classroom than are schools devoted

TABLE 8.5

Political Involvement by Classroom Political Discussion

Political Involvement:	Classroom Political Discussion: Low	Moderate	High
Low	47%	28%	11%
Moderate	42%	50%	54%
High	12%	22%	34%
	101% (n=182)	100% (n=274)	99% (n=79)

Gamma = .40
χ^2 p <.001

to "general education". In such a case the correlation between political involvement and political content in the classroom could merely be reflecting a relationship between political involvement and grammar school attendance. Indeed, when we look at the pupils' descriptions of political content in their classrooms according to school attended, we find grammar school pupils do report greater amounts of political discussion. However, when we control for the type of school attended, there is only a small decrease in the relationship between quantity of classroom input and political involvement. (See Table 8.6) That is, even within different types of schools, there are still differences

TABLE 8.6

Political Involvement by Classroom Political Discussion by Type of School Attended

	Type of School Attended:								
	Grammar School			Comprehensive School			Secondary Modern		
	Classroom Political Discussion:								
Political Involvement:	Low	Moderate	High	Low	Moderate	High	Low	Moderate	High
Low	23%	11%	7%	51%	28%	18%	53%	42%	11%
Moderate	57%	58%	50%	38%	52%	50%	38%	43%	63%
High	20%	31%	43%	10%	20%	32%	9%	15%	26%
	100% (n=35)	100% (n=84)	100% (n=30)	99% (n=37)	100% (n=85)	100% (n=22)	100% (n=90)	100% (n=105)	100% (n=27)
	Gamma = .32 χ^2 $p < .15$			Gamma = .39 χ^2 $p < .05$			Gamma = .36 χ^2 $p < .005$		

in political involvement between pupils high on the classroom discussion variable and those low on it. This is particularly so among comprehensive and secondary modern school pupils. (Among grammar school pupils the small number, combined with the lower correlation makes the relationship less reliable than the other ones.)

These data on the "impact" of classroom discussion are particularly interesting if one compares the role of classroom discussion with the school variable. Holding school type constant and using the percentage of high scorers on the involvement scale as the indicator, the average difference between the pupils reporting low levels of political discussion and those reporting high levels of discussion is 20 percent whereas the average difference in scores between "extremes" of the school system (i.e., grammar schools and secondary modern schools), holding political discussion constant, is only 15 percent.[40] (See Table 8.7)

TABLE 8.7

Percentage of High Involvement Scores by Classroom Discussion by Type of School Attended

Political Discussion:	Secondary Modern	Comprehensive	Grammar	% difference between grammar and secondary modern schools
Low	9%	10%	20%	11%
Moderate	15%	20%	31%	16%
High	26%	32%	43%	17%
% difference comparing low and high political discussion	15%	22%	23%	

At this point the question arises as to the differential impact of school political communication with respect to family variables. Is the relationship between political involvement and quantity of discussion in classrooms different among pupils from different kinds of family environments? Looking first at the relationship between school input and involvement within different levels of home politicization, we find little variation or reduction in the size of this correlation among the three groups. (See Table 8.8.) Rather, the effect of both variables seems evident. That is, the general level of involvement is higher among pupils from more politicized homes even while the effect of school discussions is apparent; and although the general level of political involvement is lower among pupils from less politicized homes, the correlation is still as high.

When we look at school input in the context of social class, we find a similar effect. The general level of political involvement is high amongst middle class pupils, but within this group, exposure to political discussion in the schools is still correlated with increased political involvement. However, the data do suggest that the effect of political content may be somewhat greater among working-class pupils than among middle-class pupils. (See Table 8.9.) Since the child's political exposure is generally lower in the working-class environment, both because of lower parental interest and (presumably) less political input from other social contacts, the impact of the school may be greater simply because political information and stimuli are new and not redundant.[41]

The question still remains of course as to whether these findings

TABLE 8.8

Political Involvement by Classroom Political Discussion by Parental Political Model

	Parental Political Model:								
	Apathetic			Moderate			Potential & Mobilized		
	Classroom Political Discussion:								
Political Involvement:	Low	Moderate	High	Low	Moderate	High	Low	Moderate	High
Low	64%	52%	33%	46%	25%	10%	24%	9%	4%
Moderate	32%	43%	33%	41%	54%	63%	59%	52%	54%
High	4%	5%	33%	13%	22%	26%	17%	39%	42%
	100% (n=53)	100% (n=56)	99% (n=12)	100% (n=90)	101% (n=153)	99% (n=38)	100% (n=29)	100% (n=54)	100% (n=24)
	Gamma = .34 χ^2 $p < .005$			Gamma = .37 χ^2 $p < .001$			Gamma = .38 χ^2 $p < .10$		

TABLE 8.9

Political Involvement by Classroom Political Discussion by Social Class

	Social Class:					
	Working Class			Middle Class		
	Classroom Political Discussion:					
Political Involvement:	Low	Moderate	High	Low	Moderate	High
Low	59%	39%	21%	31%	18%	6%
Moderate	35%	44%	59%	50%	58%	55%
High	6%	17%	21%	19%	25%	38%
	100% (n=86)	100% (n=121)	101% (n=29)	100% (n=74)	101% (n=118)	99% (n=47)
	Gamma = .41 χ^2 $p < .005$			Gamma = .33 χ^2 $p < .01$		

are reliable given the methodological difficulties of using a subjective measure for classroom political exposure. We can only conclude that the data suggest an effect of political discussion in the context of the English school system, and prior to the age group Jennings and Niemi studied in the United States.

SCHOOL AUTHORITY STRUCTURE

As discussed in Chapter V, experiences in non-political authority structures outside the family may well influence individuals' responses to the political realm. Since the school is a system of relationships which is hierarchically organized in both pupil-teacher and pupil-administration interaction it is reasonable to consider this institution in terms of the effects of these authority patterns. Do differing patterns of subordination-superordination within schools have consequences for political involvement?

Almond and Verba have examined the role of the school as an organizational "training ground" for the development of citizen orientations, and from their data they suggested that opportunity to participate in decisions in the school contributed to the development of feelings of political competence, at least among those in their lower educational group.[42] Using a similar hypothesis on the generalization of non-political authority relationships, Harry Eckstein described school life (and family life) among the lower strata in England as more authoritarian and less consultative, and thus contributing to more undemocratic orientations among the working class. On the other hand,

persons closest to the center of political power (that is, members of the social elite) are said to experience more self-government in school (and family life) and during their youth, and are therefore more prepared for the elements of democracy found in political life.[43] Given our findings on the relationship between family authority patterns and participatory orientations, we would expect to find some evidence of the effect of school authority patterns or at least perceptions thereof, among the adolescents in this study, if indeed the school experience has consequences along this line.

In order to test this, two items were used to score the pupils' perspectives on their school's pattern of authority. The first item asked the students to rate their (the students') role in determining "how your school is run." Then they were asked to indicate whether they felt students in their school were free "to complain" to the head or the teachers in their school.[44] A cross-tabulation of the political involvement scores with those perceptions of the school structure did suggest some relationship, but not a very considerable one. (See Table 8.10.) Moreover, in examining the data according to the type

TABLE 8.10

Political Involvement by (Perceived) Authority Patterns

Political Involvement:	(Perceived) School Authority Pattern: Unresponsive	Moderately Responsive	Responsive
Low	41%	31%	25%
Moderate	39%	52%	50%
High	20%	18%	25%
	100% (n=139)	101% (n=241)	100% (n=141)

Gamma = .16
χ^2 $p < .05$

school attended, the evidence did not remain consistent, as the relationship did not hold among comprehensive school pupils. (See Table 8.11) And an effort to find more supportive evidence by looking at the relationship between political involvement levels and perceived authority patterns aggregated by school was unproductive. Schools ranked high on their responsiveness showed no difference in involvement scores among their pupils from those ranked low in responsiveness.

While the evidence on this issue is sufficiently equivocal to demand further inquiry, there are a couple of factors which may account for a relatively small impact from the school in this regard. First of all, while it may be possible to detect a general tenor in authority relationships in a school, these relationships are probably quite variable over teachers, making a homogeneous school experience unlikely. Primary school experience would add another and sometimes different experience in teacher-pupil relationships which would make homogeneous school experience even less likely. Secondly, the school is only one of the many kinds of authority relationships in the young persons' environment, and lacking both homogeneity and isolation of pupils from influences outside the institution, the independent effect of the school structure is perhaps not likely to be strong.

Alternatively, it may be that the range of authority patterns is not great enough in our sample, and indeed in the national school system, to account for substantial differences of experience. We find for example, that while 37% of the pupils may feel free to complain to the head or teachers, 54% feel that the students have little or no say

TABLE 8.11

Political Involvement by (Perceived) Authority Patterns by Type of School Attended

	Type of School Attended:								
	Secondary Modern			Comprehensive			Grammar School		
	(Perceived) School Authority Pattern:								
Political Involvement:	Unresponsive	Moderately Responsive	Responsive	Unresponsive	Moderately Responsive	Responsive	Unresponsive	Moderately Responsive	Responsive
Low	51%	43%	33%	40%	30%	37%	24%	10%	8%
Moderate	34%	44%	50%	38%	51%	44%	49%	64%	54%
High	15%	13%	17%	22%	18%	20%	27%	25%	38%
	100% (n=65)	100% (n=106)	100% (n=48)	100% (n=37)	99% (n=82)	101% (n=41)	100% (n=37)	99% (n=59)	100% (n=52)
	Gamma = .15 χ^2 p = .39			Gamma = .01 χ^2 p = .73			Gamma = .24 χ^2 p = .1		

in how their school is run. Only 17% feel students in their school have quite a lot of influence. Some cross-national comparisons with students both from countries such as France (reputed to have a more authoritarian school structure)[45] and the United States (reputed to have more democratic school structures) would be helpful in this regard in order to assess the possibilities of school structures for the promotion of more participative orientations.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Hess and Torney, op.cit., p. 101.

[2]For a good critique of Hess and Turney on this point see David O. Sears review in Harvard Educational Review, 38 (1968) pp. 571-580. Sears has suggested, and quite reasonably so, that this conclusion goes beyond the data. For example, correlations of materials generally presented in the school with children's attitudes are not consistent over age, nor is there an effort "to show that a classroom's attitudes covary with those of its teacher." In addition, their concept of socialization is limited in that they concentrate largely on such things as norms of compliance and attachment to the system and "omit the more controversial, divisive issues that too often are missing from school curriculae."

[3]See Richard G. Niemi's review of the literature on the role of the school in "Political Socialization," Jeanne N. Knutson (Ed)., Handbook of Political Psychology,(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973), pp. 129-132.

[4]Ibid., pp. 131-132.

[5]Caroline Benn and Brian Simon, Halfway There (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1972),p. 80.

[6]For some of the criticisms of selective education, see Ibid., pp. 46-54.

[7]William Taylor, The Secondary Modern School (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1963),pp. 105-106; Paul Abramson, "Differential Political Socialization of English Secondary School Student," Sociology of Education,Vol. 40 (1967), pp. 251-252; and Glen H. Elder, "Life Opportunity and Personality: Some Consequences of Stratified Secondary Education in Great Britain," Sociology of Education, 38 (1965),pp. 192-194.

[8]See Taylor, op. cit., pp. 121-126 for a description of the factors which are counterproductive for successful examination completion in secondary modern schools.

[9]See Ibid., pp. 119-120 for figures of the comparative success of secondary modern and grammar school pupils in GCE examinations.

[10]Elder, op. cit., pp. 186-187.

[11]For a number of years it was felt that secondary modern schools should not provide facilities to follow courses in preparation for external exams, but failure to develop successful alternate educational strategies and the social pressure which arose because of the importance employers attached to certification, meant secondary modern schools did

enter the field of providing courses in preparation for GCE exams. Taylor, op. cit., ch. 6.

[12]Elder, op. cit., p. 192. In our sample the gamma correlation between social class and selection is .82. (The working class category includes, as before, the lower middle class strata.) The distribution of class backgrounds among the three types of schools using this revised categorization of social class is as follows:

	Type of School:		
Social Class Background:	Secondary Modern	Comprehensive	Grammar School
Working Class	67%	61%	14%
Middle Class	33%	39%	86%
	100% (n=192)	100% (n=145)	100% (n=139)

See p. for the original distribution of social class background among schools based on the unrevised manual non-manual categories.

[13]Ralph H. Turner, "Sponsored and Contest Mobility and the School System," in A.H. Halsey, et al., (Eds.) Education, Economy and Society: A Reader in the Sociology of Education (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 121-139.

[14]Turner recognizes there are some aspects of the English system which do not accord to the sponsorship model -- such as for example, inclusion of academic study in secondary modern schools -- but he contends that the overall nature of the system is congruent with the sponsorship model.

[15]Brian Jackson and Dennis Marsden, Education and the Working Class (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1966).

[16]Ronald King, Values and Involvement in a Grammar School (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), pp. 23-25.

[17]Ibid., pp.24-25.

[18]Report of the Central Advisory Council for Education (England), 15 to 18 (Crowther Report) HMSO Vol. I, 1959, p. 74.

[19]Although King does not elaborate on this point, the role of the teacher in this model seems to be one of "preparing" the pupils for

their "appropriate" roles in the occupational structure. This means then preparing grammar school pupils for middle-class occupational roles and secondary modern pupils for working-class occupational roles. However, some caution must be used when assuming that secondary modern school teachers interpret their role in this way and do not "intrude" their own perspectives and orientations -- which would more likely reflect their own middle-class status.

[20]Dowse and Hughes, op. cit., p. 37.

[21]In this respect, it would indeed be difficult to sort out the contribution "IQ", as opposed to curriculum, has in the development of political orientations. For data and discussion of the effect of IQ on political efficacy see Elliot S. White, "Intelligence and Sense of Political Efficacy in Children," Journal of Politics, Vol. 30 (1968) pp. 710-731. This problem becomes even more difficult to untangle when one considers that IQ itself, may be at least partly a result of educational experience and grammar school programs may well contribute to IQ devlopment more than do secondary modern schools.

[22]According to this scenario, we may also expect party identification to fall into this category of class culture. However the Abramson data does not support such an interpretation -- probably to be explained by the more effective transmission of parental values in the area of party identification compared to other political orientations. See Chapter VI above.

[23]Turner, op. cit., p. 126.

[24]It is interesting however that while the hypothesis on political involvement is supported by the data, there is no important difference in the levels of personal political efficacy between grammar school and secondary modern school pupils. (See Appendix A for the construction of this scale.)

[25]See White, op. cit., pp. 722-724, for a discussion in IQ as related to personality traits which in turn suggest political attitudes.

[26]See Paul Meehl, "Nuisance Variables and the Ex Post Facto Design," in Michael Radner and Stephen Winokur (Eds.) Analyses of Theories and Methods of Physics and Psychology (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Press, 1970) pp. 373-402, for a discussion of the problem of unrepresentativeness in control samples. Although this is a problem for any kind of control procedure, it is particularly crucial in this kind of issue and would certainly allow one to question the generalizability of any conclusion derived from such a control in this instance.

[27]The distribution between secondary modern and grammar school pupils was weighed to approximate a distribution of three secondary

modern pupils to every one grammar school pupil. See p. for the distribution of pupils in secondary modern and grammar schools. (The grammar school group included 13 boys from the direct grant school and they were not excluded from this weighting since both their social social and school characteristics were very similar to their grammar school counterparts.)

[28]This tentative conclusion is of course made within the limitations of the sample.

[29]Comprehensive schools are more like North American neighborhood schools and to that extent are likely to be class dominated -- according to local social class structure.

[30]The distribution of political involvement scores between more and less homogeneous class comprehensive school samples is as follows:

Class Composition of School Sample:

Political Involvement:	Homogeneous Working Class*	Heterogeneous**
Low	42%	28%
Moderate	40%	50%
High	18%	22%
	100% (n=66)	100% (n=98)

* At least 60% working class pupils in the sample
**Less than 60% working class in the sample

Some emphasis must be put on the purely suggested nature of these data. The monogeneous and heterogeneous schools may not be comparable because of differing sample procedures required in each school in addition to the problems of "representativeness" of the small sample of schools included.

[31]See Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 293. For studies which seem to question Almond and Verba's conclusions, see for example, Franklin Patterson, et al., The Adolescent Citizen (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), pp. 71-73 and Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jennings, "Political Socialization and High School Cives Curriculum," American Political Science Review, LXII (1968), pp. 852-854 for a discussion of other studies looking at the impact of formal teaching.

[32]Ibid., pp. 852-867.

[33]Ibid., p. 865.

[34]Ibid., p. 859.

[35]See Vincent Roger, The Social Studies in English Education (London: Heineman, 1968) for a discussion of social studies including political science in English secondary schools, pp. 17-24. Although he finds social studies and social science had low priority in English secondary education at the time of writing, he does see some encouraging developments which may inprove this situation.

[36]See Appendix A for the construction of this index.

[37]Edgar Litt in "Civic Education, Community Norms and Political Indoctrination," American Sociological Review, Vol. 28 (1963), pp. 69-75 has found some differential effect of political education according to the type of input from civics education courses; at least insofar as he is concerned with students' perspectives on the political process. On the other hand, he did find that although emphasis on political participation varied according to the social class nature of the school, attitudes to political participation and levels of political activity are not affected by courses in civics education.

[38]W.E. Gardner, "Teachers' Attitudes Toward Political Education," Bulletin of the British General Studies Association, Fall, 1968.

[39]Ibid., p. 6.

[40]Using low scores on political involvement as the indicator the average differences are 30% for classroom discussion and 22% for type of school.

[41]See a similar argument vis-à-vis the greater effect of American civics courses on black high school students as compared to white in Langton and Jennings, op. cit., pp. 859-867.

[42]Op. cit., pp. 280-290.

[43]Harry Eckstein, "A Theory of Stable Democracy," Appendix B in Division and Cohesion in Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 245-247.

[44]See Appendix A for the construction of this scale.

[45]William R. Schonfeld, Youth and Authority in France: A Study of Secondary Schools (Beverley Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1971.)

CHAPTER IX

SOCIAL FACTORS

Studies in the area of participation among adults have consistently found that organizational involvement, measured in almost any meaningful way, is an important correlate of political participation.[1] In other words, membership and participation in voluntary organizations of all sorts (and not just political organizations) seem to promote political involvement. Some studies even indicate that organizational involvement may be a more reliable predictor of political participation than is social class. For example, using the Civic Culture data, Nie, Powell and Prewitt found higher correlations between organizational involvement and participation than they found between social status and participation in each of the five countries.[2] William Erbe, using a sample from the American Midwest, found that when he used a standardization procedure to look at the independent effects of social class and organizational involvement, the relationship between the independent variable and political participation was slightly higher for organizational involvement.[3] Further, the Nie, Powell and Prewitt research suggests that the relationship between organizational involvement is stronger than that between social class and participation in another sense, in that organizational involvement is more directly linked to political participation. It does not seem to work through intervening attitudinal variables as does social class. To quote them,

> The high status citizen does not just participate in politics; he does so only when he has the attitudes such as efficacy and attentiveness which are postulated as intervening variables....On the

other hand a very large part of the relationship between organizational involvement and participation is unexplained by any variable in this model.[4]

Given this apparent importance of organizational involvement for adult participation, we might look for some beginnings of such a relationship among adolescents. If part of the explanation of the relationship between organizational involvement and political participation is the "practice effect (i.e., one becomes "used to" participation and/or involvement and this habit is generalized to the political world) then we may expect the same generalization effect among adolescents as well as adults. (We have already seen some evidence for generalization in the correlation between participation in family decision-making and political involvement in Chapter 6.) If, however, the relationship between social involvement and political participation among adults is to be explained largely because organizations mobilize their members on political issues relevant to them, and not because of generalization effects, then we would have little reason to expect adolescent social participation to affect political involvement levels. It is not likely that many adolescent clubs or organizations mobilize their members for political activity.

There is a paucity of evidence on this generalization effect among adolescents, and that which is available is open to interpretation. This evidence, reported by Helen Lewis, indicated positive relationships between participation in high school extra-curricular activities on one hand, and a number of political variables, including political efficacy and expectations of future participation, on the other.[5] However, she

felt that social participation did not directly affect the political responses, but rather increased awareness of cultural conventions about what made "good citizens". "In short [the students who participate socially] are giving socially appropriate responses and have a better idea of what responses are socially appropriate."[6] But does or does not this mean that attitudes have been internalized?

In order to test the generalization effect in this sample -- and incidentally to use our measure of political involvement which is more behavior-oriented and hence less likely to be invalidated by "socially appropriate" responses than was Lewis' measure -- the pupils were asked to indicate the number of both school-based and nonschool-based clubs or associations to which they belonged. A social involvement scale was then computed for each respondent using the number of club memberships reported, and the relationship between political involvement and social involvement was measured.[7] The resulting gamma coefficient was .31, suggesting some amount of generalization may be occurring. (See Table 9.1)

TABLE 9.1

Political Involvement by Club Memberships

Political Involvement:	Number of Club Memberships: None	One or Two	Three or More
Low	52%	34%	25%
Moderate	42%	49%	49%
High	6%	17%	26%
	100% (n=67)	100% (n=207)	100% (n=254)

Gamma = .31
χ^2 p = < .001

However, since social involvement is found to be somewhat correlated with social class,[8] and since we have found differential effects of variables according to social class in other areas, the relationship between club memberships and political involvement was measured within the two social class groups. The results, shown in Table 9.2 were surprising. Among the middle-class respondents the correlation increased to .49, but among the working-class group it virtually disappeared.

TABLE 9.2

Political Involvement by Club Memberships by Social Class

	Social Class:					
	Working Class			Middle Class		
	Number of Club Memberships:					
Political Involvement:	None	One or Two	Three or More	None	One or Two	Three or More
Low	53%	40%	43%	47%	28%	10%
Moderate	40%	44%	43%	53%	54%	56%
High	8%	16%	13%	-	18%	34%
	101% (n=38)	100% (n=93)	99% (n=99)	100% (n=15)	100% (n=85)	100% (n=133)
	Gamma = .05 χ^2 p = < .64			Gamma = .49 χ^2 p = < .001		

One interpretation of these findings may be that while social participation in clubs provides "practice" for middle-class children to bring to the political sphere, for working-class children such experiences are simply not politically relevant, perhaps because the political world

is more remote when viewed from the working-class culture. Alternately, one could interpret the differing effeets as being at least partly the result of the kinds of clubs to which youngsters belong, rather than their class backgrounds. We would probably find, for example, that athletic club memberships dominate the working-class culture far more than they do the comparable middle-class culture, and athletic clubs, stressing as they do physical activity and prowess, may give less "practice" in social involvement than do other kinds of clubs. Unfortunately there is no means of distinguishing directly between different kinds of club members in this survey (no questions relevant to this were included in the questionnaire) but we can examine some indirect evidence on this issue relating to athletic clubs. If we presume, because of usual sex-role differences, that working-class adolescent girls would not tend to belong exclusively to athletic clubs to as great an extent as do working-class boys, and if we expect that athletic clubs are different in their effects (or lack thereof) than are memberships in other kinds of clubs, then we should expect to find some differences between working-class girls and working-class boys with respect to the effects of club memberships on political involvement. We do not, however, find any such difference.[10] Neither the working-class boys nor the working-class girls show any significant relationship between club memberships and political involvement. (See Table 9.3)

Another consideration is that the differences between the middle-class and the working-class groups are attributable to the differences

TABLE 9.3

Political Involvement of Working Class Sample by Club Memberships by Sex

	Sex: Male			Female		
	Number of Club Memberships:					
Political Involvement:	None	One or Two	Three or More	None	One or Two	Three or More
Low	50%	37%	41%	57%	42%	45%
Moderate	46%	49%	46%	29%	40%	41$
High	4%	15%	13%	14%	17%	14%
	100% (n=24)	101% (n=41)	100% (n=46)	100% (n=14)	99% (n=52)	100% (n=51)
	Gamma = .09 χ^2 p = .69			Gamma = .02 χ^2 p = .87		

in the academic levels of the two groups. It may be that the same sorts of factors which prompt grammar school children of both classes to be politically interested similarly increases the likelihood of generalizing social experiences to the political world. With this in mind we can look for the generalization effect within different school types for working-class children, found in Table 9.4, and for middle-class children, found in Table 9.5.

While the working-class contingent of the grammar school sample is too small a group from which to draw reasonable conclusions, they do show an increase in political involvement as the level of club memberships increases. Neither of the other working-class groups shows such an increase. Nor do we see that the school variable changes the

TABLE 9.4

Political Involvement Among Working Class Adolescents
by Club Memberships by Type of School Attended

	Type of School Attended:								
	Secondary Modern			Comprehensive			Grammar		
	Number of Club Memberships:								
Political Involvement:	None	One or Two	Three or More	None	One or Two	Three or More	None	One or Two	Three or More
Low	56%	47%	48%	46%	34%	46%	50%	25%	-
Moderate	40%	34%	40%	36%	55%	44%	50%	50%	57%
High	4%	19%	12%	18%	10%	10%	-	25%	43%
	100% (n=25)	100% (n=47)	100% (n=52)	100% (n=11)	99% (n=38)	100% (n=39)	100% (n=2)	100% (n=8)	100% (n=7)
	Gamma = .06 χ^2 p = .46			Gamma = -.11 χ^2 p = .71			Gamma = .63 χ^2 p = .43		

TABLE 9.5

Political Involvement Among Middle Class Adolescents
by Club Memberships by Type of School Attended

	Type of School Attended:								
	Secondary Modern			Comprehensive			Grammar		
	Number of Club Memberships:								
Political Involvement:	None	One or Two	Three or More	None	One or Two	Three or More	None	One or Two	Three or More
Low	57%	39%	12%	100%	38%	10%	17%	12%	10%
Moderate	43%	50%	65%	-	46%	52%	83%	64%	53%
High	-	11%	23%	-	17%	38%	-	24%	36%
	100% (n=7)	100% (n=28)	100% (n=26)	100% (n=2)	101% (n=24)	100% (n=29)	100% (n=6)	100% (n=33)	99% (n=77)
	Gamma = .57 χ^2 p = .06			Gamma = .61 χ^2 p < .05			Gamma = .30 χ^2 p = .35		

generalizability of social experience among the middle-class children. For them generalizability is still high in both secondary modern and comprehensive schools. (On the face of it, it even seems that grammar school experience decreases the likelihood of generalization among middle-class children given that the gamma score goes down for the grammar school children. However, this lower correlation is probably partly to be explained by the fact that there is little variance in the independent variable within this group; their scores are quite uniformly high for club memberships.) Our conclusion must be then that educational selection does not seem to account for differential class response to this social participation variable.

Parenthetically, it could be suggested that selection may be a compensatory factor for working-class children, exposing them to the kind of environment which prompts generalization. Middle-class children seem to inhabit this kind of environment more frequently <u>in spite of</u> their not attending grammar schools.

But perhaps participation in the more political levels of social organizations would prompt a greater readiness for political involvement among working-class adolescents, both because of the greater social involvement one would expect among people in "office" categories of social organizations, and because of the greater isomorphism of such positions to the larger world of government and politics. To test this proposition, a calculation was made to determine the relation between political involvement and "office-holding" in club organizations. While there is some difference between levels of involvement among adolescents

who report holding or having held a club position, and those who report never having done so, among working-class adolescents this difference is slight.[12] Again we find participation in the social world is not politically relevant for the working class adolescent.

In this respect the contrast in the comparative class effect of variables prompts comment. Variables which are indirectly political, such as social participation and family authority patterns, have been found to be either ineffective or at least not as effective politicization factors among working-class adolescents compared to middle-class youths.[13] However, with variables which are more explicitly political, such as classroom political discussions and parental political role models, this is not the case. Rather, the correlations between political involvement and the more directly political variables, if anything, increase among working-class adolescents.[14] The only exception to this is the variable of school selection, which may itself involve both direct and indirect political factors. We will return to this issue in the next chapter, but in the meantime let us consider one other social factor which may have implications for the development of political interest among adolescents. This factor is sex-role socialization.

SEX-ROLE DIFFERENCES

Through various kinds of socialization mechanisms, societies perpetuate differing social norms and expectations for girls and boys. Traditionally in England it was expected that many areas of social life

would be reserved for men. Woman, being considered both intellectually and socially inferior, shouldn't concern themselves with such things as business and politics, but rather should concentrate their interest and attention on appropriate female endeavors (largely restricted to the home and family).[15]

In the Twentieth Century, these ideas have been brought into question by, amongst other things, democratic norms, the feminist movement of the early part of the century, and, more recently, the women's liberation revival of feminism.[16] But traditions die slowly. And since many other aspects of women's lives are still limited by traditional conceptions of "the woman's place,"[17] we should not be surprised to find sex-role differences in politics too. In fact, insofar as mass level participation is concerned, women generally do tend to show less interest in politics, be less informed and participate less.[18] It seems that limitations on political activity which are peculiar to women are still somewhat effective, although decreasingly so.[19]

Many of the restraints on adult women are structural and are tied to their roles as housewives and mothers, roles which limit both the physical mobility and social contacts which are necessary for participation and involvement.[20] However, it is not the pretraining procedure which encourages girls to accept, and in fact to seek such politically restraining social positions, which is of concern here, although indeed this must be recognized as some part of the socialization into female non-participation. Rather it is a somewhat more direct socialization of non-involvement which is the focus of inquiry.

The question is whether pre-adult sex-role socialization discourages girls from developing political interest so that women in effect will be disadvantaged even before they encounter the structural constraints of the homebound wife.

Pre-adult socialization could be effective in limiting female involvement in three different ways apart from programming girls to become wives and mothers. First of all, adolescent girls could be the recipients of social cues which suggest political interest and involvement is "unfeminine", in which case we would certainly expect some decrease in levels of such "unfeminine" behavior among girls.[21] Secondly, since a mother would seem to play in important role in defining her daughter's female role, less politicization of adult women as opposed to men could be perpetuated by role imitation in the family.[22] Finally, traditional norms of appropriate female characteristics such as passivity, dependence and submission which are prized in other aspects of social life,[23] could mediate politicization, in which case we would again expect lower politicization levels for girls.[24]

On the other hand, considering that the schools and media communicate the importance of universal political participation at the mass level[25] (presumably without sex-role stereotyping), girls may not show deviance in this regard -- particularly since one of the "characteristics" apparently more prevalent in females than males is conformity.[26] Indeed, we find that with respect to citizen duty items, political socialization research shows no difference between boys and girls.[27]

Looking at other aspects of citizen role socialization, we find mixed results. On some indicators such as information levels, media exposure and "politicized concern" (i.e., partisanship), sex differences are evident and statistically significant.[28] However, with respect to features such as professed interest in politics, political discussion and even in some cases actual political activity, little difference has been found between boys and girls.[29] Generally speaking, then, we can say that to an important degree pre-adult citizen role socialization has become androgynous.[30]

An initial look at the data from this survey seems to confirm this pattern by showing little difference between boys and girls in their levels of political involvement. (See Table 9.6) However both

TABLE 9.6

Political Involvement by Sex

Political Involvement:	Girls	Boys
Low	34%	30%
Moderate	46%	50%
High	20%	20%
	100% (n=278)	100% (n=258)

χ^2 p = .62

a disproportionate distribution of boys and girls between the different types of schools in the sample,[31] and the possibility that girls in different classes may receive different sorts of sex role cues require some

breakdown of the data.[32]

From Table 9.7 we can see that the distribution of boys and girls scores according to type of school attended does not change the general direction of the evidence. There is only a small difference in the political involvement scores of boys and girls in secondary modern schools and no difference between the sexes in either grammar schools or comprehensive schools. While the grammar school finding could still be consistent with some element of differential sex-role socialization, given the apparent role of education in expanding the political horizons of women,[33] the comprehensive school finding, coming as it does from the full range of pupils in the state system, is not consistent with any hypothesis of differences. The overall weight of evidence then supports the androgynous thesis.

Investigation into the class pattern of responses also supports this thesis. There is only a small difference between boys and girls in the middle class culture -- perhaps to be expected because of the higher education levels of middle class mothers who are important for role models for their daughters. But in the working class -- the area in which one would <u>most</u> expect differences to occur because of the education variable and the more traditional family patterns one is led to anticipate in the working class -- there is no difference between the boys and the girls. (See Table 9.8)

TABLE 9.7

Political Involvement by Sex by Type of School Attended

Political Involvement:	Type of School Attended: Secondary Modern		Comprehensive		Grammar	
	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys
Low	50%	39%	34%	35%	13%	13%
Moderate	36%	47%	48%	45%	55%	58%
High	14%	13%	18%	20%	32%	30%
	100% (n=91)	99% (n=131)	100% (n=125)	100% (n=40)	100% (n=62)	101% (n=87)
	χ^2 = .23		χ^2 p = .94		χ^2 p = .94	

TABLE 9.8

Political Involvement by Sex by Social Class

	Social Class:			
	Working Class		Middle Class	
Political Involvement:	Girls	Boys	Girls	Boys
Low	46%	41%	22%	16%
Moderate	38%	47%	54%	55%
High	16%	11%	23%	28%
	100% (n=120)	99% (n=116)	99% (n=129)	99% (n=109)
	χ^2 p .31		χ^2 p = .43	

FOOTNOTES

[1]Milbrath, op. cit., pp. 133, 135-137, and William Erbe, "Social Involvement and Political Activity: A Replication and Elaboration," American Sociological Review XXIX (1964), pp. 198-215. In his study Erbe refers to 14 studies which report such an association and notes he could not find a reversal of this relationship. In these studies, measures of organizational involvement have included, "number of memberships, frequency of attendance at meeting, expression of interest in organizational affairs, and participation in organizations as measured by committee memberships, office holding and financial contribution."

[2]In Britain the organizational correlation was .480 compared to .303 for social status. Nie, Powell and Prewitt, "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, II," p. 812.

[3]Op. cit., p. 209.

[4]Op. cit., p. 811.

[5]Helen S. Lewis, The Teen-age Joiner and his Orientation Toward Public Affairs: A Test of Two Multiple Group Membership Hypotheses (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Michigan State University, 1962), cited in David Ziblatt, "High School Extracurricular Activities and Political Socialization," The Annals, 361 (1965), p. 24.

[6]Lewis, op. cit., pp. 171-172.

[7]The questions used here were as follows:
"Do you belong to any school clubs or associations (including sports clubs)? How many do you belong to?"
"Do you belong to any clubs outside of school (including sports clubs)? How many do you belong to?"
Originally the social involvement scale was run without collapsing the membership categories. It was found however that scores on political involvement were very similar for those reporting one or two club memberships on one hand and those reporting three or more on the other hand. Furthermore, it was found that adding a measure of attendance at club meetings added no distinguishing capability to the scale.

[8]The relationship between social class and club memberships is shown in the table below.

	Social Class:	
Club Memberships:	Working Class	Middle Class
None	16%	6%
One or Two	40%	36%
Three or More	43%	57%
	99%	99%
	(n=220)	(n=233)

Gamma = .26

[9]See Chapters 6 and 7, specifically the differential effects of parental political authority and classroom political discussions.

[10]The gamma score for working class boys is .09 and for working class girls it is .02. Among middle class pupils there is similarly only a slight difference between boys and girls. The gamma scores are .54 and .45 respectively.

[11]The "different environments" of the non-grammar school, middle class children may also include quite different kinds of school environments that the institutional variable does not control for. While the institutional variable may control somewhat for academic environments, it does not mean schools within institutional types are standardized. In this respect we would find that the kinds of secondary modern and comprehensive schools that middle class children attend are still more middle class in composition and probably in values also than are the secondary modern and comprehensive schools that working class children attend, simply because working class children tend to go to schools in working class neighborhoods and middle class children tend to go to school in middle class neighborhoods.

[12]Among working class children who have not held a club position 46% were low on political involvement and only 12% were high on this variable. For those who have held a club position, these scores were 35% and 16% respectively.

[13]Comparative correlations for the family authority variable were: working class = .28; middle class = .38.

[14]Comparative gamma scores on these variables were:

	Working Class	Middle Class
Political Involvement by Parental Political Role Model	.51	.40
Political Involvement by Classroom Political Discussion	.41	.33

[15]See Martha Vicinus (Ed.), Suffer and Be Still (London: Indiana University Press, 1972) for readings on traditional ideas about women in Victorial England.

[16]It is interesting to note that J.S. Mill wrote on the desirability of equal status for women at a time when this was virtually inconceivable. See J.S. Mill, The Subjection of Women (1896) (London: Oxford, 1966) and "Extension of the Suffrage," in Representative Government (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1910).

[17]Statistics on the occupational and professional roles assumed by women in England are sufficient evidence to presume the existence of powerful social norms about the appropriate roles for women. However, lest one counter this sort of evidence with the argument that biological differences are responsible for this pattern of occupational distribution, one need only refer to countries such as the Soviet Union which have quite different patterns of employment for men and women. This suggests that under different cultural expectations, the distribution of occupations can be very different. For an interesting and perceptive interpretation of the process by which women are limited in their own views of their appropriate roles, see Sandra L. Bem and Daryl J. Bem, "Training the Woman to Know Her Place: The Power of Nonconscious Ideology,"in Michelle Hoffning Garskoff (Ed.), Roles Women Play: Readings Toward Liberation, (Belmont, Calif.: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1971).

[18]For lower interest in politics among women in Britain see Butler and Stokes, op. cit., p. 50. Almond and Verba report data which indicate lower levels of political cognition and political communication among British women as compared to British men. Op. cit., pp. 325-329. (For tables see the unabridged edition by Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 390-393.) For non-English data see for example, Campbell, et al., The American Voter, pp. 255-259; Maurice Duverger, The Political Role of Women, Paris, UNESCO, 1955; and M. Gruberg, Women in American Politics (Oshkosh: Academia, 1968).

[19]See Butler and Stokes, op. cit., pp. 49-51 and Campbell et al., op. cit., pp. 255-259 for discussion and data relevant to the decrease in some kinds of constraints on women.

[20]Ibid., pp. 258-259.

[21]See Robert Lane, Political Life (New York: The Free Press, 1959) p. 211 for a discussion of such a process working among adult women. As he notes, this view of the female role is probably not very widespread, however it may still be sufficient to effect some degree of difference between girls' and boys' interest in politics.

[22]Butler and Stokes, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

[23]Inge K. Broverman, et al., "Sex-Role Stereotypes: A Current Appraisal" found such characteristics were considered typical and indeed appropriate for women even by college students, who are presumably less

prone to traditional stereotyping of women than is the general population. Found in Journal of Social Issues, 28 (1972) no. 2, pp. 59-79.

[24]Hess and Torney make this kind of argument as one explanation for sex differences in political socialization data. Op. cit., pp. 174-175.

[25]Some emphasis must be put on the extent to which this non-sexist communication is restricted to mass level participation. The same could not be said of images both the school and media present of more elite level participation. It seems to this author that cultural norms do not support the "excursion" of women into roles of political leadership, and the media and schools probably do not provide countervailing images to discredit this sort of cultural discrimination. On this point see Dowse and Hughes, "Girls, Boys and Politics," British Journal of Sociology 22 (1971) p. 61. They found that a large number of boys (71%) described women politicians as "unfeminine," and a smaller but still significant proportion of girls (45%) agreed with them.

[26]For some references to themes on conformity and "other orientation" among women see Lois Wladis Hoffman, "Childhood Experiences and Achievement," in Journal of Social Issues 28 (1972) no. 2, pp. 129-155 and Elizabeth Douvan, "New Sources of Conflict in Females at Adolescence and Early Adulthood," in Judith Bardwick, et al., Feminine Personality and Conflict, pp. 31-44.

[27]Hess and Torney, op. cit., pp. 190-191; Dowse and Hughes also report boys and girls show the same level of agreement with the statement that people should be interested in politics. "Boys, Girls and Politics," p. 62.

[28]Ibid., p. 62 for media exposure; and Hess and Torney, op. cit., report lower levels of politicized concern on the part of girls, p. 194. Dowse and Hughes also found girls less likely to show partisanship but this decreased with age so that in the 15+ age group the difference was only 4%.

[29]Dowse and Hughes, "Girls, Boys and Politics" p. 58; Hess and Torney, op. cit., pp. 184-193. On political activity, Hess and Torney found boys more active than girls until grade 8, at which time they showed the same level of political participation.

[30]Again we must emphasize that this is only with respect to mass level participation.

[31]The distribution of boys and girls among school types is as follows:

Type of School:	Girls	Boys
Secondary Modern	33%	51%
Comprehensive	45%	16%
Grammar School	22%	34%
	100%	101%
	(278)	(258)

[32]For some indication of class differences see Dowse and Hughes, Boys, Girls and Politics, pp. 56, 57 and 63.

[33]Milbrath, op. cit., pp. 136-137; Almond and Verba, op. cit., Chap. 13 and Campbell et al., op. cit., p. 256.

CHAPTER X

POLITICAL DEFERENCE

In Chapter II we noted that a number of commentators have described the English culture as one which retains an element of traditionalism particularly at variance with the ethic of participation. This element is political deference. There is, it is said, a prevalence of deference in this country and this is a characteristic somewhat peculiar to England as a Western democracy. In reviewing this theme it was suggested that the notion of England as a (politically) deferential society may need reconsideration from a more contemporary perspective. It is the task of this chapter to examine evidence from the adolescent survey which bears upon this issue. The question being posed is whether political deference is an important component of the culture being transmitted in this society. If it is, then we should expect to find adolescents in our sample indicating general acceptance of statements related to deference issues. If we do not find such acceptance, we have further reason to question the deference thesis. Secondly, since this study is essentially a developmental exploration, we shall not only speculate on the extent of deference in the adolescent sub-population, we will also look for factors which are related to deference. Finally, as the level of deference may bear on other participation dimensions, notably political involvement, we will also consider the relevance of our findings for the level of political involvement among the adolescents.

CONSTRUCTING THE MEASURE

In attempting to describe and evaluate the prevalence of political

deference among the adolescents, the first problem was to design a scale by which to measure such an orientation. For this, nine questions were developed which, content-wise, were thought to involve issues of political deference. As mentioned earlier, political deference has not been systematically measured in any sample, nor has it been given clear referents for empirical research. Consequently, in devising possible scale items, it was necessary to develop original measures from the two themes of deference extracted from the literature: the independence of political leaders and the superiority of political elites. Five questions were drawn up to tap elements of the independence theme and three questions were used to measure notions of elite superiority. (See Table 10.1)

The questions directed primarily toward the independence of government and political leaders were concerned with three facets of this aspect of deference:

(a) Whether the respondents (as ordinary individuals) accepted a passive role for themselves in political decision-making (see questions 1, 2 and 3);

(b) "readiness to accept rather than question...governmental authority" (see question 4);

(c) representational norms, that is, the degree to which the respondents feel the government should consider public opinion when laws are made (see question 5).

The questions relating to the superiority of political elites were concerned with notions about the general superiority of political leaders (see questions 6 and 7), and the superiority of leaders compared

TABLE 10.1

Deference Questions

	Deferential Reply
*1. Since political decisions are so complex and important, most decisions are best left up to political leaders. People like me shouldn't try to influence them too much or interfere. (agree/disagree)	Agree
*2. Ordinary people like me and my family shouldn't have too much say in public issues because we should leave most of the government of our nation to those people who are best qualified to do it. (agree/disagree)	Agree
*3. Would you say that people have to keep an eye on Government and politicians in this country to see that they're doing the right sorts of things or do you think that we can pretty well leave things up to them? (We can pretty well leave things up to them/ We've got to keep an eye on them.)	We can pretty well leave things up to them
*4. If people in Government say that some policy is good for this country, then it's our duty to support them on that policy. (agree/disagree)	Agree
5. How much attention do you think governments SHOULD pay to what the people think when they decide what laws to make? Governments SHOULD pay: (a great deal/quite a lot/some/little or none.)	---
6. Most high political leaders are uncommonly well-gifted men and women. (agree/disagree)	Agree
7. It doesn't take any special abilities to be a politician. (agree/disagree)	Disagree
8. People like me know enough about some things to criticize political leaders. (agree/disagree)	Disagree
9. No matter what politicians try to do, the British system of law will protect the citizens well enough. (agree/disagree)	Agree

*Included in the deference scale.

to one-self (see question 8).

One additional item (question 9) was added to allow the emergence of a new element which may be part of political deference: trust in the British system of government. While it may be presumed that respect for political leaders reinforces norms concerning the independence of political leadership, acceptance of these independence norms is not necessarily a result of notions concerning the superiority of political leaders and politicians. Rather, they may be related to a feeling of trust in the British system of government. (This trust in the British system need not, of course, be just an alternative to ideas of elite superiority, but may be an additional element of a deference "syndrome".)

The second problem in developing the deference scale was to determine which of the items were empirically related and could be used in the final scale as good indicators of an attribute definable as political deference. To assist in this task, all the items were subjected to factor analysis. The results of this procedure indicated, first of all, that two items, numbers 5 and 7, were quite unrelated to the rest of the measures and should not be retained for scale construction. Also, although the remaining items all showed some inter-relationship, only four of them had loadings of at least .40 on the first (unrotated) principal component.[1] Since factor rotation did not provide a more interpretable solution, the four items which loaded at .40 or higher were used for the final deference scale.[2] (See Table 10.1 for these items).

A look at the items retained for the scale indicates that all are to be found under the theme on the desirability of granting "special"

independence to Governmental and political leaders. What we seem to have found from the factor analysis is a dimension which can be interpreted as political deference, but one for which neither notions of the superiority of political leaders nor trust in the British system are, in themselves, good indicators. (It should be noted that reference to the abilities of leaders was not absent from the questions on the independence theme. See question number 2.) There were quite a number of respondents who, although indicating a belief that political leaders are especially capable folk, were not very willing to grant "special" independence to political leaders or to accept their leadership unquestioningly.[3] This was similarly true for the question on "faith in the British system."[4] On consideration, these results are reasonable. One or both of these notions may be important ingredients of deference, but such attitudes alone are not deferential. While these findings may, of course, be due to peculiarities of measurement used in this study and should not be considered definitive on the question of deference, including measures on the abilities of leaders and/or "trust in the system" in the scale here would have added confounding elements.

It is interesting to note that question number 5, asking how much attention "governments SHOULD pay to what the people think when they decide what laws to make," is noticeably unrelated to any of the deference items. This is probably because the content of this question, although relevant to the issue of the independence

of government was, of all the questions, most closely associated with notions of the popular mandate. As such it was the question most obviously concerned with a basic tenet of democracy which enjoys cultural support. (This was illustrated by the strong support for government responsiveness within the sample as a whole.[3]) The fact that even political deferents did not tend to discount the desirability of government responsiveness in decision-making illustrates that deference is not an orientation which persists wholly outside the context of cultural values related to democracy. Rather, it conforms to Eckstein's description of political deference as part of a value system which simultaneously accommodates -- although with some inconsistency -- pre-democratic and democratic values.[4]

PREVALENCE OF DEFERENCE

As shown on Table 10.2, which describes the distribution of responses to the five deference items, the data do not appear to support the idea that English adolescents are highly deferential. On none of the items did a majority of adolescents select the deferential response. Moreover, using a simple additive scale to sum the responses over the four questions, 56% of the respondents scored either 0 or 1 point.[5] Only 20% scored more than 2 points.

But while these scores suggest that this deference syndrome may not be widely distributed among English youth, it could still be argued that, comparatively speaking, they are more prone to exhibit elements of this dimension than would be the youth of other Western democracies. On this issue one of the most obvious points of comparison would be American

TABLE 10. 2

Individual Deference Item Responses

1. Would you say that people have to keep an eye on Government and politicians in this country to see that they're doing the right sorts of things or do you think that we can pretty well leave things up to them?

We can pretty well leave things up to them	27%
We've got to keep an eye on them	70%
No answer	3%

2. Ordinary people like me and my family shouldn't have too much say in public issues because we should leave most of the government of our nation to those people who are best qualified to do it.

Agree	31%
Disagree	66%
No answer	3%

3. Since political decisions are so complex and important, most decisions are best left up to political leaders. People like me shouldn't try to influence them too much.

Agree	36%
Disagree	59%
No answer	5%

4. If people in Government say that some policy is good for this country, then it's our duty to support them on that policy.

Agree	38%
Disagree	58%
No answer	4%

youths, whose reputation in terms of cultural background would least support suggestions that deference, either social or political, was common. The populist tradition in American politics and the emphasis in American folklore on individualism and on equality of opportunity are contrary to the elitism of political deference. In order to establish some comparative perspective, efforts were made to sample some element of the American adolescent culture. Unfortunately, a large-scale diversified sample of American adolescents, similar to the English sample, was not available. However, some questionnaires were distributed in a school in northwest Washington state.[8] Although the results of this testing are not really comparable to the British figures, for obvious methodological reasons, the data are interesting and suggestive. The samples were different in terms of size and geographical diversity, but there was rough similarity in the social class composition and the questions used were almost identical.[9]

Comparing the scale scores between the two samples, the figures do not conform to expectations based on the hypothesis of cultural differences. The mean score in the American sample was 1.36, just .01 lower than the English mean. The modal score in both groups was 0, with 29% of the American respondents and 31% of the English respondents scoring here. Twenty-two percent of the American compared to 20% of the English scored more than 2 points. (See Table 10.3.)

Insofar as the individual deference items are concerned, again the similarities between the two sample are more evident than the differences.[10] However, there is an interesting variation on two of the questions.

Question number 2, which suggests that "ordinary people...shouldn't have too much say in public issues..." has less support in the American sample than in the English sample (22% compared to 31%), but question number 4, tapping a sense of duty to support government is more favored in the American sample (50% versus 38%).

TABLE 10.3

Deference Scores: English and American

Number of Deferential Responses	English Sample	American Sample
0	31%	29%
1	25%	32%
2	24%	18%
3 or 4	20%	22%
	100% (n=472)	101% (n=139)

This duty ethic, evident in spite of the fact that the Americans generally rejected any suggestion that the public should be passive on government and public issues, may reflect an interpretation of patriotism which is particularly prevalent in the United States.[11]

In placing English children in a comparative context, these data are consistent with those reported by Dennis et al.[12] Looking at supportive orientations toward the nation and government in four countries, they were surprised to find that their English respondents were consistently more critical and cynical of government than were the Americans, Germans, or Italians.[13] In other words, the English children did not

exhibit the kind of respect and appreciation for Government that one would expect in a deferential political culture.

POLITICAL DEFERENCE AND PARTY AFFILIATION

The references to political deference that we find in the literature on England appear to conceive of deference as a generalized disposition towards political leadership and governmental authority which is not dependent upon party or the contemporary incumbents of leadership positions. In other words, it seems to be presumed that the English are deferential to government leaders irrespective of the partisan makeup of the Government.[14] Given the popularity of the theme on traditionalism in the culture, it is not surprising that English society is interpreted as so ascriptive that not even partisanship affects public deference.

In other "modern" Western societies, we expect political considerations to affect people's evaluations of leaders and their willingness to criticize the Government. Thus, although we think political deference in these societies is somewhat limited, we would expect that the deference which would be found would be highly influenced by partisan attachments. "Pure deference", independent of party or incumbents in power, would be rare. Since it is the thesis of this chapter that there has been a decline in England in the kind of traditionalism which fosters political deference, not only should we expect to find relatively low levels of deference among the adolescents, we should also expect political deference to be related to party affiliation. Those who are supporters of the party in power (in this case the Labour Party) should be more deferential than those who are supporters of other parties, or those who indicate no party affiliation.

Indeed we find that when we look at deference across party groupings in our sample, there is such a relationship. Twenty-one percent of the Labour Party supporters scored lowest on the deference scale compared to 33% of the rest of the sample, while the 30% high scoring Labourites are matched by only 16% in the rest of the sample.[15] (See Table 10.4.) It seems then that some element of the political deference we have measured may be party-related, that some individuals may be deferential to Government leaders only when their party is in power. From this we should expect a movement of individuals in and out of the "population" of deferentials as the government changes party hands.[16]

TABLE 10.4

Political Deference by Labour Party Affiliation

Political Deference:	Labour Party Supporters:	Not Labour Party Supporters:
0	21%	33%
1	21%	28%
2	28%	22%
3 or 4	30%	16%
	100%	99%
	(n=141)	(308)

χ^2 $p < .001$

But levels of deference do not vary solely according to support for the Government party. When compared to party supporters, whether Labour, Tory or Liberal, those who indicate no partisan leanings have the lowest level of political deference. (See Table 10.5.) What is interesting, however, is that differences between the opposition

partisans and the non-partisans are not limited to reference to political leadership. An item analysis of the deferential responses of the Tory and Liberal supporters on one hand and the non-partisans on the other shows that although the difference between these two groups is the greatest on item 3, which refers only to political and not Governmental leadership ("since political decisions are so complex and important most decisions are best left up to political leaders..."), differences are also evident in item 4, concerning one's duty to support Government policy, and for the Tory supporters, on item 2, which advises leaving government to the qualified (as opposed to "ordinary people like me and my family").[17] Whether this is a sort of elitism one expects of the older and more traditional parties, but not of Labour supporters in an opposition situation, awaits testing under conditions of a non-Labour government. What can be suggested is that under conditions of opposition, partisan attachments to the Tory or Liberal parties seem to sustain a level of political deference not found among non-partisans.

TABLE 10.5

Political Deference by Party Affiliation

Political Deference:	Party Supported: Labour Party	Other Party	No Party
0	21%	31%	42%
1	21%	26%	37%
2	28%	26%	5%
3 or 4	30%	16%	16%
	100% (n=141)	100% (n=251)	100% (n=57)

χ^2 $p < .001$

SOURCES OF POLITICAL DEFERENCE

It seems apparent from the above analysis that levels of political deference among Labor supporters may be party dependent and that under conditions of opposition, deference among these supporters may decrease. While such "partisan deference" is still deference of a sort and for this study is of interest as an elitist phenomenon contrary to the participation ethic, it is more limited and less traditional than is "pure deference." In this respect, it can be said that deference levels among the non-Labour respondents may more nearly reflect "pure deference" since they do not depend upon the respondent's party being in power to sustain them. But in looking for the sources of deference in the following analysis, it is not the possibility of different kinds of deference among Labour and non-Labour respondents which is important to consider. First of all, on the basis of these data we cannot determine which of the Labour supporters would be similarly deferential to a non-Labour government. Secondly, we should expect the sources of the deference, pure or partisan, to be similar. (Both kinds of deference are, after all, hierarchical and elitist orientations.) But the party variable must be kept in mind as a possible contaminating factor in the relationships between deference and the independent variables.

The Family

Since we have no measure to assess the deferential orientations of the parents in our sample, we cannot in this section consider the role of the family in directly transmitting deferential orientations to their children. However, we can look at the two family variables

considered earlier with respect to political involvement as possible indirect sources of deference.

We have already found parental political involvement scores are related to the adolescents' own political involvement scores. As will be argued later, political involvement may play some role in limiting deference, hence we might expect some indirect effect on deference (through political involvement) from the political models parents set for their offspring. "Political" parents will stimulate the child's political interest and awareness. As the child becomes more politically involved, non-deferential (i.e., more "democratic") values will be reinforced.

While there is some support in the data for this interpretation, the differences by parental model are both substantively and statistically significant only among Labour Party supporters (see Table 10.6) and this is largely due to the working class sample among Labour Party supporters.[18] The indirect effect then of the parental political model, while evident, is not sizable.

The second family variable, authority patterns in the family unit, may seem a more likely factor contributing to political deference as both variables are concerned with authority relationships. Since we may plausibly predict that parents who do not encourage participation by their offspring in family decision-making also expect their children to be more obedient (and deferential?), we might expect their children to be more submissive in the family unit. Further, since we might also anticipate these children will generalize this submissive behavior to

TABLE 10.6

Political Deference by Parental Political Model by Labour Party Affiliation

	Labour Party Affiliation					
	Labour Supporters			Not Labour Supporters		
	Parental Political Model					
Political Deference:	Potential & Mobilized	Moderate	Apathetic	Potential & Mobilized	Moderate	Apathetic
0	42%	21%	8%	41%	34%	26%
1	12%	25%	17%	27%	27%	29%
2	35%	22%	36%	19%	22%	26%
3 or 4	12%	32%	39%	14%	17%	18%
	101% (n=26)	100% (n=72)	100% (n=36)	101% (n=64)	100% (n=161)	99% (n=68)
	Gamma = .34 χ^2 $p < .05$			Gamma = .12 p = .76		

the outside world -- especially if they come in contact with this norm in other spheres -- we may reasonably hypothesize that they will become more deferential to political authority than will other children. On the other hand, we have little evidence to substantiate the notion that the culture in general widely supports such deferential orientations to Government and political elites. Also, in this study our indicator of the nature of the family authority system is limited to the (crude) family participation variable and does not include more direct measures for discipline in the family, and/or closeness of the parent and child (variables not easily measured when using school facilities for questionnaire distribution, but ones which are probably quite relevant to the submission syndrome). It should not then be surprising if we find our relationship between the family authority structure and deference is not substantial.

Indeed, although deference is lowest among pupils who scored highest on the family participation variable, the differences between the groups are not very large. (See Table 10.7.) Moreover, bringing

TABLE 10.7

Political Deference by (Perceived) Family Authority

	Perceived Family Authority		
Political Deference:	Democratic	Moderate	Non-democratic
0	36%	28%	25%
1	27%	19%	32%
2	19%	32%	21%
3 or 4	18%	21%	22%
	100% (n=221)	100% (n=160)	100% (n=77)

Gamma = .14
χ^2 $p < .05$

the party variable into the analysis, we find the relationship disappears among Labour supporters. Perhaps because partisan considerations are especially relevant for the level of deference here, generalization from family experience is not as likely. (See Table 10.8.) But for both groups, a stronger test of the family authority system as a source of deference requires taking into account the dimensions of discipline and closeness.[19]

Social Class

It could be argued that because of their social location and the prevalence of traditional social values in England, working class persons were historically more prone to deferential orientations than persons in the middle class. Under a traditional social order, deference to one's "betters" is required and those lowest in the social hierarchy would have more experience in being socially subservient. Presumably, then, if traditional values are prevalent, deferential life styles would be more entrenched at the lower end of the social scale and perhaps reflected more in political values and preferences here than at higher status levels. That this situation did exist in England is implied by A.L. Lowell's observations of 1908.

> The sentiment of deference, or snobbishness, becomes, if anything, stronger as the social scale descends. The working man, when not provoked by an active grievance to vote for a trade union candidate, prefers a man with title, and thus the latest extensions of the franchise have rather strengthened than weakened the hold of the governing class upon public life.[20]

However, in spite of Lowell's observations, it is not altogether clear how extensive generalized deference was amongst the working class.

TABLE 10.8

Political Deference by (Perceived) Family Authority by Labour Party Affiliation

	Labour Party Affiliation					
	Labour Supporters			Not Labour Supporters		
	(Perceived) Family Authority					
Political Deference:	Democratic	Moderate	Not Democratic	Democratic	Moderate	Not Democratic
0	22%	22%	18%	27%	29%	29%
1	18%	14%	39%	34%	21%	29%
2	32%	28%	25%	15%	34%	19%
3 or 4	28%	36%	18%	14%	16%	23%
	100% (n=60)	100% (n=50)	100% (n=28)	100% (n=146)	100% (n=103)	100% (n=48)
	Gamma = -.06 χ^2 p = .21			Gamma = .16 χ^2 p < .05		

Traditional notions of social hierarchy and authority were based on pre-industrial relationships in small feudal communities, and we have no accurate measure of the degree to which general deferential values of pre-industrial society were transferred to the more impersonal environment of the industrial working class, nor whether they were expressed in attitudes to political authority in the industrial society.[21] Moreover, recent influences would seem to have a potential for neutralizing traditional norms if they were prevalent in the industrial working-class culture. The Labour Party with its attacks on elitism, the trade union movement which has reiterated Labour ideology to its members, and working-class consciousness and class esteem which expanded with the growth of the trade union movement are factors which would be particularly relevant to the breakdown of deference, both social and political among the working class.

Yet even with these features, it may be that residual elements of traditional political values are still part of the working-class environment, and working-class adolescents are more likely to be politically deferential than their middle-class counterparts. In order to test this proposition, a simple class breakdown of the deference scores was made. This distribution did suggest some effect from the class variable (see Table 10.9), but bringing into consideration the important party variable does modify the picture. (See Table 10.10.) Among the more "pure" deferentials, those for whom high deference cannot be attributed to over-zealous support of "their" party in government, there is some difference between the middle- and working-class respondents, but it is not statistically significant using the chi square measure. Only among the Labour

Party supporters themselves is there a significant class difference. But perhaps it is not surprising that middle-class Labour supporters, who support a party which contrasts with the political climate of their social class, are less prone to deferential support of political and Governmental leaders than are working-class supporters, for whom the Labour Party is their traditional class party.[22]

As it stands here, then, the difference between middle-class and working-class deference scores is to some degree attributable to the greater deference of working-class Labour supporters. While it does seem likely that under conditions of a middle-class Conservative government we would see some increase in middle-class deference, which could narrow the social class differences, this awaits further data.[23] With the available evidence it is not possible to determine the extent to which the difference in deference scores is related to the incumbency of a working-class party, and to what extent it reflects a more general tendency toward political deference on the part of the working class adolescent.

TABLE 10.9

Political Deference by Social Class

Political Deference:	Social Class: Working Class	Middle Class
0	24%	37%
1	22%	29%
2	30%	18%
3 or 4	24%	15%
	100% (n=214)	100% (n=203)

Gamma = -.29
χ^2 $p < .001$

TABLE 10.10

Political Deference by Social Class by Labour Party Affiliation

	Labour Party Affiliation:			
	Labour Party Supporters:		Not Labour Party Supporters:	
Political Deference:	Working Class	Middle Class	Working Class	Middle Class
0	12%	29%	29%	37%
1	16%	37%	28%	30%
2	35%	17%	28%	18%
3 or 4	36%	17%	16%	15%
	99% (n=80)	100% (n=41)	101% (n=116)	101% (n=162)
	Gamma = -.48 χ^2 p < .005		Gamma = -.13 χ^2 p = .24	

Schools

As with other aspects of political participation, there is reason to suppose the educational system may have implications for political deference. More particularly, the system of educational selection across schools and authority patterns within schools seem particularly relevant as potential sources of deference.[24] It is to the first of these two factors that we will now turn.

As described in chapter VIII, one of the more popular descriptions of the selective system in English education likens it to a sponsorship model by which a minority of children are "sponsored" into elite status through grammar school education while the rest of the children are "trained" to be non-elites, or the followers.[25] According to this model, one way in which the elite system is perpetuated is by inculcating "appropriate" values in the two groups. (This has already been described in reference to political involvement.) If this is an accurate description of the macro effect of this kind of education system, then we would expect differences in political deference between types of schools. In the elite grammar schools we would find little political deference since the recruits would, according to the model, assume a sense of equality with other elites. In secondary modern schools, there would be higher levels of political deference, reflecting lower self-esteem and belief in the superiority of elites. Comprehensive pupils, as neither 'the chosen' nor 'the rejected' would show scores somewhere in between those of the grammar schools and the secondary modern schools.

Looking at Tables 10.11 and 10.12, which show the distribution of

deference scores by school attended both for the overall sample and within party groups, these expectations are not borne out. For one thing, the comprehensive pupils do not show more deference than the grammar school products. And while there is some difference in the expected direction between secondary modern and grammar school pupils, the party breakdown shows this difference is not retained among the Labour party supporters. In fact, although the distribution is not statistically significant, among Labour Party supporters, political deference is highest in the grammar schools.

TABLE 10.11

Political Deference by Type of School Attended

Political Deference:	Type of School Attended: Grammar School	Comprehensive School	Secondary Modern
0	38%	39%	22%
1	25%	22%	27%
2	17%	24%	28%
3 or 4	20%	15%	23%
	100% (n=133)	100% (n=141)	100% (n=198)

χ^2 $p < .01$

It should be noted that the distribution of scores among the Labour Party supporters may in part reflect the peculiar political conditions of the time. The Labour Party was under strong attack for its performance in Government, and grammar school students, among the most politically aware, were probably more exposed to the political climate.[26]

TABLE 10.12

Political Deference by School by Labour Party Affiliation

	Labour Party Affiliation:					
	Labour Party Supporters:			Not Labour Party Supporters:		
Political Deference:	Secondary Modern	Comprehensive	Grammar	Secondary Modern	Comprehensive	Grammar
0	21%	26%	15%	19%	43%	41%
1	21%	21%	18%	32%	24%	28%
2	32%	21%	30%	27%	25%	15%
3 or 4	25%	33%	37%	22%	8%	17%
	99% (n=71)	101% (n=43)	100% (n=27)	100% (n=119)	100% (n=88)	101% (n=101)
	χ^2 p = .77			χ^2 p < .005		

Under conditions of party unpopularity and attacks from both the left and the right, one would expect that among persons exposed to the political controversy, those leaving the party fold would be the least deferential. Almost by definition, the most deferential would go down with the party ship.

But even if the distribution of deference scores among Labour Party supporters is to some extent a result of the temporary circumstance, in the rest of the sample we can see that where there is some effect from type of school attended, it is not one of inculcating the elite culture in grammar school recruits -- in which case we would have seen a difference between comprehensive school pupils and grammar school pupils. The effect is more plausibly one of emphasizing the inferiority of secondary modern pupils and hence contributing to deference among those who are "relegated" to secondary modern schools.

With respect to authority patterns within schools, while we have found only weak evidence to support the hypothesis relating school authority structures and political involvement, it could be that deferential orientations are more relevant to this variable. At least we should not discount this possibility without first investigating the data. The hypothesis then is that where school authorities are not responsive to pupils' complaints and pupils are allowed little legitimate opportunity for participation in decision-making in their school, they may subsequently doubt the legitimacy of non-elite participation in political decision-making, and thus show high deference scores.

The data however do not substantially support the hypothesis.

Among Labour Party supporters, there was no difference between pupils scoring their schools as "responsive" and those scoring their schools as relatively authoritarian, and in the rest of the sample the relationship was not only weak (gamma = .10), the chi square probability was not significant (χ^2 p = .21).[27] The explanation for this lack of impact would seem to be similar as that used to account for the weak relationship with the political involvement variable. That is, the variability in the nature of pupil-teacher relationships within schools and the possibility for the child to experience other (non-school) authority relationships which may be as (or more) salient.

Sex

Since one of the themes on sex-role differences has been that women are more traditional in their social and political values,[28] we might expect that women would show greater political deference. This may in turn be reflected in the role socialization of adolescent girls. However, among the adolescents in this sample, there was no difference between levels of political deference among male and female respondents, either taken together, or within the party groups.[29] Again this reiterates recent findings in this study and elsewhere that have shown few sex differences in the political attitudes of contemporary young people.[30]

Although generally speaking we have found few social or cultural supports for political deference, among the adolescent population, there was one item in the survey which suggested that personality factors may be more closely related to attitudes of political deference. This question was concerned with the respondents' views on authority in the

family. Those who agreed that "obedience and respect for authority are the most important things children should learn," showed significantly higher levels of political deference than did those who disagreed with the statement. (See Table 10.13.) And these differences remained when the sample was broken down according to the party variable. While one item such as this is hardly sufficient evidence from which to draw conclusions, it does suggest that further research into personality correlates of political deference may be rewarding.

TABLE 10.13

Political Deference by Concern with Authority

Political Deference:	Obedience and Respect for Authority are the Most Important Things Children Should Learn: Agree	Disagree
0	27%	41%
1	22%	31%
2	27%	16%
3 or 4	24%	12%
	100% (n=321)	100% (n=148)

χ^2 $p < .001$

POLITICAL DEFERENCE AND POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

Although political deference and political involvement are quite different dimensions of political participation, and each of interest in itself, we may well inquire as to their relationship to each other.

As is evident in Table 10.14, there is a significant negative relationship between deference and political involvement (gamma = -.36). Moreover, although partisan considerations among Labour supporters tend to reduce the correlation somewhat in this group (gamma = -.27), it remains high amongst the non-Labour respondents. (gamma = -.39).

But this correlation does not establish any direction of causality. The most convincing explanation in this respect would seem to be one of mutual reinforcement. If it is thought politics should be left to the competence of political leaders, then why would "ordinary people" bother to monitor those affairs? (Politics is not "their place.") But if the people do not follow politics and become involved politically, they are not likely to develop a sense of efficacy to challenge notions of the righteous omnipotence of leaders.[31] Further, attentive, active citizens are more likely to encounter criticism of politicians -- criticism which surely challenges deferential tendencies.

Thus while our data on the comparative levels of deference suggest the thesis on the "toryness" of the English approach to political authority is "exaggerated"[32] and certainly cannot support any notions that deference provides a culturally specific support for low political involvement for the "common man," it does seem that where political deference is found, it may be at least a reinforcing element for low political involvement.

TABLE 10.14

Political Involvement by Political Deference

Political Involvement:	Political Deference: 0	1	2	3 or 4
Low	16%	33%	38%	48%
Moderate	52%	46%	45%	45%
High	32%	21%	16%	6%
	100% (n=147)	100% (n=117)	99% (n=109)	99% (n=93)

Gamma = -.36
χ^2 p < .001

FOOTNOTES

[1]The first principal factor which separated out the four deference items accounted for 58.5% of the total variance. The loadings of all the original items on this factor were as follows:

question 1	.53
question 2	.55
question 3	.42
question 4	.40
question 6	.27
question 8	.27
question 9	.26

For more detailed results of the factoring procedure, including the correlation matrix used for analysis, the principal components loading matrix and the variable communalities see Appendix C.

[2]See J.C. Nunnaly, Psychometric Theory (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), p. 328 for the argument that substantive considerations should be the criteria for using solutions found through factor rotation.

[3]Of the two questions on the superiority of leaders, the results indicated question number 7 was an invalid measure for such an attitude. While the question seemed at first glance to be relevant in terms of content, the pupils' spontaneous comments illustrated that "special abilities" can be of types both socially valued and otherwise. A politician could be judged to have special abilities such as persuasive techniques, yet be inept as a governmental decision-maker. But using the other question on the superiority of leaders as an indicator for this theme, a cross-tabulation of scores on the four final scale items with this item gave the following results:

Number of Deferential Responses:	Most high political readers are uncommonly well-gifted men and women	
	Agree	Disagree
0	20%	40%
1	28%	23%
2	24%	23%
3 or 4	28%	14%
	100%	100%
	(n=201)	(n-256)

[4]A cross-tabulation of the deference scores with the question on the British system produced results as follows:

No matter what politicians try to do, the British system of laws will protect the citizens well enough

Number of Deferential Responses:	Agree	Disagree
0	22%	39%
1	24%	24%
2	27%	21%
3 or 4	26%	16%

[5]Fifty-three percent of the respondents said "governments in this country should pay a great deal of attention" to public opinion and only 9% thought they should pay only some or little attention.

[6]Eckstein, op. cit., pp. 62-63. The coincidence of such feelings on "responsiveness" of elites with the independence theme elicits an image of a paternalistic elite whose consideration of the public's "thinking" is "granted" by them (the elite), but should not be "demanded" from below.

[7]See Appendix A for construction of this scale.

[8]I would like to thank Orest Kruhlak for his assistance in this part of the survey. It was through his efforts I was able to secure the sample of American teenagers.

[9]The English sample did have a slightly higher proportion of respondents from homes of non-manual workers than did the American sample. However, there was no relationship found between deference and social class in the American sample, and the relationship in the English sample was not great enough to have made any appreciable difference between the group scores.

[10]The comparative distribution of responses to the deference items is as follows:

Item Number:	Percentage of English	Deferential Responses American
1	27%	27%
2	31%	22%
3	36%	34%
4	38%	50%
	(n=547)	(n=149)

[11]It is to be remembered that this survey was conducted at a time when internal opposition to the American government policy in Vietnam was strong and may have caused the students to polarize on this issue of duty to the government.

[12]Jack Dennis, et al., "Support for Nation and Government...," pp. 25-48.

[13]Dennis, et al. interpret their evidence as showing a lack of support for the system of government. This they think may threaten political stability. As argued earlier with respect to this point, it is not clear why a critical approach to government should not be interpreted as a sign of a healthy democracy

[14]While this assumption is never made explicit in the literature, this is the general understanding one comes to upon reading the literature. The lack of comment on the effect of partisanship is surprising given that partisan attachments are so prevalent in England. See chapter III above.

[15]This relationship is evident in spite of the fact that the wording of the items was intentionally designed so as to make only references to government and leaders in general without reference to party or present incumbents and thus to de-emphasize the partisan nature of the government.

[16]This of course should be measured longitudinally, however even evidence which indicates higher deference among supporters of the Tory party under a Tory Government would be strong support for this hypothesis.

[17]The distribution of deference responses on these items was as follows:

Item Number:	Labour Supporters	Other Partisans	Non-partisans
3 (decisions best left to leaders	44%	40%	19%
4 (duty support Government policy)	50%	38%	26%
2 (leave Government to the qualified)	38%	31%	22%

[18]The relationships between parental political "apathy" and deference are:

working-class: gamma = .27 (χ^2 $p < .05$)
middle-class: gamma = .13 (χ^2 p n.s.)

[19]See R.E. Le Vine, "The Internalization of Political Values in Stateless Societies," in R. Hunt (Ed.) Personalities and Culture (New York: Natural History Press, 1967) pp. 185-203 for an analysis of attitudes to political authority in tribal societies using these dimensions.

[20]From the Government of England (New York, 1924) Vol. II, p. 508. Cited in Samuel Beer, British Politics in the Collectivist Age (New York: Vintage Books, 1969) pp. 254-255.

[21]See Reinhard Bendix, Nation Building and Citizenship (New York: Wiley, 1964) pp. 40-43 for a description of traditional relationships. For a discussion of the change in the ideological basis of community rights and obligations of the feudal period to that of marketplace relationships see pp. 55-61.

[22]We would expect them to be less prone to deference under either a Labour or Tory Government. Under a Labour Government they would presumably encounter much more criticism of the (Labour) Government in their class environment than would working class supporters of the Labour Government, and under a Tory Government their partisan affiliation would probably make them critical of the group in power.

[23]Under a Tory Government some decrease in deference would probably be evident among working class Labour supporters. While it may be expected that working class Tory supporters would at the same time show an increase in deference, under normal political conditions only two-fifths or less of the adult working class population -- and probably at least as small a proportion of the working class adolescent population -- are Tory supporters. Thus an increase in working class deference from Tory supporters would probably not surpass the decrease in working class deference among the present Labour supporters if this decrease was fairly general. (In my sample 47% of the working class respondents who indicated a party choice were Labour supporters and 40% were Tory supporters.)

[24]While it may again be hypothesized that an indirect relationship through political involvement would be evident, this time with respect to the school discussion variable, this was not apparent in the data.

[25]Turner, op. cit.

[26]See Chapter VIII for data which support the claim that grammar school children are the most politically aware.

[27]See Appendix A for the construction of this scale. In addition to this scale, another scale was created to rank the perceived hierarchy of authority relations in the schools. This second scale was based on the pupils' evaluations of "how much say or influence" each of the following has on "how your school is run": the head, the teachers, the prefects (where they existed) and the rest of the students. Using this scale to correlate political deference with school authority, again there was no difference between deference scores on the basis of school authority patterns.

A third method was used to explore the data on deference, and school hierarchy characteristics. This time the individual responses were combined to provide a rating for each school. There was no difference in the score distributions among schools rated on an "authoritarian" scale.

[28]See Seymour Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1963) p.242 for the frequency of left voting among women and p. 278 for the greater religiosity of women.

[29]The distribution of deference scores among the boys and the girls was as follows:

Deference:	Boys	Girls
0	32%	31%
1	26%	24%
2	22%	25%
3 o 4	20%	20%

[30]See Dowse and Hughes, op. cit., pp. 53-67.

[31]The relationship between political participation and sense of efficacy is quite well established in the literature. The assumption being made here however is not so much that political efficacy is the independent variable, assumed in many studies, but that participation itself can develop one's sense of personal political efficacy and competence to deal with politics. For a development of this sort of theme with respect to industrial democracy see Carole Pateman, op. cit., pp. 67-103. In our sample, a measure of personal political efficacy is related both to deference (mildly, gamma = -.29) and political involvement (strongly, gamma = .58). See Appendix A for this efficacy scale.

[32]D. Kavanaugh initially made this comment on the "popular" academic view of England in his discussion of political deference in op. cit., p. 346.

CHAPTER XI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Having to some extent assumed adolescent political dispositions are relevant for subsequent adult behavior, it has been the object of this study to spell out some of the more important factors which contribute to the development of participatory orientations among adolescents. While the data are, in many instances, equivocal (for reasons elaborated upon in the text), some directions, both for tentative conclusions and suggestions for research, can be derived from the evidence.

We did find, for example, that of the variables examined, the family and school, acting as more or less "direct" transmitters of political input, ranked as the most effective agents of politicization. Thus the largest and most consistent correlation throughout has been the relationship between the respondents' involvement scores and involvement scores attributed to their parents. Not only in the initial correlation, but in virtually all tabulations which controlled for this parental variable, we found differences between those pupils with politically apathetic parents and those with "political" parents. Although the substantive importance of this relationship is in conflict with other data collected on this issue, the use in this study of a composite index for political involvement, an index which includes both behavioral and attitudinal items, at least calls into question other evidence based on a less reliable indicator for political "interest". In other words, we have presented evidence that the parental influence cannot be discounted, but further confirmation would seem to be requested, particularly through

studies using indices containing behavioural measures of parental involvement, preferably collected from the parents.

Insofar as the school is concerned, again the size and consistency of the correlations with direct input deserve comment. It would seem that in spite of the reported lack of impact (on political interest) of more formal classroom instruction in American high schools, in these data the relationship between political involvement and respondents' reported levels of political discussion in their classrooms does suggest political input from the schools in the English context may not be irrelevant for teenagers. It could be that variations in the amount of political input in the classroom show some effect simply because there is not customary instruction in politics or government (as there is in the U.S.). While this may suggest some positive impact would accrue from including political and government in the curriculum, it could, on the other hand, have a mixed blessing. Perhaps not instituting formalized instruction in this subject avoids identifying "politics" as "school stuff" and, ipso facto, uninteresting. However, by excluding politics and government from the curriculum, schools may be contributing to low levels of political involvement.

In this respect a better answer to the question of the impact of the school might be to specify the kind of children who benefit most from political input in the classroom. We have already seen that working class children appear to benefit from political discussion slightly more than do middle class children. It seems likely that this occurs because working class children are initially less interested in politics hence

there is more "room" for development of political interest (starting from such a low point). If we could specify the differential impact of classroom discussion along lines such as this, we may be better equipped to recommend strategies for teachers concerned to develop the participatory potential of their pupils.

Looking at the effect of less direct socialization experiences, we found the impact varied. The data support the hypothesis that participatory experiences in the family environment contribute to higher levels of political involvement. But further research, which takes into account other characteristics such as closeness of family relationships, would be welcome. Also needed is some attempt to elaborate upon the relationship by tracing out the linkages involved. Is it that the family experience is merely a "practice ground" for participation or is it that a family which discourages its children from taking a role in the family decision-making tends to create in its offspring a certain personality type which is not attracted to politics; or does the explanation involve some combination of both these processes?

While the "democratic" family experience may appear to have an impact politically, variations in school experience along this direction do not appear to be as important. Because schools are probably not wholly consistent in the various authority relationships they impose on the child, because most schools are not "total institutions" which isolate the child from other kinds of authority experiences, and because the family, not the school, is the initial authority experience for the child, we should perhaps expect the school to play mainly a reinforcing,

but not independent, role as a preparatory experience for roles in larger authority systems.

To look at the school from another direction, it seems the effect of the organization of secondary education is a more arguable issue. While there was always a substantive difference in the data between the overall scores of pupils attending different types of schools, particularly when secondary modern and grammar school pupils were compared, to what extent this reflects an impact of the school environment, and to what extent it reflects the impact of the IQ variable (or an equivalent thereof), independent of school, is impossible to determine. Again it would seem the most reasonable explanation is that the school plays a reinforcing role, reinforcing the effect of factors such as IQ, class background and home environment -- which tend to be correlated with the type of school attended. But however great the impact of attendance at different types of school, it appears that changing to a non-selective system will in itself do little to change the overall distribution and level of political involvement among Britons.

To return to the theme that political participation may be fostered by participation experiences outside the political sphere, we found some precursor to an adult pattern in which participation in social organizations seems to promote political participation, but the finding applied only among middle-class children. This raises such questions as, a) for what reason is social participation apparently related to political participation in some groups but not in others; and b) in particular, why is social participation ineffective among

working-class children? An answer to the first question requires first of all spelling out the relationship in order to ascertain whether or not adolescents who participate socially are already of a certain personality type which is attracted to participation and involvement of many types, including the political, or whether we can assume involvement increases as a result of social participation. If political involvement does increase as a result of social participation, then the question becomes one of identifying intervening variables, if any, between participation and involvement. With regard to the second question, we should look first to the characteristics of the working-class environment which inhibit politicization generally. In this case a number of findings from this study may provide a partial answer.

Class is one of those variables which represents a kind of experience encompassing a number of factors, and for the purposes of analysis, we may or may not wish to separate them. In this analysis, we considered the independent effects of certain class-related factors, but recognized that to some extent they were part of the overall experience which explains class differences in political involvement. Thus we found that parental political involvement, family authority patterns and type of school attended all had an impact independent of class, but it was recognized that lower parental interest in politics, a less "democratic" family structure and attendance at either a secondary modern or working-class comprehensive school were generally part of the working-class experience. We also found however that other, unspecified, aspects of class environment apparently contributed to the

relationship, since political involvement was higher among middle-class adolescents regardless of parental involvement, family authority patterns and (although less so) type of school attended. Generally speaking then, it seems there are a number of factors in the milieu of the middle-class child which contribute to the skills and motivations underlying greater political involvement, and these factors are not part of the working-class experience.

Perhaps it is because their milieu is generally apolitical, one in which others tend to be either unaware of or cynical about politics, that social participation (at least as measured here) does not prompt political involvement among working-class youths. In fact, as indicated in Chapter 9, it seems that for the working-class adolescents, direct transmission of political input is most effective for politicization and less manifestly political input is ineffective or not as effective as it is for middle-class adolescents. It could be that among middle-class children the "indirect" factors which seem to contribute to political involvement, may promote the kind of non-political dispositions which encourage people to pick up political cues in their environment, while in the working-class environment these political cues are relatively absent. If so, then it is not surprising that in grammar schools, working-class children are more like middle-class children because their school environment is largely middle-class in character (if not clientele). Following from this, a further investigation into the differential political socialization of middle-class and working-class children might consider whether integration into

their class environment in other ways (such as friendship ties, daily contacts and so on) increases the level of political involvement of the middle-class child but decreases the level of political involvement of the working-class child.

With respect to different levels of political involvement between the sexes, we found no evidence to support earlier socialization studies which pronounced that girls found their "appropriate" political roles early in life. However, to what extent the similarity between boys and girls is evidence for a changing pattern of socialization is impossible to determine on the basis of these data. It may be that similarity between the sexes in adolescence is nothing new and that for women it is the realities of the adult female situation which limits their participation.[1] Without evidence from previous generations, or at least a longitudinal study of development among women, this question cannot be resolved. But it is speculated here that <u>both</u> interpretations may be partially correct. In other words, we may expect the current generation reflects a general cultural change in the socialization of women, but we would also expect that in the previous generation, and probably for the current generation too, among women the adult experience is (and will be) one which is less encouraging for participation motivations than it is among men.

In another direction, on the political deference theme, some general conclusions can also be drawn from the data. First of all, there was little evidence to substantiate the notion that the adolescent population will contribute a deferential element to the English political

culture. Not only did the English adolescents show no widespread evidence of a political deference syndrome -- at least as measured here -- but, comparatively speaking, they did not seem to be any more deferential than their counterparts in other Western democracies. Also, although deference was related to political apathy, it is probably as much a reinforcing element -- part of a general "package" of non-participatory orientations for some individuals -- as it is an initiating factor.

In looking for correlates of political deference among the young people, social factors such as school selection, school authority patterns and social class, which have been suggested elsewhere as important sources of deference in the English culture, explain differences in levels of deference to only a limited extent. But the party variable, that is, preference for one or other, or none, of the political parties, appeared to be more relevant since partisan sentiments seem to support a kind of limited deference -- or is it that partisan considerations limit general deference? Finally, results obtained by looking at the respondents' attitudes to authority generally suggest that the basis of political deference may in fact be more related to personality characteristics.

In reviewing the range of factors that have been considered in this study of participant orientations, it must be pointed out that one area of socialization which was <u>not</u> investigated is the individual's relationship to the environment via the peer group. In fact, generally speaking, the study followed a model set by many political socialization studies by, in a sense, "isolating" the individual from his or her

relationships with the environment and, indeed, with the variables investigated.[2] The individual may be described in terms of his or her milieu, but very little analysis was done on how the individual is related to this milieu. This method almost seems to assume undifferentiated relationships between the individual and the immediate surroundings, instead of recognizing that people are differentially integrated into their surroundings.While perhaps justifiable for exploratory inquiries the restrictiveness of this assumption must be recognized. For example determining whether the adolescent attends a grammar, comprehensive or secondary modern school does not tell us the extent to which he or she is part of the school community. Without this kind of information, determining the impact of the "values" of a grammar school, comprehensive school or secondary modern school may be misleading.[3] We should know, for example, whether the adolescent's friends largely attend the same school, whether the adolescent feels an outsider in the school and so on.[4] The relationships of the adolescent to the classroom experience might be similarly helpful. Does the individual really "take part" in the classroom or is she"remote" from what is going on? Already mentioned is the possibility that differential integration into class environments may be relevant for political socialization. More investigations of this sort, elaborating the individual's relationship to the immediate environment and the "agents" of socialization may present us with a more complex, but surely more informative picture of political socialization.

As a final thought on directions for new research in the area of

participation socialization, we would suggest that experimental research in schools, to design curriculae and programs on politics, is needed. As suggested earlier, we may expect the impact of motivational programs to be greatest among working-class children. And returning to the theme on democratic theory with which we began, in this respect it would seem that "compensatory" programs may be justified to bring "the disadvantaged" into the political realm. Educators have been concerned to provide special programs for those children who are disadvantaged according to more traditional definitions of education, why should we, as political scientists, concerned with issues of equality and individual development, not be concerned with those disadvantaged on this political dimension? One outcome of such a program might be some adjustment in the political balance for those persons who are now powerless compared to more highly organized, mobilized political interests. "The theory of democracy beckons us toward an ancien ideal: the liberation of the energies of all our citizens in the common pursuit of the good society,"[5] and perhaps also the development of the self.

FOOTNOTES

[1]For this argument, see Robert E. Dowse and John A. Hughes, Political Sociology (London: John Wiley & Sons, 1972),pp. 192-93.

[2]An exception to this is Kenneth Langton's analysis of the effect of homogeneous and heterogeneous peer groups in op. cit., Chapter 5.

[3]For study using this approach see King, op. cit.

[4]Ziblatt attempts this sort of analysis. Op. cit., pp. 25-31.

[5]Jack L. Walker, "A Reply to 'Further Reflections on 'The Elitist Theory of Democracy.'" American Political Science Review LX (1966), p. 392.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Adams, James F. Understanding Adolescence. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968.

Adelson, Joseph and Douvan Elizabeth. The Adolescent Experience. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966.

Adorno, T.; Frenkel-Brunswick, E.; Levinson, D. and Sanford, N. The Authoritarian Personality, New York: Harper, 1950.

Alford, Robert R. Party and Society. Chicago: Rand, McNally, 1963.

Almond, Gabriel A. and Powell, G. Bingham. Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1966.

Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sydney. The Civic Culture. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963.

Bachrach, Peter. The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1967.

Bardwick, Judith. Feminine Personality and Conflict. Belmont, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1970.

Beer, Samuel H. British Politics in the Collectivist Age. New York: Vintage Books, 1969.

Beer, Samuel H. and Ulam, Adam B. (Eds.). Patterns of Government. New York: Random House Inc., 1958.

Bendix, Reinhard. Nation Building and Citizenship. New York: Wiley, 1964.

Benn, Caroline and Simon,Brian. Half Way There. Hardmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1972.

Berelson, Bernard; Lazarsfeld, Paul and McPhee, William. Voting. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954.

Blondel, Jean. Voters, Parties and Leaders. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1963.

Blumler, J.G. and McQuail, D. Television in Politics. London: 1968.

Brim, Orville G. and Wheeler, Stanton. Socialization After Childhood. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966.

Burgess, Turell. Matters of Principle: Labour's Last Chance. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968.

Butler, David. The Electoral System in Britain Since 1918. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963.

Butler, David and Stokes, Donald. Political Change in Britain. London: Macmillan, 1969.

Budge, Ian. Agreement and the Stability of Democracy. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970.

Campbell, A.; Gurin, G. and Miller, W. The Voter Decides. Evanston: Row Peterson, 1954.

Campbell, Angus. The American Voter. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964.

Cox, C.B. and Dyson, A.E., (Eds.). The Twentieth Century Mind. Vols. I and II. London: Oxford University Press, 1972.

Dahl, Robert. A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1956.

Dawson, Richard E. and Prewitt, Kenneth. Political Socialization. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969.

Dennis, Jack. (Ed.). Socialization to Politics. New York: Wiley & Sons, 1973.

DiPalma, Guiseppi. Apathy and Participation. London: Collier Macmillan Ltd., 1970.

Douglas, J.W.B.; Ross, J.M. and Simpson, J.R. All Our Future; A Longitudinal Study of Secondary Education. London: Davis, 1968.

Douvan, Elizabeth and Adelson, Joseph. The Adolescent Experience. New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1966.

Dowse, Robert E. and Hughes, John. Political Sociology. London: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1972.

Duverger, Maurice. The Political Role of Women. Paris: UNESCO, 1955.

Easton, David and Dennis, Jack. Children In the Political System. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969.

Eckstein, Harry. Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Elkin, Frederick and Handel, Gerald. The Child and Society. 2nd ed. New York: Random House, 1972.

Flavell, John. The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand Company Inc., 1963.

Garskoff, Michelle Hoffning, (Ed.). Roles Women Play: Readings Toward Liberation. Belmont, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1971.

Goldthorpe, J.H.; Lockwood, David; Bechofer, Frank and Platt, Jennifer. The Affluent Worker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.

Greenstein, Fred I. Children and Politics. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965.

Gruberg, M. Women in American Politics. Oshkosh: Academia, 1968.

Guttsmann, W.E. The British Political Elite. London: MacGibbon and Key, 1963.

Halsey, A.H.; Floud, Jean and Anderson, C. Arnold, (Eds.). Education, Economy and Society. New York: The Free Press, 1965.

Hess, Robert D. and Torney, Judith V. The Development of Political Attitudes in Children. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967.

Hoggart, Richard. The Uses of Literacy: Changing Patterns in English Mass Culture. Harmondsworth, Middlessex: Penguin Books, 1960.

Hyman, Herbert. Political Socialization. New York: Free Press, 1959.

Jackson, Brian and Marsden, Dennis. Education and the Working Class. Harmondsworth, Middlessex: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1966.

King, Ronald, Values and Involvement in a Grammar School. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969.

Klein, Josephine, Samples from English Culture, Vols. I and II. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965.

Knutson, Jeanne N. (Ed.). Handbook of Political Psychology. San-Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Publishers, 1973.

Lane, Robert. Political Life. New York: Free Press, 1959.

Langton, Kenneth,P. Political Socialization. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Larzarsfeld, P.F.; Berelson, B. and Gaudet, H. The People's Choice. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948.

Lipset, Seymour. The First New Nation: The United States in Comparative Perspective. New York: Basic Books, 1963.

Lipset Seymour. Political Man. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1963.

Lipset, Seymour and Lowenthal, Leo. (Eds.). Culture and Social Character. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961.

Lipset, Seymour and Rokkan,Stein, (Eds.). Party Systems and Voter Alignments. London: Collier-MacMillan, 1967.

MacPherson, C.B. The Real World of Democracy. Toronto; C.B.C. Learning Systems, 1965.

McKenzie, Robert T. British Political Parties. London: Mercury Books, 1963.

McKenzie, Robert T. and Silver, Allen. Angels in Marble. London: Heinemann, 1968.

Mardsden, Dennis and Jackson, Brian. Education and the Working Class. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962.

Milbraith, Lester. Political Participation. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965.

Mill, J.S. On the Subjection of Women. 1896. London: Oxford University Press, 1966.

Mill, J.S. Utilitarianism, On Liberty and Representative Government. London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1910.

Monks, T.G. Comprehensive Education in England and Wales. National Foundation for Educational Research in England and Wales, 1968.

Nagel, Julian, (Ed.). Student Power. London: Merline Press, 1969.

Nelson, Jack L. and Besag, Frank P. Sociological Perspectives in Education. New York: Pitman Publishing Corporation, 1970.

Nordlinger, Eric. The Working Class Tories. London: MacGibbon and Key Ltd., 1967.

Nunnally, Jum C. Psychometric Theory. New York: MacGraw-Hill, 1967.

Parkin, Frank. Social Class Inequality and Political Power. St. Albans, Herts.: Granada Publishing Limited, 1972.

Parry, Geraint, (Ed.). Participation in Politics. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1972.

Pateman, Carole. Participation and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

Pelling, Henry. The Origins of the Labour Party: 1880-1900. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1954.

Piaget, Jean and Inhelder, Barbel. The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence. Translated by A. Parsons and S. Seagrin. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1958.

Pulzer, Peter G.J. Political Representation and Elections in Britain. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1967.

Pye, Lucien and Verba, Sydney. Political Culture and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.

Radner, Michael and Winokur, Stephen, (Eds.). Analyses of Theories and Methods of Physics and Psychology. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1970.

Reich, Wilhelm. The Mass Psychology of Fascism. New York: Orgone Institute Press, 1946.

Remmer, H.H. and Radler, D.H. The American Teenager. Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957.

Roger, Vincent. The Social Studies in English Education. London: Heninemann, 1968.

Rose, Richard. Politics in England. Boston: Little,Brown and Company, 1964.

Rose, Richard, (Ed.). Policy-Making in Britain. New York: The Free Press, 1969.

Rosenberg, Morris. Society and the Adolescent Self-Image. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965.

Runciman, W.G. Relative Deprivation and Social Justice. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966.

Schonfeld, William R. Youth and Authority in France: A Study of Secondary Schools. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1971.

Schumpeter, Joseph. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1943.

Sigel, Roberta, (Ed.). Learning About Politics. New York: Random House, 1970.

Shils, Edward. The Torment of Secrecy. London: Heinemann, 1956.

Taylor, William. The Secondary Modern School. London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1963.

Thompson, Dennis, F. The Democratic Citizen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

Valen, Henry and Katz, Daniel. Political Parties in Norway: A

Community Study. Oslo: University of Oslo Press, 1964.

Vincinus, Martha, (Ed.). Suffer and Be Still. London: Indiana University Press, 1972.

Wakeford, John. The Clustered Elite. London: Macmillan, 1969.

Wylie, Lawrence. Village in Vaucluse. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957.

ARTICLES

Abrams, Paul and Little, Alan. "Youth in British Politics." British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 16 (1965), pp. 95-110.

Abramson, Paul. "The Differential Political Socialization of English Secondary School Students." Sociology of Education, Vol. 40 (Summer, 1967), pp. 246-289.

Abramson, Paul and Ingelhart, Ronald. "The Development of Systemic Support in Four Western Democracies." Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 2 (January, 1970), pp. 419-422.

Adelson, Joseph. "Mystique of Adolescence." Issues in Adolescent Psychology. Edited by Dorothy Rogers. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969.

_____; Green, Bernard and O'Neill, Robert P. "Growth of the Idea of Law in Adolescence." Developmental Psychology, I (1969), pp. 327-332.

_____, and O'Neill, Robert P. "The Growth of Political Ideas in Adolescence: The Sense of Community." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 4 (1966), pp. 295-306.

Alford, Robert R. and Scoble, Harry M. "Sources of Local Political Involvement." American Political Science Review, LXII (December, 1968), pp. 1192-1206.

Ball, D.W. "Covert Political Rebellion as Resentment." Social Forces, Vol. 43 (1964-1965), pp. 93-101.

Bay, Christian. "Politics and Pseudo-Politics." American Political Review, LIX (March, 1965), pp. 39-51.

Bem, Sandra L. and Bem, Daryl J. "Training the Woman to Know Her Place." Roles Women Play: Readings Toward Liberation. Edited by Michelle Hoffning Garskoff. Belmont, California: Brooke/Cole Publishing Company, 1971, pp.

Bender, Gerald, J. "Political Socialization and Political Change." Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 20 (1967), pp. 722-727.

Broverman, Inge K.; Susan Raymond Voge; Broverman, Donald M.; Clarkson, Frank E. and Rosenkrantz, Paul S. "Sex-role Stereotypes: A Current Appraisal." Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 28, 1972), pp. 59-79.

Budge, Ian. "Support for Nation and Government Among English Children: A Comment." British Journal of Political Science, I (1971), pp. 398-392.

Campbell, Angus. "The Passive Citizen." Acta Sociologica, VI (1962) pp. 9-27.

Cameron, David R. and Summers, Laura. "Non-Family Agents of Political Socialization." Canadian Journal of Political Science, V (September, 1972), pp. 418-432.

Converse, Phillip. "Attitudes and Non-Attitudes." The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems. Edited by Edward R. Tufte. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1970, pp. 168-189.

_____. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." Ideology and Discontent. Edited by David Apter. New York: Free Press, 1964, pp. 206-261.

_____, and Dupeux, Georges. "The Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States." Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 26 (1962), pp. 1-23.

Dahl, Robert. "Further Reflections of 'the Elitist Theory of Democracy.'" American Political Science Review, LX (June, 1966), pp. 296-305.

Davis, Lane. "The Cost of Realism: Contemporary Restatements of Democracy." Western Political Quarterly, XVIII (March, 1964), pp. 37-46.

Dennis, Jack; Lindberg, Leon and McCrone, Donald. "Support for Nation and Government Among English Children." British Journal of Political Science, I (1971), pp. 25-48.

Dennis, Jack and McCrone, Donald J. "Pre-adult Development of Political Party Identification in Western Democracies." Comparative Political Studies, III, July 1970, pp. 243-263.

Dodge, R.W. and Uyeki, E.S. "Political Affiliation and Imagery Across Two Generations." Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 6 (August, 1962), pp. 266-276.

Dowse, Robert and Hughes, John A. "The Family, the School and the Socialization Process." Sociology, V (1971), pp. 21-45.

_____, and _____. "Girls, Boys and Politics." British Journal of Sociology, XXII (March, 1971), pp. 53-67.

Duncan, Graeme and Lukes, Steven. "The New Democracy." Political Studies, XI (June, 1963), pp. 156-177.

Easton, David and Dennis, Jack. "The Child's Image of Government." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 361 (1965), pp. 40-57.

Easton, David and Dennis, Jack. "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy." American Political Science Review LXI (March, 1967), pp. 25-38.

_____ and Hess, Robert D. "The Child's Political World," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 6 (1962) pp. 229-246.

Elder, Glen H. "Life Opportunity and Personality: Some Consequences of Stratified Secondary Education." Sociology of Education, Vol. 38 (1965), pp. 171-205.

Elkind, David. "Cognitive Development in Adolescence." Understanding Adolescence. Edited by James F. Adams. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968, pp. 128-159.

Erbe, William. "Social Involvement and Political Activity: A Replication and Elaboration." American Sociological Review, Vol. 29 (April, 1964), pp. 198-215.

Farber, M. "English and American Values in the Socialization Process." Journal of Psychology (October, 1953), pp. 243-250.

Fisk, Trevor, "The Nature and Causes of Student Unrest." Political Quarterly, Vol. 40 (1969) pp. 419-425.

Froman, Lewis. "Personality and Political Socialization," Journal of Politics, Vol. 23 (may, 1961), pp. 341-352.

Gallatin, Judith and Adelson, Joseph. "Individual Rights and the Public Good." Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 3 (1970), pp. 226-243.

Gardner, W.E. "A Programme of Political Education," Education and Social Science, Vol. 1 (1969), pp. 55-59.

Gardner, W.E. "Teachers' Attitudes Toward Political Education." Bul- Bulletin of the British General Studies Association, Fall, 1968.

Greenstein, Fred I. "The Benevolent Leader: Children's Images of Political Authority." American Political Science Review, LIV (December, 1960), pp. 934-943.

_____. "Personality and Political Socialization: Theories of the Authoritarian and Democratic Character." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 361 (1965), pp.81-95.

_____. "Socialization: Political Socialization." International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Edited by S. Sills, New York: Macmillan, 1968.

Hawgood, John A. "Evolution of Parties and the Party System, the Nineteenth Century." The British Party System. Edited by Sydney D. Bailey. London: The Hansard Society, 1952, pp. 28-35.

Hess, Robert D. "The Socialization of Attitudes Toward Political Authority: Some Cross-National Comparisons." International Social Science Journal, Vol. 15 (1963), pp. 542-559.

____ and Easton, David. "The Child's Changing Image of the President." Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 24 (1960), pp. 632-644.

Hoffman, Lois Wladis, "Childhood Experience and Achievement." Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 28 (1972), pp. 129-255.

Jahoda, Gustav. "Development of Scottish Children's Ideas and Attitudes About Other Countries." Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 58 (1962), pp. 91-1098.

_____. "The Development of Children's Ideas About Country and Nationality; Part I: The Conceptual Framework." British Journal

of Psychology, Vol. 33 (1963), pp. 143-153.

Jahoda, Gustav. "Children's Concept of Nationality: A Critical Study of Piaget's Stages." Child Development, Vol. 35 (1964), pp. 1081-1092.

Jaros, Dean. "Children's Orientations Toward the President: Some Additional Theoretical Considerations and Data." Journal of Politics, Vol. 29 (1967), pp. 368-387.

_____; Hirsch, H. and Fleron, F. Jr. "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Subculture." American Political Science Review, LXII (June, 1968), pp.

Jennings, M. Kent and Fox, Lawrence E. "The Conduct of Socio-Politico Research in Schools: Strategies and Problems of Access." The School Review, Vol. 76 (December, 1968).

_____, and Langton, Stephen. "Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum." American Political Science Review, LXII (September, 1968), pp.852-867.

_____ and Niemi, R.H. "Patterns of Political Learning." Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 38 (Summer, 1968), pp. 443-457.

_____ and _____. "The Transmission of Political Values From Parent to Child." American Political Science Review, LXII (March, 1968), pp. 169-184.

Jessop, R.D. "Civility and Traditionalism in the English Political Culture." British Journal of Politics, I (January, 1971) pp.1-24.

Kahan, M.J.; Butler, D.E. and Stokes, D. "On the Analytical Division of Social Class." British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 17 (1966), pp. 122-132.

Kavanaugh, Dennis. "The Deferential English." Government and Opposition, (1971), pp. 333-360.

Knight, R. "Changes in Occupational Structure of the Working Population." Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Part 3 (1967), pp, 408-422.

Kohn, Melvin J. "Social Class and Parent-Child Relationships: An Interpretation." American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 68 (January, 1963), pp. 471-480.

Levin, Martin. "Social Climate and Political Socialization." Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 25 (1961), pp. 596-606.

Le Vine, R.A. "The Internalization of Political Values in Stateless Societies." Personalities and Cultures. Edited by R. Hunt. New York: National History Press, 1967, pp. 185-203.

_____. "The Role of the Family in Authority Systems: A Cross-Cultural Application of Stimulus Generalization Theory." Behavioral Science, Vol. 5 (1960), pp. 290-296.

Lipset, Seymour M. "Value Patterns of Democracy: A Class Study in Comparative Analysis." American Sociological Review, Vol. 28 (1963), pp. 515-531.

Lipsitz, Lewis. "If as Verba Says the State Functions as a Religion, What are We To Do Then To Save Our Souls?" American Political Science Review, LXII (June, 1968), pp. 527-535.

Litt, Edgar. "Civic Education, Community Norms and Political Indoctrination." American Sociological Review, Vol. 28 (1963, pp. 69-75.

McCloskey, Herbert and Dahlgren, Harold. "Primary Group Influence on Party Loyalty." American Political Science Review, LIII (September, 1959), pp. 757-776.

Maccoby, Eleanor E. and Mathews, Richard E. "Youth and Political Change." Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 18 (1954), pp. 23-29.

Marsh, David. "Political Socialization: The Implicit Assumptions Questioned." British Journal of Political Science, I (October, 1971), pp. 519-631.

Merelman, Richard M. "The Development of Political Ideology: A Framework for the Analysis of Political Socialization." American Political Science Review, LXII (September, 1969), pp. 750-767.

_____. "The Development of Policy Thinking in Adolescence." American Political Science Review, LXV (December, 1971), pp. 1033-1047.

Middleton, Russell and Putney, Snell. "Political Expression of Adolescent Rebellion." American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 68 (1963), pp. 527-535.

Niemi, Richard. "Political Socialization." Handbook of Political Psychology. Edited by Jeanne Knutson. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Publishers, 1973, pp. 117-138.

Nie, Norman H; Powell, G. Bingham and Prewitt, Kenneth. "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, I." American Politicical Science Review, LXIII (June, 1969), pp. 361-378.

___; _____ and _____. "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, II." American Political Science

Review, LXIII (September, 1969), pp. 808-832.

Noble, Trevor. "Social Mobility and Class Relations in Britain." British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 23 (1972, pp.

Pearlin, Leonard I, and Kohn, Melvin L. "Social Class, Occupation and Parental Values: A Cross-National Study." American Sociological Review, Vol. 31 (1966), pp. 466-479.

Piner, Frank A. "Parental Overprotection and Political Distrust." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 361 (September, 1965), pp. 58-70.

Quail, D; O'Sullivan, L and Quine, W.G. "Elite Education and Political Values." Political Studies, XVI (June 1968), pp. 257-266.

Sears, David. "Review of R. Hess and J. Torney, Development of Political Attitudes in Children." Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 38 (1968), pp. 571-580.

Sigel, Roberta. "Assumptions About the Learning of Political Values." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 361 (1965), pp. 1-9.

Uyeki, Eugene S. and Dodge, Richard. "Generational Relations in Political Attitudes and Involvement." Sociology and Social Research, Vol. 48 (1964), pp. 155-165.

Walker, Jack L. "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy." American Political Science Review, LX (June, 1966), pp. 285-295.

White, Elliot. "Intelligence and Sense of Political Efficacy." Journal of Politics, Vol. 30 (1968), pp. 728-735.

Wilkinson, R. "Political Leadership and the Late Victorian Public School." British Journal of Sociology, XIII (December, 1962).

Zeigler, Harmon and Peak, Wayne. "The Political Functions of the Educational System." Sociology of Education, Vol. 43 (1970), pp. 115-142.

Ziblatt, David. "High School Extra-Curricular Activities and Political Socialization." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 361 (September, 1965), pp. 20-31.

Zurick, Elia A. "Party Images and Partisanship Among Young Englishmen." British Journal of Sociology, forthcoming.

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Central Advisory Council on Education. 15 to 18 (Crowther Report) London: HMSO, 1959.

Department of Education and Science. Statistics of Education: Schools. London: HMSO, 1970 and 1971.

Great Britain. The Report of the Public Schools Commission. London: HMSO, 1968.

OTHER SOURCES

Abramson, Paul Robert. Education and Political Socialization: A Study of English Secondary Education. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1967.

InterUniversity Consortium for Political Research. Study of Political Change in Britain, 1963-1970. Ann Arbor, Michigan: ICPR, 1972.

APPENDIX A

SCALE CONSTRUCTION

I. POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT SCALE

The Political Involvement Scale was created by averaging the scores from three component indices of spectator involvement.

Construction of Component Index Scores

1. Each index is composed of items standardized into low (0 points), moderate (1 point) and high (2 points scores).

2. Each respondent's non-missing item scores for an index were added together and the subsequent total was divided by the number of non-missing responses coded for the respondent.

3. Respondents with more than one missing item scores per index were not given a score for either the indices with the missing items or for the overall political involvement scale.

Contents of the Indices

Political Communication Index:

Item 1: ABOUT how often do you talk about public affairs and politics outside of classes with your family or friends?
High: Two or three times a week or more/ About once a week
Moderate: A couple of times a month or so
Low: Almost never/never

Item 2: Have you ever talked about the following issues with anyone outside of school? (a) the war in Biafra: often/sometimes/ seldom/ never
(b) the marches and demonstrations that have been in the news recently: often/sometimes/seldom/never
(c) the prices and incomes: often/sometimes/ seldom/never
(d) Enoch Powell's views on immigrants: often/ sometimes/seldom/never
Each answer was scored as follows: often = 3 points; sometimes = 2 points; seldom = 1 point; never = 0 points. A total score of 9 or greater on this question was scored as high; 5 to 8 points was scored as moderate; 0 to 4 points was scored as low. (Any respondent missing any one of the sections in this question was considered to have a missing item here.)

Item 3: Did you ever take a side in any of the discussions you have had on these issues? If so, please tick which issue or issues.

The war in Biafra/the marches and demonstrations/ prices and incomes/Enoch Powell's views.

Respondents who indicated they had taken a side on three or four of the issues were scored high on this item; respondents who indicated they had taken a side on 2 issues were scored as moderate; respondents who indicated they had taken a side on one issue or on no issues were scored as low.

Index of Attention to Politics:

Item 1: Some people seem to think about what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time. Others aren't that interested. How often do you follow what's going on in government and public affairs?
High: Most of the time
Moderate: Some of the time
Low: Only now and then / Hardly at all

Item 2: Do you follow news and public affairs programs on the radio and TV?
High: Most days
Moderate: A few times a week
Low: A couple of times a month or so/Less than once a month/Almost never

Item 3: ABOUT how often do you read about the government, politics or public issues in newspapers and magazines?
High: Almost every day
Moderate: A few times a week
Low: A few times a month/Less than once a month/Almost never

Importance of Politics Index:

Item 1: Do you ever get as worked up about things in government and public issues as you do about things that happen in your own personal life?
High: Frequently
Moderate: Sometimes
Low: Not very often/Never

Item 2: Do you think that people in government deal with very many things which affect you and your family?
High: A great many things they deal with affect us/ Many things they deal with affect us
Moderate: Some things they deal with affect us
Low: Little or none of the things they deal with affect us

Item 3: I don't really care too much what laws the Government makes. As long as I stay on the right side of the law I'm all right.

High: Disagree strongly
Moderate: Disagree
Low: Agree/Agree strongly

Item 4: Does it matter much to you who wins political elections:
High: It matters a great deal/It matters quite a bit
Moderate: It matters somewhat
Low: It matters little or not at all

II. PARENTAL POLITICAL MODEL

Contents of Index

Item 1: Do your parents take part in other political activity beside voting, for example, campaigning for a political party, going to political meetings, or belonging to political clubs? Yes/No.

Item 2: Do you think your parents are very interested in politics and public affairs or do you think they aren't that interested? I think they are very interested/I think they are quite interested/I think they aren't very interested/I think they aren't interested at all.

Scoring

Mobilized: Indicated their parents took part in "other political activity and were at least quite interested on item 2.

High Interest: Indicated their parents were "very interested" on item 2, but did not take part in "other political activity".

Moderate: Indicated their parents were "quite interested" on item 2, but did not take part in "other political activity".

Apathetic: Indicated their parents "aren't very interested" or aren't at all interested" on item 2 and may or may not take part in "other political activity".

(Respondents with missing scores on one or both of the items were not scored on the index)

III. (PERCEIVED) FAMILY AUTHORITY STRUCTURE

Contents of Index:

Item 1: How much influence do you feel you have in family decisions

that affect you?
High: A great deal of influence/Quite a bit of influence
Moderate: Some influence
Low: Little or no influence

Item 2: How often to you think your family does...the following?
Listen to your side of the argument.
High: Often
Moderate: Sometimes
Low: Seldom/Never

Item 3: How often do you think your family does...the following?
Talk over important decisions with you.
High: Often
Moderate: Sometimes
Low: Seldom/Never

Scoring

Answers to the above questions were scored as follows: high = 2 points; moderate = 1 point; low = 0 points. The respondents scores on these three questions were added and classed as follows on the overall index:

Democratic = 4, 5 or 6 points
Moderately Democratic = 2 or 3 points
Non-democratic = 0 or 1 point

(Respondents with missing responses on one or more items were not scored on the index)

IV. CLASSROOM POLITICAL DISCUSSION

Contents of Index

Item 1: When you were in earlier forms, did you ever have discussions or debates on politics, government or public issues in class? Often/Sometimes/Seldom/Never

Item 2: How about now? Do you ever have discussions or debates on government or public issues in classes in this form? Often/Sometimes/Seldom/Never

Scoring

In items 1 and 2 responses were scored as follows:
Often = 3 points
Sometimes = 2 points
Seldom = 1 point
Never = 0 points

Scores on items 1 and 2 were added and classified as follows on the overall index:

High = 5 or 6 points
Moderate = 3 or 4 points
Low = 0, 1 or 2 points

(Respondents with missing responses on one or both of the items were not scored on the index)

V. (PERCEIVED) SCHOOL AUTHORITY PATTERN

Contents of Index

Item 1: In general, how much say or influence do you feel (the students have) on HOW YOUR SCHOOL IS RUN? A great deal/Quite a bit/ Some/Little or none.

Item 2: Sometimes students feel they have been treated unfairly or they have other kinds of complaints about school. Do you think student in this school are free to complain to the teacher or head? Most of the time/Quite often/Not very often/Never.

Scoring

Responses to item 1 were scored as follows:

A great deal = 3 points
Quite a bit = 2 points
Some = 1 point
Little or none = 0 points

Responses to item 2 were scored as follows:

Most of the time = 3 points
Quite often = 2 points
Not very often = 1 point
Never = 0 points

Scores on items 1 and 2 were added and classified as follows on the overall index:

Responsive = 4, 5 or 6 points
Moderately responsive = 2 or 3 points
Unresponsive = 0 or 1 point

(Respondents with missing responses on one or both of the items were not scored on the index)

VI. POLITICAL DEFERENCE

Contents of Index

See Table 10.1.

Scoring

Respondents were scored 1 for each deferential response and the points were summed. Respondents who had any missing items were eliminated from the scale.

VII. POLITICAL EFFICACY

Contents of the Index

Item 1: People like me know enough about some things to criticize political leaders.
Agree strongly/Agree/Disagree/Disagree strongly

Item 2: Government and politics are so complicated I can't really understand what is going on.
Agree strongly/ Agree/Disagree/Disagree strongly

Scoring

In item 1 responses were scored as follows:

Agree strongly:	3
Agree:	2
Disagree:	1
Disagree strongly:	0

In item 2 responses were scored as follows:

Disagree strongly:	3
Disagree:	2
Agree:	1
Agree strongly:	0

Scores on items 1 and 2 were added and classified as follows:
High: 4, 5 or 6 points
Moderate: 3 points
Low: 0, 1, 2 points

Any respondents who had a missing item score were excluded from the scale.

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONNAIRE:

BRITISH YOUTH AND POLITICS

This questionnaire is part of a study we're doing of British young people in schools in various parts of England. We're interested in how young people your age feel about a number of things, but particularly about government and politics.

This is NOT A TEST. You won't be graded in any way. We want to know about YOU and YOUR IDEAS AND FEELINGS so we can learn more about young people. The answers you give us will be kept STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. No one but us and our assistants will see them and we do not want your name on the questionnaire.

The questionnaire is completely voluntary. If you do not wish to answer some questions, indicate this on your questionnaire. However, we would appreciate it if you would answer all the questions. Please answer the questions as accurately as you can. The success of the study depends on this.

INSTRUCTIONS

Most of the questions need only a tick (✓) to answer.

Some questions require written answers. On these questions sentences are NOT necessary.

Please do the questions in order.

There are four parts to the questionnaire.

This is NOT a test,but please work as quickly as you can.

We hope you find the questions interesting and that you enjoy answering them. THANK YOU FOR BEING AN IMPORTANT PART OF THIS RESEARCH PROJECT.

AGE _____ PLACE OF BIRTH _____

FORM _____ SCHOOL _____

MALE OR FEMALE _____

PART I

In this part of the questionnaire we are interested in some of your feelings and ideas about politics and government. We'd like to know what YOU think, even if you're not sure about some of your answers.

1. Some people seem to think about what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time. Others aren't that interested. How often do you follow what's going on in government and public affairs? (PLEASE TICK ONE ANSWER)

( ) Most of the time
( ) Some of the time
( ) Only now and then
( ) Hardly at all

2. Do you ever get as worked up about things in government and public issues as you do about things that happen in your own personal life? (PLEASE TICK ONE ANSWER)

( ) Frequently
( ) Sometimes
( ) Not very often
( ) Never

3. Do you think that people in government deal with very many things which affect you and your family? (TICK ONE)

( ) A great many things they deal with affect us.
( ) Many things they deal with affect us.
( ) Some things they deal with affect us.
( ) Little or none of the things they deal with affect us.

4. People have different ideas about what a good citizen SHOULD BE. We're interested in what you think. What are some of the words that come into your mind when you think of a "good citizen" in this country?

_____

_____

_____

5. Over the years, how much attention do you feel Governments in this country pay to what the people think when laws are made? Governments pay: (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(__) A great deal of attention to what the people think.
(__) Quite a lot of attention to what the people think.
(__) Some attention to what the people think.
(__) Little or no attention to what the people think.

6. How much attention do you think governments SHOULD pay to what the people think when they decide what laws to make: Governments SHOULD pay: (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(__) A great deal of attention to what the people think.
(__) Quite a lot of attention to what the people think.
(__) Some attention to what the people think.
(__) Little or no attention to what the people think.

7. Imagine that a law were being considered by Parliament which a person like your parents thinks is unjust or harmful. What do you think could be done about it?

_____

_____

_____

8. If a person like your parents made an effort to change this law, how likely is it that they would be successful? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

( ) Very likely
( ) Somewhat likely
( ) Not very likely
( ) Not at all likely

9. If you were older, how likely is it YOU would make an effort to change a law you thought was bad or unjust? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

( ) Very likely
( ) Somewhat likely
( ) Not very likely
( ) Not at all likely

10. Now how about a local council? Imagine a regulation were being considered by your local council which a person like your parents thinks is unjust or harmful. What do you think could be done about it?

_____

_____

_____

11. If someone like your parents made an effort to change this law, how likely is it they would be successful? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

( ) Very likely
( ) Somewhat likely
( ) Not very likely
( ) Not at all likely

12. If you were older, how likely is it YOU would make an effort to change a law you thought was bad or unjust? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

( ) Very likely
( ) Somewhat likely
( ) Not very likely
( ) Not at all likely

PART II

This part of the questionnaire asks you to answer some questions about three imaginary situations. We'd like to know how you would feel or what you think you would do if they did happen.

A. Suppose that the schools in this country became too crowded. Because of this the Government decided to pass a new law. This law would limit the number of young people who could attend school after a certain age. You and the rest of your class are among the ones who can't stay in school after the end of term. You are upset about this because you know that if you aren't allowed to finish the next term you won't get the job you were hoping to get. Some of the others in your class have decided the new law is unfair and they must do something about it.

1. Which of the following best describes what your reaction would be. (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(__) I would probably try and do something about this law.
(__) I probably wouldn't try to do anything because nothing we could do would do any good.
(__) I probably wouldn't try to do anything because I think Governments generally know what they are doing, and there must be a good reason for the law.
(__) I probably wouldn't try to do anything because I just take things as they happen.
(__) I probably wouldn't try to do anything for some other reason. (PLEASE SAY WHAT IT IS)

_____

_____

_____

2. ANSWER ONLY IF YOU TICKED NUMBER ONE IN THE LAST QUESTION.

If you think you might try to do something would you: (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(__) Try to do something ONLY if a teacher or some other adult leader organized your class.
(__) Try to do something even if you had to organize things yourselves.

B. Suppose when you are older prices have gone up so much that you have to have plenty of money to be able to live. Most people's wages have also gone up and they can afford to buy lots of things. But the old age pension has NOT increased and some people in your district think this is unfair. They decide something must be done to try and change the pension law. They approach you to join them.

1. Which of the following best describes what you would do? (PLEASE TICK ONE ANSWER)

(__) I probably would join them and try to do something to change the law.
(__) I probably wouldn't do anything because I have so many other concerns I'm not bothered much by other people's problems.
(__) I probably wouldn't do anything because I think we shouldn't interfere. We should leave things like that up to the Government.
(__) I probably wouldn't do anything because even if we tried, nothing would be changed.
(__) I probably wouldn't do anything because people like me don't know what to do.
(__) I probably wouldn't do anything for some other reason. (PLEASE SAY WHAT IT IS)

_____

_____

_____

2. ANSWER ONLY IF YOU CHOSE ANSWER NUMBER ONE IN THE LAST QUESTION.

Suppose you found that the leadership of your favorite political party thought that the pension law should NOT be changed. Would you: (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(__) Decide NOT to do anything about the law because you think the party leaders probably know best.
(__) Decide NOT to do anything about the law for some other reason. (PLEASE SAY WHAT IT IS)

_____

_____

(_) Continue to try and do something about the law.

C. Suppose that you heard there were some dishonest dealings in an election in your local district. Which of the following things would you do? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(_) Accept it as just part of the usual way local officials run elections.
(_) Try to get an inquiry set up to find out just what went on.

PART III

This part of the questionnaire has more questions about your feelings and opinions. It includes questions about government, your school and your family.

1. Would you say that people have to keep an eye on Governments and politicians in this country to see that they're doing the right sorts of things or do you think that we can pretty well leave things up to them? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(_) We can pretty well leave things up to them.
(_) We've got to keep an eye on them.

2. You hear a lot these days about marches and demonstrations concerned with public issues. Some people think these kinds of activities are a good thing, others say they're not. How do you feel about them? On the whole do you think they are a good thing or not?

_____

_____

_____

3. The following group of questions asks whether you agree or disagree with a number of statements. Please read each statement and decide whether you:

agree strongly
agree
disagree
disagree strongly

(PLEASE TURN OVER)

(TICK ONE BOX FOR EACH LINE)

	A great deal	Quite a bit	Some	Little or none
a) The problem with this country is that a few big people have all the say in what goes on. What ordinary people want doesn't count	(_)	(_)	(_)	(_)
b) People like me know enough about some things to criticize political leaders	(_)	(_)	(_)	(_)
c) No matter what politicians try to do, the British system of law will protect the citizens well enough	(_)	(_)	(_)	(_)
d) So many other people vote in national elections that if I were old enough, it wouldn't matter to me whether I voted or not	(_)	(_)	(_)	(_)
e) It doesn't take any special abilities to be a politician ..	(_)	(_)	(_)	(_)

The next three questions are about school and how you feel about it.

First we'd like to know what people have a lot of say about how things are run in your school. We'd like to know WHAT YOU THINK, even if you're not sure of all your answer.

In general, how much say or influence do you feel each of the following has on HOW YOUR SCHOOL IS RUN?
(TICK ONE BOX FOR EACH LINE)

(PLEASE TURN OVER)

	A great deal	Quite a bit	Some	Little or none
a) the head	( )	( )	( )	( )
b) the teachers	( )	( )	( )	( )
c) the prefects	( )	( )	( )	( )
d) the rest of rhe students	( )	( )	( )	( )

4. Now you've told us how things actually SEEM to be at your school, we'd like to know how you think they SHOULD BE. That is, we'd like you to tell us how you'd like to see things run IDEALLY. (TICK ONE BOX FOR EACH LINE)

IDEALLY, how much say or influence do you feel each of the following SHOULD HAVE ON HOW YOUR SCHOOL IS RUN?

	A great deal	Quite a bit	Some	Little or none
a) the head	( )	( )	( )	( )
b) the teachers	( )	( )	( )	( )
c) the prefects	( )	( )	( )	( )
d) the other students	( )	( )	( )	( )

5. Sometimes students feel they have been treated unfairly or they have other kinds of complaints about school. Do you think students in this school are free to complain to the teachers or head? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

( ) Most of the time
( ) Quite often
( ) Not very often
( ) Never

6. COULD YOU SHOW IF YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH EACH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS? (TICK ONE BOX FOR EACH LINE)

(PLEASE TURN OVER)

	Agree Strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree Strongly
a) Obedience and respect for authority are the most important things children should learn	(_)	(_)	(_)	(_)
b) Ordinary people like me and my family shouldn't have too much say in public issues because we should leave most of the government of our nation to those people who are best qualified to do it ..	(_)	(_)	(_)	(_)
c) Even if a person doesn't care how an election turns out, he should vote in it	(_)	(_)	(_)	(_)
d) Some young people are always trying to get the Government to make changes in how things are run. But I think the way things are done now is good enough and people should stop trying to change things	(_)	(_)	(_)	(_)
e) Government and politics are so complicated I can't really understand what is going on ..	(_)	(_)	(_)	(_)

7. We know that most adults have many problems and activities that take up their time. In view of this, how much interest do you think you will take in politics and public affairs when you are older.

(TICK ONE ANSWER)

(_) A great deal
(_) Quite a lot
(_) Some
(_) Little or none

8. How much influence to you feel you have in family decisions that affect you? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(__) A great deal of influence
(__) Quite a bit of influence
(__) Some influence
(__) Little or no influence

9. How much influence do you feel people your age SHOULD HAVE in family decisions. That is, if things were run IDEALLY, how much influence would you have? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(__) A great deal of influence
(__) Quite a bit of influence
(__) Some influence
(__) Little or no influence.

10. How often do you think your family does each of the following: (TICK ONE BOX FOR EACH LINE)

	Often	Some-times	Seldom	Never
a) Listen to your side of the argument	(__)	(__)	(__)	(__)
b) Talk over important decisions with you	(__)	(__)	(__)	(__)

11. COULD YOU SHOW IF YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH EACH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS? (TICK ONE BOX FOR EACH LINE)

	Agree Strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree Strongly
a) If the people in Government say that some policy is good for this country, then it's our duty to support them on that policy	(__)	(__)	(__)	(__)

(PLEASE TURN OVER)

	Agree Strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree Strongly
b) The way the people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country	(_)	(_)	(_)	(_)
c) Young people these days need a lot of guidance and control	(_)	(_)	(_)	(_)
d) Most high political leaders are uncommonly well-gifted men and women	(_)	(_)	(_)	(_)
e) I don't really care too much what laws the Government makes. As long as I stay on the right side of the law, I'm alright	(_)	(_)	(_)	(_)
f) Since political decisions are so complex and important, most decisions are best left up to political leaders. People like me shouldn't try to influence them too much, or interfere	(_)	(_)	(_)	(_)
g) What happens in government is generally all for the best	(_)	(_)	(_)	(_)

PART IV

Now we'd like to ask you a few questions about yourself, your family and your activities inside and outside of school.

1. Do you belong to any school clubs or associations (including sports clubs)? How many do you belong to? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(__) None (__) One (__) Two (__) Three (__) More than three

2. Do you belong to any clubs outside of school (including sports clubs? How many to you belong to? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(__) None (__) One (__) Two (__) Three (__) More than three

3. If you belong to any clubs or associations, how often do you go to club meetings? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(__) Frequently (__) Sometimes (__) Seldom (__) Never

4. Have you ever held a position such as President or Secretary or something like that in any clubs or associations either in school or outside of school? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(__) Yes (__) No

IF YES, how many times have you ever held such a position?

(__) Once (__) Twice (__) Three times (__) More than three times

5. Do you belong to any political clubs or associations? If so, could you name them for us?

_____

_____

6. When you were in earlier forms, did you ever have discussions or debates on politics, government or public issues in class? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(__) Often (__) Sometimes (__) Seldom (__) Never

7. How about now? Do you ever have discussions or debates on government or public issues in classes in this form? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(__) Often (__) Sometimes (__) Seldom (__) Never

8. ABOUT how often do you talk about public affairs and politics outside of classes with your family or friends? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(__) Two or three times a week or more
(__) About once a week
(__) A couple of times a month or so
(__) Almost never
(__) Never

9. Do you follow news and public affairs programs on the radio and TV? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(__) Most days
(__) A few times a week
(__) A couple of times a month or so
(__) Less than once a month
(__) Almost never

10. ABOUT how often do you read about the government, politics or public issues in newspapers and magazines? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(__) Almost every day
(__) A few times a week
(__) A few times a month
(__) Less than once a month
(__) Almost never

11. Some young people your age take part in election campaigns by wearing party rosettes, distributing leaflets or doing something like that for a candidate or their farite party. Have you ever taken part in a political campaign? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(__) Yes (__) No

12. ANSWER ONLY IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO QUESTION 11. Which election or elections have you taken part in?

_____

13. Does it matter much to you who wins political elections? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(__) It matters a great deal
(__) It matters quite a bit
(__) It matters somewhat
(__) It matters little or not at all

14. Some people join marches or demonstrations because they feel strongly about the issue involved. Other people go along because their friends are going, or some other reason. Why do you think most of the people in demonstrations have joined in?

_____

_____

15. Have you ever taken part in a march or demonstration? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(___) Yes (__) No

IF YES, what was it about?

_____

_____

WHY did YOU join this demonstration?

_____

_____

16. Have you ever held a position of authority such as form captain, or prefect in any of the schools you have attended? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(___) Yes (__) No

IF YES, how many times have you ever held such a position?

_____

17. Have you ever talked about the following issues with anyone outside of school? (TICK ONE BOX FOR EACH LINE)

	Often	Sometimes	Seldom	Never
a) the war in Biafra	(__)	(__)	(__)	(__)
b) the marches and demonstrations that have been in the news recently	(__)	(__)	(__)	(__)
c) the prices and incomes	(__)	(__)	(__)	(__)
d) Enoch Powell's views in immigrants	(__)	(__)	(__)	(__)

18. Did you ever take a side in any of the discussions you have had on these issues? If so, please tick which issue or issues.

(__) the war in Biafra
(__) the marches and demonstrations
(__) prices and incomes
(__) Enoch Powell's views

19. Do your parents take part in other political activity besides voting, for example, campaigning for a political party, going to political meetings, or belonging to political clubs? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(__) Yes (__) No

IF YES, could you tell us what they are?

_____

_____

20. Do you think your parents are very interested in politics and public affairs or do you think they aren't that interested? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(__) I think they are very interested
(__) I think they are quite interested
(__) I think they aren't very interested
(__) I think they aren't interested at all

21. Do you think you will take part in other kinds of political activity besides voting when you are older? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(___) Yes (__) No

IF YES, could you tell us what sorts of things you have in mind?

_____

_____

22. Some people, although not FORMALLY members of a political party, call themselves supporters of a particular party. Other people call themselves independents or say they don't care about parties. What do you consider yourself? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(__) C onservative
(__) Labor
(__) Liberal
(__) Some other party (Please say which) _____

_____

(__) Independent
(__) Don't care

23. If you don't consider yourself a supporter of a particular party, is there one party you seem to favor at this time? If so, which one is that?

(__) Conservative
(__) Labor
(__) Liberal
(__) Some other party (Please say which _____

_____

24. What is your father's occupation? That is, what kind of work does he do? (If your father is not alive or you don't live with him, what is the occupation of your male guardian? If you don't have a male

(PLEASE TURN OVER)

guardian what is your mother's occupation? Please say if you are putting down your mother's job.)

Tell as well as you can what your father does in that occupation. _____

_____

Does he work for someone else or does he have his own firm? (TICK ONE ANSWER)

(__) He works for some else
(__) He has his own firm

Finally, do you think you could tell us the names of three political party leaders in Great Britain and the parties to which they belong?

	LEADER	POLITICAL PARTY
1.	_____	_____
2.	_____	_____
3.	_____	_____

APPENDIX C

THE DEFERENCE SCALE: RESULTS OF THE FACTOR ANALYSIS

The factor analytic technique which assisted in the development of the final deference scale was based upon the Pearson r correlation matrix presented below. While an argument can be made against the use of such a statistic on essentially ordinal data, it was used in this study for two reasons. Firstly, at the time the study was conducted, the only factor analysis programs available to the author were those using a Pearson correlation matrix. Secondly, it was felt that the use of this statistic (especially on dichotomized data) would not bias the substantive results in any important way. See Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, Participation in America: Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), p. 405 on this point

Correlation Matrix for the Nine Original Deference Items*

Item Number:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
2	32							
3	23	18						
4	21	21	14					
5**	03	08	01	07				
6	12	06	15	15	03			
7	-05	-05	00	-11	04	03		
8	14	13	15	09	-01	09	07	
9	10	15	13	17	02	03	11	-07

*See Table 10.1 for the wording of these items

**Question 5 was dichotomized as follows: a great deal or quite a bit was considered a non-deferential reply, some and little or none were considered a deferential reply.

The Principal Components Loading Matrix was as Follows:

Item Number:	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
1	54	-07	18	-10
2	52	-06	06	-24
3	40	10	13	07
4	49	-18	-30	17
5	08	-02	-01	00
6	26	04	11	34
7	-04	45	02	02
8	27	15	12	05
9	31	30	-28	10

The variable communalities were as follows:

Item Number	
1	34
2	34
3	18
4	40
5	01
6	20
7	21
8	11
9	28